Kent County Prosecutor v. Kent County Sheriff

• Decision Date: 01 July 1987
• Docket Number: Docket No. 74055
• Citation: 409 N.W.2d 202,428 Mich. 314
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: KENT COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENT COUNTY SHERIFF, Defendant-Appellee, v. KENT COUNTY OFFICE OF the DEFENDER, Intervening Defendant-Appellant. 428 Mich. 314, 409 N.W.2d 202

Page 202

409 N.W.2d 202

KENT COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENT COUNTY SHERIFF, Defendant-Appellee, v. KENT COUNTY OFFICE OF the DEFENDER, Intervening

Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 74055.

428 Mich. 314, 409 N.W.2d 202

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 13, 1987.

Decided July 1, 1987.

David H. Sawyer, Kent County Pros. Atty., Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Atty., Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee.

Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett by Jon F. DeWitt, Jonathan W. Anderson, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee Phillip J. Heffron, Sheriff of Kent County.

Michael P. Mathews, Richard E. Hillary, Kent County Office of the Defender, Grand Rapids, for intervening defendant-appellant.

John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Wayne County, George E. Ward, Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for amicus curiae, Wayne County Prosecutor.

ON REHEARING

CAVANAGH, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

When we originally considered this case, the Court was divided equally on the constitutionality of the county jail overcrowding act, 1982 P.A. 325, M.C.L. Sec. 801.51 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1748(1) et seq. ¹ Rehearing was granted to resolve the Court's division on this important public issue. We conclude that the act does not infringe upon the Governor's power of executive clemency, and we reverse the Court of Appeals determination of unconstitutionality.

The jail overcrowding act directs a county sheriff to declare a jail overcrowding state of emergency when the general prisoner population of a county jail exceeds one hundred percent of the rated design capacity of the jail. ² Upon a declaration of emergency, the sheriff is directed to notify designated county executive and judicial officers of the emergency ³ and is exhorted to reduce the prison population by existing legal means such as pretrial diversion, reduction in the bonds of prisoners, and use of day parole. ⁴ If these steps do not reduce the jail population sufficiently to eliminate jail overcrowding, the sheriff is directed to supply the chief circuit judge of the county with the name of each prisoner along with details of the prisoner's sentence and the offense for which he was convicted. ⁵ The chief judge is directed to classify the prisoners into two categories, those whose release would present a high risk to the public safety, and those whose release would not present such a risk. The sheriff is then directed to reduce the sentences of the low-risk prisoners by an equal percentage, set by the chief circuit judge, until the overcrowding is alleviated.

Of course, a statute is presumed constitutional, and a party attacking the constitutionality of an act must overcome this presumption. ⁶ The Kent County Prosecutor maintains that the jail overcrowding act contravenes Const 1963, art. 5, Sec. 14, which gives the Governor the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction of an offense.

We can summarize our disagreement as follows: The overcrowded conditions of many Michigan jails are legitimate legislative concerns. In enacting the jail overcrowding act, the Legislature has taken an appropriate measure to address this problem, while intruding upon the Governor's powers as little as possible. The incidental benefit that accrues to the prisoners released under the act does not amount to an unconstitutional invasion of the powers of the executive branch.

II. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT

In assessing the validity of a statute against a constitutional challenge, an appropriate starting point is the legislative purpose in enacting the statute. In equal protection challenges, for example, a showing of discriminatory intent has long been required in those cases which allege racial discrimination. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3275, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982), reh. den. 459 U.S. 899, 103 S.Ct. 198, 74 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982). In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), it was held that an electoral scheme for selecting city councilmen at-large was not unconstitutional per se even though the effect of the scheme was to deprive minority voters of the opportunity to elect any of their members to the council. If the purpose of the at-large scheme, however, was to diminish the voting potential of minorities, then the statute would have been unconstitutional.

It is also appropriate to examine the legislative purpose in considering other constitutional challenges. For example, in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Gray & Co, 467 U.S. 717, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984), a due process challenge to the provisions of ERISA was made on the ground that they applied retroactively for a period of five months preceding enactment of the statute. In rejecting the challenge, the Court explained:

"The retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former. But that burden is met simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose." 467 U.S. 730, 104 S.Ct. at 2718. (Citations and interior quotation marks omitted.)

Turning to the present case, the purpose of the jail overcrowding act is clear. Its entire thrust is to reduce or eliminate the evils fostered by overcrowded jails. ⁷

The title of the act provides:

"AN ACT to authorize county sheriffs to declare a county jail overcrowding state of emergency; to prescribe the powers and duties of certain judges, county sheriffs, and other county officials; and to provide remedies for a county jail overcrowding state of emergency." (Emphasis added.)

In evaluating the legislative goals behind the jail overcrowding act, it is helpful to keep in mind the Legislature's plenary power over matters dealing with public health and welfare:

"The public health and general welfare of the people of the state are hereby declared to be matters of primary public concern. The legislature shall pass suitable laws for the protection and promotion of the public health." Const.1963, art. 4, Sec. 51.

The overcrowding of jails and prisons and the problems generated by such overcrowding are issues with which the Legislature has traditionally dealt pursuant to the above constitutional mandate. Appellees do not contend that the purpose of the present statute is beyond legislative power. Rather, appellees argue that regardless of purpose, it is the effect of the act which must be considered and that the effect is to grant commutations of sentences.

III. THE EFFECT OF THE ACT

A lawful purpose alone will not save a statute which clearly violates constitutional principles. If the effect of the jail overcrowding act is to violate a constitutional command, then no laudable legislative purpose can save the enactment. However, it is not necessarily fatal to this legislation that, when considered in a vacuum, it appears to interfere with the Governor's executive powers. In State, County & Municipal Workers v. Dearborn, 311 Mich. 674, 677, 19 N.W.2d 140 (1945), we explained this point, quoting from Story, Constitutional Law (4th ed), p 380:

" 'When we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government, and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree. The true meaning is that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments; and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a free Constitution.' "

The United States Supreme Court, while interpreting the federal constitution, also offers persuasive authority. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3107, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), the Court emphasized:

"In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence."

Later, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2790, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977), the United States Supreme Court reasoned:

"Like the District Court, we therefore find that appellant's argument rests upon an 'archaic view of the separation of powers as requiring three airtight departments of government.' Rather, in determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress." (Citations and interior quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

The Michigan constitutional provision which appellees contend is violated states:

"The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after convictions for all offenses, except cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and limitations as he may direct, subject to procedures and regulations prescribed by law. He shall inform the legislature annually of each reprieve, commutation and pardon granted, stating reasons therefor." Const.1963, art. 5, Sec. 14.

We disagree with the appellees' assertion that the jail overcrowding act permits commutations in violation of this provision. ⁸

In our original Kent Co. opinion, Justice Levin demonstrated why a generalized reduction in sentence in response to a jail emergency did not invade the Governor's power of commutation. See...