Kent Int'l, Inc. v. United States
| Decision Date | 09 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Court No. 15-00135,Slip Op. 19-85 |
| Parties | KENT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of International Trade |
Philip Yale Simons and Jerry P. Wiskin, Simons & Wiskin of South Amboy, NJ for Plaintiff Kent International, Inc.
Monica P. Triana, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, NY, for Defendant United States. With her on the brief were Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Amy M. Rubin, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Yelena Slepak, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection of New York, NY.
Plaintiff Kent International, Inc. ("Kent") challenges the classification by U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("Customs") of Kent's entries of the imported "WeeRide Kangaroo Ltd. Center-Mounted Bicycle-Child Carrier" ("WeeRide Carrier" or "subject merchandise") under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS"). Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment. See Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 37 ("Pl.'s Br."); Def.'s Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. and Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 38 ("Def.'s Br."); see also Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 41 ("Pl.'s Resp."); Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 42 ("Def.'s Reply"). Customs classified the subject merchandise as "Parts and accessories of vehicles of heading 8711 to 8713: ... Other: ... Other" under HTSUS subheading 8714.99.80, at a 10% duty rate. Plaintiff claims that the subject merchandise is properly classified as "Seats (other than those of heading 9402), whether or not convertible into beds, and parts thereof: ... Other seats: Of rubber or plastics: ... Other" under HTSUS subheading 9401.80.40, at a 0% duty rate. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2012). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied, and Defendant's cross-motion for partial summary judgment is granted.
The following facts are not in dispute. See generally Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, ECF 37-1 ("Pl.'s Facts Stmt."); Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, ECF 38-3 ("Def.'s Resp. to Facts"); Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF 38-2 ("Def.'s Facts Stmt."); Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF 41-1 ("Pl.'s Resp. to Facts"). The merchandise at issue is Plaintiff's WeeRide Carrier. Def.'s Facts Stmt. ¶ 1; Pl.'s Resp. to Facts at 1. The sole purpose of the WeeRide Carrier is to allow a child to ride on an adult's bicycle, situated between the adult seat and the front handlebars. Def.'s Facts Stmt. ¶¶ 2–3; Pl.'s Resp. to Facts at 2–3. The WeeRide Carrier attaches to a bicycle via a supporting bar, which is attached to the handlebar and seat post of an adult bicycle. Pl.'s Facts Stmt. ¶ 5; Def.'s Facts Stmt. ¶ 6; Def.'s Resp. to Facts at 2. Plaintiff's website identifies the WeeRide Carrier as an "accessory." Def.'s Facts Stmt. ¶ 21; Pl.'s Resp. to Facts at 6.
The court reviews Customs' protest decisions de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1). USCIT Rule 56 permits summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." USCIT R. 56(c) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering whether material facts are in dispute, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 261 n.2, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
A classification decision involves two steps. The first step addresses the proper meaning of the relevant tariff provisions, which is a question of law. See Faus Group, Inc. v. United States, 581 F.3d 1369, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ). The second step involves determining whether the merchandise at issue falls within a particular tariff provision as construed, which, when disputed, is a question of fact. Id.
When there is no factual dispute regarding the merchandise, the resolution of the classification issue turns on the first step, determining the proper meaning and scope of the relevant tariff provisions. See Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This is such a case, and summary judgment is appropriate. See Bausch & Lomb, 148 F.3d at 1365–66.
Classification disputes under the HTSUS are resolved by reference to the General Rules of Interpretation ("GRIs") and the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation. See Carl Zeiss, 195 F.3d at 1379. The GRIs are applied in numerical order. Id. Interpretation of the HTSUS begins with the language of the tariff headings, subheadings, their section and chapter notes, and may also be aided by the Explanatory Notes ("ENs") published by the World Customs Organization. Id. Under GRI 1, classification is determined by "the terms of the headings and any relevant section or chapter notes." Avenues in Leather, Inc. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The HTSUS section and chapter notes "are not optional interpretive rules, but are statutory law ...." Id. Telebrands Corp. v. United States, 36 C.I.T. 1231, 1235, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1280 (2012).
Under GRI 1, merchandise that is described "in whole by a single classification heading or subheading" is classifiable under that heading or subheading. CamelBak Prods. LLC v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). If that single classification applies, the succeeding GRIs are inoperative.
Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 160 F.3d 710, 712 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
The court construes a tariff term according to its common and commercial meanings, and may rely on lexicographic authorities and its own understanding of the term. See Len-Ron Mfg. Co. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The court may also refer to ENs "accompanying a tariff subheading, which – although not controlling – provide interpretive guidance." E.T. Horn Co. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Len-Ron, 334 F.3d at 1309 ).
The dispute before the court is whether Kent's WeeRide Carrier is properly classified under HTSUS heading 8714 as an accessory to a bicycle or heading 9401 as a seat. The pertinent provisions of Chapters 87 and 94 of the HTSUS are as follows:
HTSUS subheadings 8714.99.80, 9401.80.40. The subheadings are eo nomine provisions meaning they "[d]escribe[ ] an article by a specific name, not by use." Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1310, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CamelBak Prods., 649 F.3d at 1364 ). An eo nomine provision covers all forms of the named article absent limiting language or contrary legislative intent. Nidec Corp. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Defendant argues that Customs correctly classified the WeeRide Carrier under HTSUS heading 8714 that covers "[p]arts and accessories of vehicles of heading 8711 to 8713," which includes "[b]icycles and other cycles (including delivery tricycles), not motorized ..." under HTSUS heading 8712. See Def.'s Br. at 7–12. Defendant contends that the WeeRide Carrier fits under heading 8714 because it is an "accessory" to a bicycle. Id. at 8. Defendant further argues that the subject merchandise is an "accessory" under heading 8714 in that an "accessory" is defined as "something extra; thing added help in a secondary way; ... a piece of optional equipment for convenience, comfort, appearance, etc." See id. at 7–8 (citing Webster's New World Dictionary (3d. C. ed. 1988)). Defendant maintains that because the WeeRide Carrier allows a child to ride with an adult on a bicycle, it is an accessory that adds "to the effectiveness and convenience" of a bicycle by allowing two individuals to be transported at one time. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the WeeRide Carrier is prima facie classifiable as an accessory to a bicycle under subheading 8714.99.80. See Pl.'s Reply at 3. Despite this, it argues that the subject merchandise is also prima facie classifiable under subheading 9401.80.40, a provision for seats that is more specific than the subheading for a bicycle accessory. See Pl.'s Br. at 10–11. Plaintiff relies on Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation ("ARI") 1(c) as support for its claim that the subject merchandise is classifiable as a "seat" under heading 9401, rather than as a bicycle "accessory" under heading 8714. Pl.'s Br. at 23. ARI 1(c) provides that "absent special language or context":
(c) a provision for parts of an article covers products solely or principally used as a part of such articles but a provision for "parts and accessories" shall not prevail over a specific provision for such part or accessory ...
Plaintiff maintains that there is no special language or context that would require the classification of the WeeRide Carrier as a bicycle accessory rather than the specific provision for "seats" under heading 9401. Pl.'s Br. at 24. Plaintiff further...
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Kent Int'l, Inc. v. United States
...motion to dismiss Plaintiff's "treatment" and "established and uniform practice" claims); Kent Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 43 CIT ––––, 393 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (2019) (" Kent III") (ruling for Defendant on merits of classifying Plaintiff's child bicycle safety seats under HTSUS heading 8714 ......
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Kent Int'l, Inc. v. United States
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