Kenneth E. Hopkins v. Quality Chevrolet, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | 92-LW-1644,1772 |
| Parties | KENNETH E. HOPKINS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. QUALITY CHEVROLET, INC., Defendant-Appellee Case |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Moore Corzine & Bunch Co., L.P.A., William J. Corzine III Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellants.
Fry & Waller Co., L.P.A., Barry A. Waller and Bryan L. Jeffries, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
DECISION
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Ross County Court of Common Pleas granting relief from a previous default judgment entered in favor of Kenneth E. Hopkins and Joan C. Hopkins, plaintiffs below and appellants herein, on their claim against Quality Chevrolet, Inc., defendant below and appellee herein. Appellants assign the following error for our review:
"The court below abused its discretion in granting appellee's Motion for Relief From Judgment, pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 60."
The record reveals the following facts pertinent to this appeal. Appellants commenced the action below on August 30, 1990, seeking damages for alleged fraud, breach of warranty and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act relative to their purchase of a 1987 Ford van from appellee. Although service of process was completed by certified mail, appellee filed no answer or other responsive pleading to the averments in the complaint. On October 12, 1990, a default judgment was entered against appellee and, thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of damages. On December 13, 1990, a final judgment awarding damages was entered on appellants' claims.
Appellee filed its motion for relief from judgment on January 7, 1991, arguing that it had a meritorious defense to appellants' claims and that its failure to file an answer was the result of inadvertence or excusable neglect thereby warranting relief under Civ. R. 60(B)(1). Several affidavits attached to appellee's motion set forth specific facts in support of these arguments. Appellants filed a memorandum contra arguing, in essence, that appellee had failed to make a sufficient showing of excusable neglect to justify vacating the judgment. On March 11, 1991, the trial court entered its judgment sustaining the motion and granting relief from the judgment previously journalized on December 13, 1990. This appeal followed.[1]
In order to obtain relief from judgment, a party must demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under one of those grounds stated in Civ. R. 60 (B)(1) through (5); that he has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; and that the motion is made within a reasonable time which, for those grounds set forth in Civ. R. 60(B)(1)-(3), means not more than one year after judgment was entered. Argo Plastic Products Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 389, 391; Svoboda v. Brunswick (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 348, 351; GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St. 2d 146 at paragraph two of the syllabus. A failure to establish any one of these three requirements will cause the motion to be overruled. Rose Chevrolet. Inc. v. Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 17, 20; Argo Plastic Products, supra at 391.
In their brief, appellants concede that the latter two requirements necessary to obtain relief from judgment were adequately shown by appellee. However, appellants argue that appellee failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to relief under one of those grounds set forth in Civ. R. 60(B)(1)-(5). Thus, appellants conclude, the trial court erred in granting relief.
Initially, we note that a motion for relief from judgment is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that court's ruling cannot be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St. 3d 75, 77. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment, it implies an attitude which is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Wilmington Steel Products, Inc. v. Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. (1991), 60 Ohio St. 3d 120, 122; Cedar Bay Const., Inc. v. Fremont (1990), 50 Ohio St. 3d 19, 22; Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448 at paragraph two of the syllabus. After a thorough review of the record, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion.
The gravamen of appellee's argument in its motion for relief from judgment, and in its brief on appeal, was that the failure to file an answer in the case below occurred as a result of "excusable neglect" as provided for under Civ. R. 60(B)(1). In support of this position, the affidavit of Richard P. Nourse, President of appellee, was attached to the motion. Mr. Nourse attested that, in the ordinary course of appellee's business, all legal matters were to be referred to the General Manager, Mr. David Hendrix, or to himself. The affidavit further set forth that the summons and complaint, previously served on appellee, had not been placed on his desk until December 17, 1990, and that neither he, nor Mr. Hendrix, were aware that the action was pending before that date.[2] Finally, Mr. Nourse attested that he had "reason to believe" that a specific former employee had failed to forward the summons and complaint to his supervisor so that the appropriate steps could be taken. This particular employee had been dismissed on December 14, 1990, for, among other reasons, failing "to thoroughly follow up on jobs assigned to him." On the basis of these sworn statements, the trial court found that appellee had made a Sufficient demonstration of "excusable neglect."
The concept of "excusable neglect" must be construed in keg with the proposition that Civ. R. 60(B) (1) is a remedial rule to be liberally construed. See Colley v. BaseIl (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 243, 248; Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 9, 12. There is no bright line test to determine whether a party's neglect was excusable or inexcusable. Rather a determination of excusable neglect will turn on the facts and circumstances presented in each case. Colley, supra at 249. Given the attestations in the affidavit of Mr. Nourse, we are persuaded that the court below could reasonably conclude that appellee's inaction was a result of "excusable neglect."
This holding is consistent with the principle that relief from default judgment may be granted on the basis of excusable neglect when service is properly made on a corporation but a corporate employee fails to forward the summons and complaint to the appropriate person. See Sycamore Messenger, Inc. v. Cattle Barons, Inc. (1986), 31 Ohio App. 3d 196, 197; Enhanced Systems, Inc. v. CBM Computer Center (Jul. 20, 1989), Cuyahoga App. No. 56978, unreported. Appellant urges us to reject the holding in these cases and argues that to allow relief from judgment on the basis that a complaint never reached the proper party in charge of legal matters would provide a ready excuse for any corporate party which, for any reason, seeks to vacate a default judgment. This, appellee concludes, would undermine the judicial process and the finality of judgments. We are not persuaded.
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