Kendrick v. Me. Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 30 June 2021
• Docket Number: Docket no. 2:19-cv-00028-GZS
• Citation: 547 F.Supp.3d 87
• Parties: Susan KENDRICK, Plaintiff, v. MAINE MEDICAL CENTER and MaineHealth, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

547 F.Supp.3d 87

Susan KENDRICK, Plaintiff,

v.MAINE MEDICAL CENTER and MaineHealth, Defendants.

Docket no. 2:19-cv-00028-GZS

United States District Court, D. Maine.

Signed June 30, 2021

Allan K. Townsend, Chad T. Hansen, Maine Employee Rights Group, Portland, ME, for Plaintiff.

Ronald W. Schneider, Jr., Tara A. Walker, Bernstein Shur Sawyer & Nelson, Portland, ME, for Defendants.

ORDER ON PENDING CROSS-MOTIONS

George Z. Singal, United States District Judge

Before the Court are two Cross-Motions: (1) the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Maine Medical Center and MaineHealth (ECF No. 79); and (2) the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Susan Kendrick (ECF No. 83). Having reviewed the Motions and the related submissions filed by the parties (ECF Nos. 72–78, 80–82, 84–85, 91–95 & 100–106), the Court DENIES both Motions.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, a party is entitled to summary judgment if, on the record before the Court, it appears "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine dispute is ‘one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.’ " Flaherty v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 946 F.3d 41, 53 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) ). "A fact is ‘material’ if ‘its existence or nonexistence has the potential to change the outcome of the suit.’ " Tropigas de P.R., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010) ). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party has made this preliminary showing, the nonmoving party must "produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue." Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "Mere allegations, or conjecture unsupported in the record, are insufficient." Barros-Villahermosa v. United States, 642 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Rivera-Marcano v. Normeat Royal Dane Quality A/S, 998 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1993) ); see also Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011) ("A properly supported summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, periphrastic circumlocutions, or rank speculation."). "As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment for the moving party." In re Ralar Distribs., Inc., 4 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 1993). "However, summary judgment is improper when the record is sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve a material factual dispute in favor of either side."

Morales-Melecio v. United States (Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs.), 890 F.3d 361, 368 (1st Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

District of Maine Local Rule 56 prescribes a detailed process by which the parties are to place before the Court the "material facts ... as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue ...." D. Me. Loc. R. 56(b). This local rule further requires each statement of material fact to be "followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion." D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must then file an opposing statement in which it admits, denies, or qualifies the moving party's statements, with citations to supporting evidence, and in which it may set forth additional facts, again with citation to supporting evidence. D. Me. Loc. R. 56(c). Ultimately, in constructing the narrative of undisputed facts for purposes of summary judgment, the Court deems any statement with a supporting record citation admitted but "may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment." Id.

The existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the standard for construing the undisputed facts. Rather, the Court is required to "view each motion separately and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the respective non-moving party." Roman Cath. Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2013). In accordance with these standards, the Court constructs the undisputed material facts from the record in the following section.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Defendant Maine Medical Center ("MMC") is a hospital located in in Portland, Maine. Until January 1, 2019, MMC was a separate subsidiary corporation of Defendant MaineHealth. (Stip. SMF (ECF No. 85-2), PageID # 2361.) On January 1, 2019, MMC merged into MaineHealth.² (Id. )

A. MaineHealth's Anti-Discrimination Policies

MaineHealth maintains an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy ("EEO Policy"), which explains that MaineHealth prohibits discrimination in all aspects of employment based on protected classes and that employees should report discrimination of any kind. (Stip. SMF, PageID # 2361–62.) The EEO Policy further prohibits any retaliation against employees for complaints of discrimination. (Id., PageID # 2362.)

MaineHealth also has a Policy on the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA Policy"), which describes MaineHealth's process for assisting employees who need an accommodation because of a disability. (Id. ) The ADA Policy provides:

If Maine Medical Center is notified that a qualified individual with a disability requests a reasonable accommodation to participate in the application process, perform the essential functions of a job, or enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment, the organization will engage the qualified individual with a disability in the interactive process.

(Id. ) The ADA Policy further provides that MMC will not tolerate any form of retaliation against an employee who makes a request for a disability accommodation or complains of discrimination based on a disability. (Id. )

B. The Clinical Nurse II Position

Plaintiff Susan Kendrick worked as a Clinical Nurse II in MMC's neonatal intensive care unit ("NICU") from 2009 through December 2017. (Stip. SMF, PageID # 2363.) A Clinical Nurse II is a bedside nurse in the NICU, and, in this role, Kendrick was ordinarily assigned to care for two neonates. (Pl. Response SMF (ECF No. 95), PageID # 3147.) The MMC job description for Clinical Nurse II included the following essential functions: (1) "demonstrat[ing] the required knowledge and technical skills to care for most patient populations on the unit," (2) "demonstrat[ing] the development of a caring practice," and (3) "provid[ing] ongoing patient and family education to prepare the patient and family to care for their own needs appropriate to their health status." (Stip. SMF, PageID # 2364.)

As a Clinical Nurse II, Kendrick would typically start the day with a one-on-one report with the nurse who was leaving at the end of his or her shift, and, depending on the needs of the neonates, she would monitor feedings, medications, or other intravenous medications every hour, checking IV injection sites and insertion sites for arterial or central lines. (Id., PageID #s 2363–64.) Kendrick also attended physician rounds and implemented changes to the neonates’ care plans from physician orders, and she would potentially need to leave the unit to accompany her patients for testing, MRI scans, or laboratory work. (Id., PageID # 2364.) However, due to the fragility of the NICU patient population, there was ultimately no typical day for Kendrick and her fellow NICU nurses. (Pl. Response SMF, PageID # 3151.)

As relevant here, Kendrick's performance evaluations for both 2016 and 2017 rated her as "successfully achieves" or "exceeds expectations" on all essential functions of the Clinical Nurse II position. (Def. Reply SMF (ECF No. 100-1), PageID #s 3356–57.)

C. Kendrick's Fragrance Reactions

On March 16, 2016, Kendrick experienced her first "fragrance reaction" while at work in the NICU. (Stip. SMF, PageID # 2364.) Kendrick's pulmonologist has since diagnosed her with a "neurogenic cough," a condition in which certain stimuli, such as fragrances, trigger nerves in a person's throat that cause a person to start coughing.³ (Id. ) Kendrick describes the experience as follows:

I feel it in the back of my throat first, and then I know something's happening. And it causes me to start coughing and protractive coughing. I just cough and cough and cough, and the coughing irritates my throat and makes it really sore. I get a pain in my chest that goes directly down my sternum and seems to follow the lines of my bronchus. I get a headache.

(Id., PageID #s 2364–65.)⁴ During these reactions, Kendrick can experience shortness of breath, loss of bladder control, light-headedness, chest pain, and difficulty talking. (Pl. Response SMF, PageID # 3154.) However, the symptoms Kendrick experiences during a reaction are temporary and cause her no lasting harm. (Def. Response SMF (ECF No. 91-2), PageID # 2742.)

At the onset of her reactions, Kendrick feels an irritation before she can smell the offending fragrance. (Stip. SMF, PageID # 2365.) When Kendrick starts coughing due to a fragrance, she has to leave the area where the fragrance is present or else her coughing will not resolve. (Def. Response SMF, PageID # 2740.) In some cases, Kendrick has been able to quickly finish her current task before leaving the area. (See, e.g., Def. Reply...