Kennoy v. Graves

• Citation: 300 S.W.2d 568
• Parties: J. S. KENNOY, d/b/a Kennoy & Company, Appellant, v. Charles M. GRAVES, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 29 March 1957
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

Page 568

300 S.W.2d 568

J. S. KENNOY, d/b/a Kennoy & Company, Appellant, v. Charles M. GRAVES, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 29, 1957.

Welden Shouse, Fred J. Coplin, Lexington, for appellant.

McDonald, Alford & Roszell, Lexington, for appellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

This suit was instituted by appellee Graves to recover approximately $900 for services rendered as a consulting engineer to appellant. Appellant denied liability and counterclaimed for $7,500. On motion for summary judgment the trial court allowed appellee's claim and dismissed appellant's counterclaim.

Appellant's denial of liability and his counterclaim for damages is based on a single admitted fact: Appellant was not licensed as required by KRS 322.020.

It has long been recognized in Kentucky, as elsewhere, that when a statute requires a license to practice a particular profession (the statute being enacted for the protection of the public), a contract for those professional services entered into with one not licensed is void and unenforceable. Board of Education of Ferguson Independent Graded School District v. Elliott, 276 Ky. 790, 125 S.W.2d 733. Appellee concedes the existence of this general rule, but claims there is an important exception when the contract is between a licensed and an unlicensed member of the same profession or trade. Whether or not this exception should be recognized is a new question in Kentucky.

A leading case from another jurisdiction is Dow v. United States, 10 Cir., 154 F.2d 707. The plaintiff was an unlicensed subcontractor on a construction project. The controlling Utah statute was similar to ours with respect to requiring a contractor's license. The court recognized the general rule that a contract for services cannot be enforced by an unlicensed person. The court stated, however, at page 710:

'But that general rule does not have application in a case of this kind in which an unlicensed member of a profession or trade seeks to recover from a licensed member for services rendered or labor performed pursuant to a contract entered into by them. Martindale v. Shaba, 51 Okl. 670, 151 P. 1019; White v. Little, 131 Okl. 132, 268 P. 221; Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P.2d 942, 90 A.L.R. 278; Cf. John E. Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908, 118 A.L.R. 641.'

This exception seems to have been recognized in Oklahoma, Washington, New York, Colorado, and California. In addition to the cases cited in the quotation, see Benham v. Heyde, 122 Colo. 233, 221 P.2d 1078, and Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal.App.2d 821, 281 P.2d 524. Appellant contends that there were distinguishing facts in those cases (some of them involved contracts between attorneys) and also contends that no sound reasons are shown for this exception to the general rule. It is our opinion that the principle recognized in those cases is applicable under the facts here presented and that sound reasons justify...