Kenneth P. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 16 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-05628-RMI |
| Parties | KENNETH P., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff, seeks judicial review of an administrative law judge ("ALJ") decision denying his application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's unfavorable decision was denied by the Appeals Council, thus, the ALJ's decision is the "final decision" of the Commissioner of Social Security which this court may review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge (dkts. 7 & 8), and both parties have moved for summary judgment (dkts. 14 & 15). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, and Defendant's motion is denied.
The Commissioner's findings "as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court has a limited scope of review and can only set aside a denial of benefits if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). The phrase"substantial evidence" appears throughout administrative law and directs courts in their review of factual findings at the agency level. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 1154 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 1997). "In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence," a district court must review the administrative record as a whole, considering "both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The Commissioner's conclusion is upheld where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
On April 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income, alleging an onset date of September 1, 2013. See Administrative Record "AR" at 15.2 As set forth in detail below, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled and denied the application on July 2, 2018. Id. at 36. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on July 10, 2019. See id. at 1-4. Thereafter, on September 6, 2019, Plaintiff sought review in this court (dkt. 1), contending, inter alia, that the ALJ erred by failing to consider a number of his mental impairments at Step Two and beyond, as well as by improperly weighing the evidence. See Pl.'s Mot. (dkt. 14) at 12-14. Defendant contends that the evidence was correctly weighed, and that any errors committed by the ALJ at Step Two are harmless. See Def.'s Mot. (dkt. 20) at 9-10.
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Plaintiff has a lengthy history of suffering mental illness and being subjected to psychiatric hospitalizations which long predates his alleged onset date. See AR at 472. He was hospitalized for several days in 1993 due to depression and suicidality, as well as attending a 20-week mental health program in 2003, albeit in an outpatient clinical setting. Id. Now in his late 40s - Plaintiff has experienced sporadic homelessness since 2007, he has attempted suicide on multiple occasions, and, he has been admitted for psychiatric hospitalization on more than a few occasions (particularly during the period between 2013 and 2014). See id. at 594. In November of 2007, he underwent a consultative examination by Faith Tobias, Ph.D., in the course of which, Dr. Tobias noted Plaintiff's history of auditory hallucinations, his history of paranoid and suicidal ideations, as well as his history of bipolar disorder and attention-deficit / hyperactivity ("ADHD") disorder. Id. at 464, 466. Dr. Tobias noted Plaintiff's manifestation of depressive symptoms, anxiety symptoms, and psychotic symptoms, in that during the course of the evaluation, Id. at 467. Ultimately, in 2007, Dr. Tobias diagnosed Plaintiff with a mood disorder attended with psychotic features, explaining that the condition would cause mild to moderate impairment in Plaintiff's ability to withstand stress, maintain emotional stability, or interact with others. Id.
In May of 2009, Plaintiff was admitted to the John George Psychiatric Hospital and was treated by Heather Clague, M.D., for depression and bipolar disorder. Id. at 842-43. Dr. Clague noted Plaintiff's history of suicide attempts, one of which involved Plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt at taking his own life by cutting his wrists; in which regard, he said to Dr. Clague, "[i]t doesn't work, I can't seem to die." Id. at 842. Dr. Clague also noted that Plaintiff reported disturbing nightmares (several times a week) that were related to his sexual victimization as a child. Id. Plaintiff was discharged the same day following a diagnosis for bipolar disorder, but his exit evaluation noted his continued risk for suicide. Id. at 844-45.
Two years later, in 2011, he was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital during a72-hour period for fear that he was a danger to himself. Id. at 866. During the same period, in March of 2011, he underwent a second consultative evaluation with Dr. Tobais. Id. at 471-74. In the course of this evaluation, Dr. Tobias administered cognitive function examinations and while finding Plaintiff's full scale IQ score to be situated within the average range, Plaintiff's scores reflected borderline intellectual functioning in the following categories: processing speed, visuomotor skills, coordination, cognitive flexibility, concentration, psychomotor speed, attention, symbol searching, and coding. Id. at 473. Once again, Dr. Tobias found that Plaintiff exhibited a "mood that was moderately to markedly depressed, and [that] he was frequently tearful." Id. at 474. Thus, Plaintiff was now diagnosed with major depressive disorder, and Dr. Tobias opined that he was mildly impaired in his ability to maintain adequate pace or persistence to perform even one-step tasks that were simple and repetitive; as well as being mildly to moderately impaired in his ability to interact with others; and, that he was moderately to markedly impaired in his ability to withstand the stress of a routine workday, or to maintain emotional stability and predictability. Id.
Two years later, in December of 2013, Plaintiff was admitted to psychiatric hospitalization for another overnight stay due to his "acutely worsened depression and anxiety, accompanied by suicidality, in the setting of [a] recent loss of relationship." Id. at 867, 869. His history of suicide attempts and ideations, as well as his history of depression and anxiety were noted; and, this time, Michael Vilania, M.D., diagnosed Plaintiff with depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, finding him a danger to himself in that he continued to occupy a high level of risk for suicide. Id. at 867-69. Upon discharge, Plaintiff's condition was noted as being marked with hopelessness and impulsivity, such that he continued to occupy a high risk of suicidality. Id. at 870.
Less than four months later, in March of 2014, he was once again admitted to the psychiatric hospital due to suicidality and - despite doctors' difficulty in interviewing him due to the fact that he was sleeping and could not be roused - he was again diagnosed with anxiety and depression. Id. at 859. After an overnight stay, Plaintiff was examined again and discharged by Thomas Yun, M.D., with Dr. Yun noting that Plaintiff continued to be at risk for suicide because he continued to experience psychosis and acute stressors. Id. at 861-862, 864. A few weeks later,in April of 2014, Plaintiff was back in the psychiatric hospital for depression and suicidal ideations that had come close to implementation; Plaintiff told doctors that he had tried to stab himself with something sharp. Id. at 852. Undergoing treatment by Sandhya Dubey, M.D., he was diagnosed with depressive disorder, and he was once again deemed to be a danger to himself due to his persistent suicidal ideations, which, this time, had been attended with a specific plan. Id. at 853. After one night of hospitalization, coupled with being medicated with Risperidone (designed to treat schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and irritability) Plaintiff was discharged when Erick Rizzotto, M.D., noted that his agitation had decreased and his condition had stabilized. Id. at 854. Again, upon discharge, his treatment providers noted the persistence of his suicidal ideations, his hopelessness, and his poor social support. Id. at 856. In September of 2015, he was once again admitted to the same psychiatric hospital, treated by Michael Hoeffer, M.D., he was diagnosed with a depressive disorder, and medicated him with Ativan (an anti-anxiety medication). Id. at 847-49. Upon discharge, his treatment providers noted his history of suicide attempts, as well as his suicidal ideations. Id. at 850.
During this period - namely, from 2013 to 2015 - Plaintiff's physicians (notably, Christopher Zamani, M.D.) at the Native American Health Center consistently diagnosed him with a chronic variety of each of the following mental illnesses: bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). Id. at 489-91, 495-96, 498-500. A few months later, in March of 2016, he was again diagnosed...
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