Kennett v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-1004,19-1004 |
| Parties | MICHELE KENNETT, individually and on behalf of the Rule 23 Class, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. BAYADA HOME HEALTH CARE, INC., Defendant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
(D. Colo.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Before HOLMES, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Bayada Home Health Care, Inc. ("Bayada") appeals from the district court's order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting Plaintiff-Appellee Michele Kennett's ("Ms. Kennett") cross-motion for summary judgment. The parties' dispute centers on the scope of Colorado's wage-and-hour regulations.
Under Colorado's Minimum Wage Order (the "Wage Order"), employers must pay their employees time-and-a-half wages for overtime work, with some job classifications exempted from the overtime requirement.1 The scope of one of those exemptions—the "companionship exemption"—is the subject of this case. Under the companionship exemption, employers need not pay overtime to "companions, casual babysitters, and domestic employees employed by households or family members to perform duties in private residences." 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1103-1:5 (2019).2 The question before us is whether the phrase"employed by households or family members to perform duties in private residences" (referred to herein as the "household modifier") modifies only "domestic employees" or all three occupations—that is, also includes "companions" and "casual babysitters." If the former (i.e., modifies only "domestic employees")—the reading Bayada advances—then all companions, irrespective of the nature of their employer, are exempt from the overtime requirement. If the latter (i.e., modifies all three occupations)—the reading Ms. Kennett advances—then only companions employed directly by households or family members, as opposed to companions employed by all types of employers, including third-party employers like Bayada, are exempt.
Unfortunately for Ms. Kennett, we resolved this issue in a recent, published decision, Jordan v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., wherein we concluded that "the companionship exemption applies to all companions—including those employed by third-party employers." 950 F.3d 724, 731 (10th Cir. 2020). We are bound by this decision, which governs all salient issues in this case. Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Bayada is a healthcare company that provides in-home nursing services to its clients. Ms. Kennett worked for Bayada as a Home Health Aide ("HHA"). Itis undisputed that Ms. Kennett and her fellow HHAs were "companions" under Colorado law and that Bayada did not pay them overtime. Ms. Kennett filed a class action complaint against Bayada on behalf of herself and other HHAs for allegedly violating the Wage Order by failing to pay overtime. Bayada moved for summary judgment on the ground that the HHAs fall under the Wage Order's companionship exemption for overtime pay. Ms. Kennett cross-moved for summary judgment on the basis that the HHAs do not fall under the companionship exemption.
The district court denied Bayada's motion and granted Ms. Kennett's cross-motion. In reaching its decision, the district court held that the "only grammatically sound reading of the statute . . . dictates that the household [modifier] is equally applicable to the antecedents 'companions' and 'casual babysitters' as it is to 'domestic employees.'" Aplt.'s App., Vol. III, at 525a (). The district court also found that its holding was supported by the series-qualifier canon, and that the Colorado Division of Labor's (the "Division") contrary interpretation of the regulation was not entitled to any deference. Id. at 525a-531a. Consequently, the district court held that the Wage Order's companionship exemption did not apply to Bayada's HHAs because they were not employed directly by a household or family member. Bayada now appeals from this decision.
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. See, e.g., Nielson v. Ketchum, 640 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment will be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Cross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does not require the grant of another." Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1979)). We also review the district court's "conclusions on legal issues de novo . . . and need not defer to its decisions on questions of law." Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting City of Wichita v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 72 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996)).
"In a diversity case like this one, [where] the substance . . . is a matter of state law . . . . our task is 'not to reach [our] own judgment regarding the substance of the common law, but simply to ascertain and apply the state law.'" Id. at 1295 () (quoting Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2003)). Critically for this appeal, "we are bound by 'our own precedent interpreting a state's law.'" Jordan, 950 F.3d at 731 (quoting United States v. Badger, 818 F.3d 563, 569 (10th Cir. 2016)); seealso Kokins, 621 F.3d at 1295 .
At issue in this appeal is whether "companions," like Ms. Kennett, who are employed by third-party employers, fall within the Wage Order's companionship exemption. Bayada contends that they do because the household modifier applies only to "domestic employees"—therefore, all companions are exempt, including those employed by third-party employers. Bayada reaches this conclusion by arguing that (1) the Wage Order is ambiguous; (2) the district court should have applied the last-antecedent rule instead of the series-qualifier canon of statutory construction in construing the Wage Order; and (3) the Division's interpretation of the companionship exemption as applying to all companions, including those employed by third-party employers, is entitled to deference.
Ms. Kennett contends the opposite. That is, she contends that companions employed by third-party employers do not fall within the Wage Order's companionship exemption because the household modifier applies to "domestic employees," "babysitters," and "companions." More specifically, Ms. Kennett argues the district court correctly concluded that (1) the Wage Order isunambiguous; (2) the Wage Order's plain meaning, as elucidated by applying the series-qualifier canon, compels a finding that only companions employed by households or family members are exempt from overtime payments; and (3) the Division's interpretation of the Wage Order and the companionship exemption is not entitled to deference.
We are constrained to conclude that, generally speaking, Bayada has the better of the argument. As noted supra, we recently addressed the issue of the companionship exemption's breadth in Jordan v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc.3 In Jordan, we held that the Wage Order's companionship exemption covers all companions, including those employed by third-party employers. See 950 F.3d at 731. That holding governs this case. We therefore reverse the district court's contrary judgment.
We explain our holding in three steps, relying on our analysis in Jordan along the way. First, we conclude that the Wage Order is ambiguous. Second, we hold that the district court erred by applying the series-qualifier canon. Third, we conclude that the Division's interpretation, even if not entitled to deference, is at least persuasive authority.
"Colorado law governs '[o]ur interpretation and application of the Wage Order' and, more specifically, of the companionship exemption." Jordan, 950 F.3d at 731 (alteration in original) (quoting Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line, Inc., 820 F.3d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 2016)). Under Colorado law, "we interpret the companionship exemption according to Colorado's ordinary rules of statutory interpretation." Id. "The primary goal of interpretation is to 'give effect to the intent of the enacting body.'" Id. at 732 (quoting United States v. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173, 1185 (10th Cir. 2015)). To accomplish our goal, we "look to the plain meaning of the [regulatory] language and consider it within the context of the [regulation] as a whole." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2011)). But "to the extent that the language of a [regulation] is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, and is therefore considered ambiguous, a substantial body of interpretive aids . . . is available to assist in determining which of these reasonable understandings embodies the [enacting body's] intent." People v. Opana, 395 P.3d 757, 760 (Colo. 2017) (citations omitted).
At the times of the events at issue here, Colorado's Wage Order exempted from its overtime provisions "companions, casual babysitters, and domestic employees employed by households or family members to perform duties in private residences." 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1103-1:5. Bayada argues that thedistrict court erred when it held that the "only grammatically sound reading of th...
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