Kennedy v. Crabtree

• Decision Date: 23 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-00083-KD-B
• Parties: CARLOS EDWARD KENNEDY, # 304105, Petitioner, v. CHADWICK CRABTREE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

CARLOS EDWARD KENNEDY, # 304105, Petitioner,
v.
CHADWICK CRABTREE, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 20-00083-KD-B

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division

January 23, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SONJA F. BIVINS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Carlos Edward Kennedy, an Alabama state prisoner in the custody of Respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). The petition has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R), and Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The undersigned has conducted a careful review of the record and finds that no evidentiary hearing is required to resolve this case.^[1]

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Having carefully considered Kennedy's petition and Respondent's answer and exhibits, the undersigned recommends that Kennedy's habeas petition be DENIED, that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice, and that judgment be entered in favor of Respondent. In the event Kennedy requests a certificate of appealability and seeks to appeal in forma pauperis, the undersigned recommends that said requests be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Carlos Edward Kennedy (“Kennedy”) was charged with indecent exposure for exposing himself to a female corrections officer while incarcerated at the Mobile County Metro Jail (Case No. CC-2016-4142.00). (Doc. 11-1 at 74-75). On June 14, 2017, the case was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, which found Kennedy guilty of indecent exposure as charged in the complaint. (Id. at 20, 137). The court sentenced Kennedy to serve twelve months in the Mobile County Metro Jail and ordered the sentence to run consecutively with Kennedy's existing sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for capital murder (Case No. CC-2011-001569.80). (Id. at 16, 139).

Kennedy appealed his conviction and sentence to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Id. at 25). On appeal, Kennedy, through his appointed appellate counsel, argued that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the fact that he was in jail for and had

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been convicted of capital murder. (Doc. 11-3). On December 8, 2017, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued an unpublished memorandum opinion affirming Kennedy's conviction. (Doc. 11-5). Kennedy did not file an application for rehearing and did not petition the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. (Doc. 1 at 3). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of judgment on December 27, 2017. (Doc. 11-6).

Thereafter, Kennedy filed a Rule 32 petition dated October 12, 2018, along with an in forma pauperis (“IFP”) request dated September 26, 2018, in the Circuit Court of Mobile County. (Doc. 16-1 at 2-14). These documents were stamped filed by the circuit clerk on October 29, 2018. (See id.). Although Kennedy's Rule 32 petition stated that he was challenging his June 14, 2017 conviction for indecent exposure, the petition and accompanying IFP request were docketed in Case No. CC-2011-1569.60, which appears to be associated with Kennedy's capital murder proceedings. (See id. at 2, 5-6, 11-13). On July 3, 2019, the circuit court entered an order in Case No. CC-2011-1569.60 denying Kennedy's IFP request and ordering him “to pay court costs for Rule 32 Petition to be filed.” (Doc. 16-2). On August 11, 2019, Kennedy filed a motion requesting “that the Court issue an Order allowing him to pay the filing fee in portions on a monthly basis.”

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(Doc. 16-3).^[2] In an order dated August 21, 2019, the circuit court denied Kennedy's request for a payment plan without further comment. (Doc. 16-4).

On February 10, 2020,^[3] Kennedy filed the instant petition seeking federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). In ground one of the instant petition, Kennedy claims that he was “[d]enied effective assistance of counsel” because his trial attorney “didn't introduce evidence that contradicted the State's only witness.” (Id. at 6-7). In ground two, Kennedy asserts that he was denied his “right of appeal” because “[d]uring the Rule 32 petition the state court procrastinated every time [he] filed any documents until the one year limitation period had expired.” (Id. at 7). Kennedy's petition indicates that he did not raise either of these claims before the state courts on direct appeal or in a Rule 32 petition, and it states that he has no other petition or appeal currently pending in any court which relates to the judgment being challenged in the instant petition. (Id. at 7, 9).

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Respondent filed an answer asserting that Kennedy's claims are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and procedurally defaulted based on his failure to exhaust them in state court. (Doc. 11). Kennedy's habeas petition is now ripe for consideration.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The Court's review of Kennedy's petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under the AEDPA, “the role of the federal courts is strictly limited.” Jones v. Walker, 496 F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2007). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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Thus, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court arrives at a conclusion contrary to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or decides a case differently from the way the United States Supreme Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts, or if the state court's decision involves an unreasonable factual determination. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-41 (2003) (noting that a federal habeas court will disturb a state court's decision on the merits only if the petitioner shows that the decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established constitutional law as determined by the Supreme Court, or if the decision rested upon an unreasonable factual determination).

“[A] state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). In other words, “if some fairminded jurists could agree with the state court's decision, although others might disagree, federal habeas relief must be denied.... [T]he deference due is heavy and purposely presents a daunting hurdle for a habeas petitioner to clear.” Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1220 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (noting

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that the AEDPA standard is purposely onerous because “federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction”) (quotation omitted); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (noting that the AEDPA standard “is a difficult to meet . . . and highly deferential standard for evaluating statecourt rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”) (quotations omitted).

Accordingly, in evaluating Kennedy's § 2254 petition, the Court takes care to abide by the stricture that “[a] federal court may not grant habeas relief on a claim a state court has rejected on the merits simply because the state court held a view different from its own.” Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1355 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Reese v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1286 (11th Cir. 2012) (“This inquiry is different from determining whether we would decide de novo that the petitioner's claim had merit.”).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel (Ground One).

In ground one of the instant petition, Kennedy claims that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to “introduce evidence that contradicted the State's only witness.” (Doc. 1 at 6-7). Respondent argues that this claim is time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. §

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2244(d)(1), and procedurally defaulted due to Kennedy's failure to raise it in state court.

1. Statute of Limitations.

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1). Under this statute, the limitation period runs from the latest of the following dates:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

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