Kennedy v. Adf Midatlantic, LLC
| Decision Date | 27 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. JKB-15-0346 |
| Parties | ELLEN D. KENNEDY, Plaintiff v. ADF MIDATLANTIC, LLC et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Ellen D. Kennedy brought this lawsuit against her former employer, originally identified as ADF Pizza I, LLC, and later identified as ADF MidAtlantic, LLC ("ADF"), as well as against Thomas Parks, Jr., her former supervisor. (Compl., ECF No. 1; 2nd Am. Compl., ECF No. 23.)1 Kennedy has sued Defendants for interference with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; retaliation for assertion of her rights under the FMLA; defamation per se; violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and its Maryland counterpart; and wrongful discharge. (Compl.) Defendants have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the litigation and to compel arbitration.(ECF No. 28.) The matter has been briefed (ECF Nos. 29 - 32), and no hearing is necessary, Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). The motion will be denied.
It has been said by Judge Bennett of this Court that "motions to compel arbitration exist in the netherworld between a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment." Caire v. Conifer Value Based Care, LLC, 982 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (D. Md. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, he has said, if "the formation or validity of the arbitration agreement is in dispute, a motion to compel arbitration is treated as one for summary judgment." Id. When addressing a motion for summary judgment, the Court follows this standard:
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to render a verdict in favor of the party opposing the motion, then a genuine dispute of material fact is presented and summary judgment should be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party's] position" is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. The facts themselves, and the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008), who may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading but instead must, by affidavit or other evidentiary showing, set out specific facts showing a genuine dispute for trial,Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Supporting and opposing affidavits are to be made on personal knowledge, contain such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively the competence of the affiant to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
Even though the summary-judgment standard can be applied generally in the current context, the Court notes that Defendants have relied, in part, upon their arguments in which they make factual assertions unsupported by any evidence. In such circumstances, the Court finds the standard for a motion to dismiss—under which the Court accepts as true all factual allegations of the complaint—to be implicated.
Kennedy was formerly employed at the Pizza Hut store, located at 100 Railway Lane, Hagerstown, Maryland (the "Railway Store"). (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) Her employment began in or about May 1992 and ended abruptly on July 11, 2014, when she was terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 20, 21.) In December 2006, Kennedy was employed by ADF as a server. (Id. ¶ 9.) She was promoted to the position of Restaurant General Manager of the Railway Store in March 2010. (Id.) Kennedy alleges she was a model team member of ADF and almost always worked more than 50 hours per week, but she was never paid overtime. (Id. ¶ 10.) She also alleges the Railway Store was recognized for the quality of its operations. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Kennedy alleges she worked a 16-hour shift on July 4, 2014, and after working that shift, she was notified either late that night or in the early morning of July 5 that her father's health was failing. (Id. ¶ 12.) Kennedy's elderly father was the caretaker for Kennedy's mother, who has lung cancer; Kennedy's parents lived in South Carolina, and she provided long-distance care and support to her mother. (Id.) Immediately after learning about her father's rapidly deteriorating health, Kennedy sent a text message to Defendant Parks, who was her immediatesupervisor and area coach, and advised him she would be driving to South Carolina that morning to move her parents into her home in Maryland. (Id. ¶ 13.) Thus, Kennedy's message gave Defendants approximately sixteen hours' notice of the need to have another employee cover her next shift due to her imminent travel plans. (Id.)
Parks responded to Kennedy's text message and told Kennedy she could not take leave from her Saturday, July 5th shift, but would have to wait until Tuesday, July 8th to take leave. (Id. ¶ 14.) Kennedy told Parks she was afraid her mother and/or her father would die before Tuesday, July 8th. (Id.) Parks's "suggested solution was that Mrs. Kennedy[] 'should pray.'" (Id.) Kennedy "[refused] to compromise her parents' health in favor of one shift that could be covered by another employee . . . [and] drove to South Carolina and moved her parents to Maryland." (Id. ¶ 15.) Kennedy alleges that Defendants found coverage for her shifts. (Id.)
(Id. ¶ 17.) Further, Ms. Moynihan said she would provide Parks with the requisite FMLA forms for Kennedy to complete and return to ADF, and she instructed Kennedy to meet with Parks so she could obtain from him the necessary FMLA forms. (Id. ¶ 18.) Kennedy scheduled a meeting with Parks, as instructed by Ms. Moynihan, for July 11, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Instead of providing Kennedy with the FMLA forms, however, Parks fired her, indicating that his reasonwas that her "syrup counts"2 were documented and/or calculated incorrectly. (Id. ¶ 21.) Kennedy alleges Parks's stated reason for firing her was a pretext and that her termination was retaliation for Kennedy's valid request for, and Ms. Moynihan's granting of, FMLA leave. (Id. ¶ 22.) Kennedy also alleges that the "syrup counts" were calculated and reported the same way over the previous four years of her employment, without any issue raised by Parks or anyone else. (Id. ¶ 23.)
After Parks fired Kennedy, he held individual and group meetings with her former coworkers and told them Kennedy had manipulated inventories and the "syrup counts," and his announcements at these meetings portrayed Kennedy as a thief. (Id. ¶ 24.) On the same day Kennedy was fired, Audrey Anderson, a delivery driver at the Railway Store, told a customer that Kennedy was fired because she was stealing from ADF. (Id. ¶ 25.) Kennedy alleges Anderson's falsehood was not an isolated incident (id.), and Kennedy's job search for a replacement position has not been fruitful (id. ¶ 26).
Under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), "[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Consequently, a suit or proceeding brought "upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration" must be stayed by the court upon application by one of the parties and "upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 3.
"Whether a party agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is an issue for judicial determination to be decided as a matter of contract." Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, 148 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986)). State contract law provides the body of law applicable to the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, as well as its scope, and the question of who is bound by the agreement. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009). The parties have not referred to any state law other than Maryland law; as a result, the Court will apply Maryland contract law.
"Maryland adheres to the principle of the objective interpretation of contracts." Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 709 (Md. 2007). Thus, if a contract's language is unambiguous, effect is given to its plain meaning and a court does "not contemplate what the parties may have subjectively intended by certain terms at the time of formation." Id. However, "parol evidence may be used to contravene the legal existence of a contract." Id. n.6. And if a contract is...
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