Kemper v. Lots In the City of Ashley

• Decision Date: 28 September 1887
• Citation: 13 N.E. 556,122 Ill. 297
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. KEMPER v. LOTS IN THE CITY OF ASHLEY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

122 Ill. 297

13 N.E. 556

PEOPLE ex rel. KEMPER

v.LOTS IN THE CITY OF ASHLEY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 28, 1887.

Appeal from county court, Washington county; GEORGE VERNOR, Judge.

This was an application to the county court of Washington county for judgment for taxes against certain lands and lots returned delinquent by the collector of that county. Objections were filed by John L. Sargent and others as follows:

‘Comes John L. Sargent, and files objections to judgment being rendered against lots 18 and 19, block 6, Ashley; and for special objections says: Excess in assessment,-lot 18 assessed at $25; lot 19 assessed at $300; when lot 18 should have been assessed at $12, and lot 19 should have been assessed at $125.

JOHN L. SARGENT.

‘ May 17, 1886.’

Objections of M. Kerstine and 26 other tax-payers as follows:

‘IN COUNTY COURT, MAY TERM, 1886.

‘ State of Illinois, Washington County-ss.: In matter of application for judgment against delinquent lands and lots. Now come the undersigned, owners of real estate hereinafter described, limited their appearance for that purpose, and resist application for following reasons: First, because there was no sufficient notice of application; second, because valuation of the real estate being unjust, erroneous, and excessive in the extreme, and the said owners were induced not to appear before the county board to have assessment corrected, by the false and fraudulent statements of the assessor that he was assessing said property at the same figure as had been done the year prior; third, because of want of uniformity in assessment; fourth, because the amount of assessed valuation was increased by the assessor, after same was listed, without notice to owners; fifth, because, in fact, no assessed valuation was ever made or fixed by the local assessor.’

Then follows description of property owned by objectors, with the assessments of 1884 and 1885. Objections signed by land-owners, per Forman & Watts, attorneys.

Upon hearing, the court, against the collector, permitted the objectors to introduce evidence as follows:

D. C. Rose, being duly sworn, stated that he was deputy assessor in the year 1885 for the S. 1/2 of township 2 S., range 1 W., in Washington county, Illinois, in which territory the lands of said objectors are situated; that he fixed the values of lands at their fair cash value, as understood by him; that he did not understand he was making any assessment at all; that he thought the county board or assessor would make the assessment from his figures, and that he told parties assessed that their assessment would be about as the year before, which would be one-third of his figures. On cross-examination, said Rose stated that he placed his figures in a book furnished him by the county assessor, in the column headed ‘Fair Cash Value;’ that he supposed the county board or county assessor would reduce these figures to one-half, or one-third, or whatever proportion would be necessary to raise the requisite amount of taxes; that whenever asked about the matter by land-owners he told them that his figures were the fair cash value, and that the county board or county assessor would reduce them to one-half or one-third, or whatever proportion might be necessary to raise the requisite amount of taxes; that as a matter of fact he made no false or fraudulent representations, unless these statements honestly made amount to fraudulent representations. Hugh P. Green, on oath, stated that he was assessor of Washington county, Illinois; that D. C. Rose was one of his deputies, and as such deputy assessed the property of objectors, together with other property; that all his deputies received their books and instructions in a body, at the same time, and were instructed to assess real estate at about one-third its fair cash value, and to put it in the column marked ‘Fair Cash Value;’ that Rose was present with the others, and heard these instructions; that real estate assessed by other deputies was assessed at about one-third its fair cash value. J. P. M. Harrison on oath stated that the mill property was valued in his presence, as one of the owners, at $15,000, and that Rose told him the final assessment would be $5,000; and that the assessment of property would be one-third of his figures. Other witnesses were offered, but it was admitted that they would swear substantially the same as Harrison, as to the manner of assessing done by Rose.

The judgment of the court is in the usual form, except as to lands and lots of objectors, and, after describing such lots and lands, is as follows: ‘On all the above lots, parts of lots, tracts, or parts of tracts, or parcels of real estate, judgment is rendered for one-third of the amount for which judgment is applied, and judgment is refused as to the other two-thirds, and the sheriff and ex officio collector to be credited with the other two-thirds.’ From the judgment so rendered, as to the tracts and lots of objectors, the collector prosecutes this appeal.Chas. T. Moore, State's Atty., for appellant.

Forman & Watts, for objectors.

SHOPE, J.

The questions presented by this record, involving the correctness of the judgment for taxes against the lots and tracts of land therein mentioned, arises upon the assessment of such lots and tracts. All other requirements of the statute, precedent to the right of the people to judgments for taxes levied, seem to have been strictly conformed to. The taxes were levied for purposes authorized by law, and within the limit prescribed.

The county court, upon the application for judgment, heard evidence in respect of the assessment, and rendered judgment against the several tracts involved in this appeal, for one-third of the taxes extended against the same severally upon the assessment as returned by the assessor, and refused judgment as to the residue. The constitution provides that ‘the general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needed, by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to his, her, or its property; such value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise.’

The legislature, in counties under township organization, and those not under township organization, has designated and directed the persons who shall determine the value of property for the purposes of taxation, and prescribed the method, not only for the ascertainment and certification of such values, but also for the correction of any errors that may have been made in the assessment. Revenue Act, §§ 76, 84, 90, 97, Starr & C. St. 2052 et seq. The second clause of section 97 provides that the county board, at its July meeting, shall, ‘on the application of any person considering himself aggrieved, or who shall complain that the property of another is assessed too low, * * * review the assessment, and correct the same...