Kempner v. Huntsville State Bank

Decision Date08 February 1926
Docket Number(No. 8739.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
Citation282 S.W. 325
PartiesKEMPNER et al. v. HUNTSVILLE STATE BANK.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from Harris County Court; Roy F. Campbell, Judge.

Action by the Huntsville State Bank against I. H. Kempner and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed and rendered.

Williams, Neethe & Williams, of Galveston, for appellants.

Vinson, Elkins, Sweeton & Weems, of Houston, for appellee.

GRAVES, J.

Appellants' brief statement of the nature and result of the suit is accepted by the appellee as being correct:

"This appeal is taken from the judgment of the county court at law No. 2 of Harris county for the sum of $325.73, with interest thereon from September 30, 1922, rendered in favor of the Huntsville State Bank, appellee, against appellants I. H. Kempner, D. W. Kempner, R. L. Kempner, S. E. Kempner, and J. Seinsheimer, doing business under the trade-name of H. Kempner. The action was brought against appellants and in the alternative against one J. R. Jordan to recover the amount named in the judgment, which the appellee claimed to have advanced or paid upon a draft for that amount drawn on appellants by Jordan, who was alleged to have been an agent for appellants and acting as such in drawing the draft and obtaining the money thereon from appellee; it being further alleged that if in fact Jordan was not an agent of appellants, then appellants had so held him out as such, and had by honoring other drafts drawn on them by him so misled appellant as to be estopped from denying the authority of Jordan to, as their agent, draw the draft in suit. A further statement of the pleadings will be made below. The case was submitted to a jury on special issues, and upon the verdict returned judgment was, on motion of appellee, rendered against appellants, as above stated, Jordan having been by appellee dismissed from the suit."

The further elaboration of the pleadings referred to need not be made; it being sufficient for determination of the appeal to recite that appellants, under oath, denied any connection with or responsibility for the draft in suit, through Jordan or otherwise, asserting that he had neither been authorized to nor did execute any such instrument as their agent, and that they received no money or benefit of any sort therefrom.

In answer to the special issues, which embodied inquiries about those matters, the jury found that L. L. Kelly, about September 1, 1922, for the firm of H. Kempner, made an agreement with J. R. Jordan to buy cotton for Kempner in Walker county and draw drafts on them for the purchase price; that in making such contract he acted within both the actual and the apparent scope of his authority; that the firm ratified and confirmed the contract; that Jordan in drawing the draft for $325.73 acted as the agent of H. Kempner within both the actual and apparent scope of his authority; and that the appellee bank in cashing such draft believed from the conduct and dealing of the Kempner firm that Jordan was authorized as its agent to draw the draft.

As the summary of its pleadings has indicated, the bank sought to hold Kempners solely on the theory that Jordan either was their agent in drawing the draft through and getting the money thereon from it, or if not so in fact, that as a result of their conduct they were estopped to deny that relationship to him.

Appellants do not attack the jury's findings as being against the weight of the evidence, but insist only that there was no competent evidence showing either that the draft sued on was drawn by or the proceeds thereof paid to any agent of theirs, or that any acts, omissions, or conduct of theirs estopped them from so saying. This, therefore, is the sole question the appeal presents, and after carefully reviewing the statement of facts, we conclude that appellants are right about it.

The draft involved bore date of September 30, 1922, was for the $325.73, recited "statement attached," and was signed simply "J. R. Jordan." Attached to it was a letter likewise dated, addressed, and signed, reading:

Below hand you statement of ginning, insurance, sampling, and weighing, chargeable to the four shipments as follows, viz.:

                31 B/C marked W.L.D. ..................  $ 95 88
                40 B/C marked U.L.D. ..................    98 46
                65 B/C marked L.O.U. ..................    11 31
                15 B/C marked T.I.P. ..................    32 08
                                                         _______
                                                         $325 73
                

It will be noted from this statement that the sum the draft evidenced was the aggregate of "ginning, insurance, sampling, and weighing" on four different lots of cotton, amounting to a total of 151 bales, which was otherwise shown to have been shipped the week before to Kempner by Mr. Jordan under drafts for the purchase price thereof, which he had already paid, with bills of lading therefor attached, Kempner having paid the drafts and so gotten the cotton on the bills of lading; so that the draft sued on was exclusively for "ginning, insurance, sampling, and weighing" that accrued at the point of origin — that is, up in Walker county—on this cotton, which had previously been bought there by Mr. Jordan and so shipped to and received at Galveston by Kempner.

Mr. Jordan testified that he was buying the cotton in Walker county for Kempner under an agreement to that effect he made with the latter's representative, Mr. L. L. Kelly, and that in doing so he would, by his own checks on the Huntsville State Bank, pay the sellers the agreed price, less these "ginning, insurance, sampling, and weighing" charges, ship the cotton right on to Kempner under a draft payable to the appellee, with attached bill of lading for the actual amount he had paid out to the sellers, and then on the following week would get a statement of these charges thereon and make separate draft on Kempners for that, which they always paid; that the transaction here involved was of that character, was carried out under that cotton buying agreement, and this draft was the only one turned down in their business together. He never at any time, however, said that he was the agent of Kempners, but limited his relation to them to the agreement he had through Mr. Kelly to buy cotton for them, and on cross-examination thus defined its terms:

"I was not working on a salary for Kempner. I did not get any commission out of these cotton factors. I made a mistake of working for nothing. A fellow buying cotton has a limit, a price given the same day, and he has got to buy it under that to make anything for himself, deducting the usual loss in weight, which is about six pounds on green cotton early in the season, and a few points of exchange; the bank has to weigh it too; then freight, you know. I would get the limit from Mr. Marquez, which would mean they were offering a certain price for cotton. I would then go and buy cotton from whoever happened to have it for a less price than I sold it to Kempner and make the difference. The limit was the price that Kempner was to pay me for cotton landed at Galveston, which meant that I had to bear the freight to Galveston and other charges against the cotton, and the class and weight should be fixed at Galveston; it was to be delivered to Galveston. When I would buy up cotton under a certain limit, it is a fact that I would take out the bill of lading from the railroad company and would make out an invoice and attach those two documents to a draft on Kempner at the Galveston weights and class. If my draft was more than the cotton was worth after it was classed and weighed down there, I would owe Kempner the difference. I bought cotton for Kempner's account. Kempner did not have anything to do with the price I paid the farmer or other person I got the cotton from. I fixed the price in buying it; I bought it at enough less to leave me a little profit in it on the limit I got from H. Kempner. I got nothing but the limit from Kempner; I had to use my own judgment in buying."

In buying the cotton, his method was to give his own checks on the Huntsville bank to the sellers, and then next day to draw the drafts for the same amounts on Kempner with the bills of lading for the cotton attached, together with a letter or confirmation of sale, of which this form is typical:

                                 "Huntsville, Tex.-29-1922
                  H. Kempner, Galveston, Texas. — Dear Sirs
                We beg to confirm our sale to you this day by
                  | phone     |                 | 14 A M |
                 of forty (40)  bales
                  | telegraph |                 | 26 P M |
                cotton at price of 21.15 cents per lb., basis
                middling, landed Galveston, your weight and
                grade. Please confirm.   Yours very truly
                                            "J. R.
...

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