Kenneth S. Sales v. Res-Care, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2021
• Docket Number: C/A No.: 3:18-cv-03591-JFA-JDA
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Kenneth S. Sales, Plaintiff, v. Res-Care, Inc., Arbor E&T, LLC, and Lisa Giacco, individually and as an employee and/or agent of Res-Care, Inc., Defendants.

Kenneth S. Sales, Plaintiff, v. Res-Care, Inc., Arbor E&T, LLC, and Lisa Giacco,

individually and as an employee and/or agent of Res-Care, Inc., Defendants.

C/A No.: 3:18-cv-03591-JFA-JDA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

March 30, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kenneth S. Sales ("Plaintiff") filed this action against his former employer, Arbor E&T, LLC ("Arbor"), wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Res-Care, Inc. ("Res-Care"), and the Regional HR Manager Lisa Giacco ("Giacco") (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff's action alleges race and sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act"), as amended; race discrimination under Title VI of the Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and several state law claims. (ECF No. 11).

All pretrial proceedings in this case, including the instant motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 52), were referred to a Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.).

The Magistrate Judge assigned to this action¹ prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation ("Report") and opines that this Court should grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims under Title VI, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well as Plaintiff's state law defamation claim. The Magistrate Judge also recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. (ECF No. 62). The Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation.

Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report. (ECF No. 67). Defendants filed their reply. (ECF No. 68). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). Inthe absence of specific objections to portions of the Report of the Magistrate Judge, this court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the court must only review those portions of the Report to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).

"An objection is specific if it 'enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.'" Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must "direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).

"Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object." Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court reviews portions "not objected to—including those portions to which only 'general and conclusory' objections have been made—for clear error." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47).

The legal standard employed in a motion for summary judgment is well-settled and correctly stated within the Report. Accordingly, that standard is incorporated herein without a recitation.

III. DISCUSSION

In the Report, the Magistrate Judge first recommended the Court grant summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims against Giacco under Title VII and Title VI because Title VII does not permit discrimination or retaliation claims against individual defendants, see Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc. 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998) ("supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations"), and because Giacco is not a program or activity that has received any federal funds within the meaning of Title VI, see Windsor v. Bd. of Educ. Of Prince George's Cty., No. TDC-14-2287, 2016 WL 4939294, at *9 (D. Md. Sept. 13, 2016) (dismissing Title VI claims against the individual defendants). Plaintiff did not file objections on this ground and Defendants request the Court adopt the Report in full. In the absence of specific objections to the Report of the Magistrate Judge, the Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Therefore, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation on this ground.

Next, the Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims that he was terminated on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because he has no evidence of a causal link between his discharge and his race. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's determination that the Plaintiff has not proffered evidence to support an inference that there was a connection between hisrace and Plaintiff's discharge because Lamb is not a true comparator. As the Fourth Circuit has noted, where a plaintiff attempts to rely on comparator evidence to establish circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, there must be "enough common features between the individuals to allow [for] a meaningful comparison." Haywood v. Locke, 387 F.App'x 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007)). See also Ketema v. Midwest Stamping, Inc., 180 F.App'x 427, 428 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment where evidence was insufficient to show proposed comparators were similarly situated). In spite of Plaintiff's accurate assertion in his objections that comparator evidence is not strictly required to prove discrimination, he continues to argue that he was treated less favorably than Lamb. Further, Plaintiff has failed to present any alternative evidence to support his claims. Plaintiff's objection is overruled and the Court adopts the Report on this ground.

The Magistrate Judge further recommends granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims that he was terminated because of his sex and that he was denied certain resources for the same reason. The Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff failed to identify a valid comparator who was treated more favorably for similar offenses. Plaintiff's claims assert that because of his sex, Defendants denied his requests to either provide his office with an in-house human relations representative or provide him with additional human resources ("HR") training. However, Plaintiff failed to provide evidence showing that the denial of his HR requests amounted to an adverse employment action. Further, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that Plaintiff cannot establish his gender discriminationclaim because Murphy was not similarly situated. As with Lamb, Murphy was not in a leadership role and the allegations against her at the time of the investigation—that she acted overly familiar with Lamb—were not similar to Plaintiff's statements.

The Report also recommends granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim of retaliation. The Magistrate Judge considered that although Plaintiff complained about the denials of his HR requests, he admitted in his deposition that he never made any complaints that he was being treated differently based on his race or sex. Plaintiff also did not point to anything in the record indicating that he did complain of race or sex discrimination. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge noted that even assuming Plaintiff established a prima facie case, Defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims challenging his termination because Defendants have offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory explanation for the termination—Plaintiff's inappropriate statements. Moreover, Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that this explanation is actually a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

Plaintiff's objections to the foregoing raise numerous factual arguments to the Report. In their reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's objections fail to adhere to the requirements of Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure such that Plaintiff has waived the right to de novo review of the Report. Plaintiff's objections aver that the Report fails to consider the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff and that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending that summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's federaldiscrimination claims and state law defamation claim. (ECF No. 67).² The Court agrees that substantial portions of Plaintiff's objections are nonspecific or conclusory disagreements with the Report and addresses only those arguments warranting de novo review.

Plaintiff objects to the Report on the basis that the Report erroneously fails to analyze the race and sex claims in...