Kent Products, Inc. v. Hoegh

• Decision Date: 15 December 1953
• Docket Number: No. 48392,48392
• Citation: 245 Iowa 205,61 N.W.2d 711
• Parties: KENT PRODUCTS, Inc. et al. v. HOEGH et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 711

61 N.W.2d 711

245 Iowa 205

KENT PRODUCTS, Inc. et al. v. HOEGH et al.

No. 48392.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 15, 1953.

Leo A. Heogh, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Kading, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Earle S. Smith, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Clyde E. Herring, Des Moines, County Atty., for appellants.

Evans, Duncan, Jones, Hughes & Riley, Des Moines, for appellees.

GARFIELD, Justice.

Prior to July 4, 1953, sale of colored oleomargarine in Iowa was prohibited by statute. Sections 190.6, 191.2, subsection 3, Code 1950, I.C.A. Chapter 97, Acts of the 55th General Assembly, effective on said date, permits the sale of colored oleomargarine (we will call it 'margarine') upon compliance with certain specified conditions. This requirement of section 3, chapter 97, is the subject of this controversy: 'There shall be four readily legible imprints made by the manufacturer of the word 'oleo' on the product equally distributed on one of the greater sides of each one-quarter pound, one-half pound, or pound.'

Section 3, chapter 97, states, immediately preceding the above-quoted 'imprint provision': '3. No person shall sell or offer for sale, colored oleo, oleomargarine or margarine unless such oleo, oleomargarine or margarine is packaged; the net weight of the contents of any package sold in a retail establishment is one pound or less; there appears on the label of the package the word 'oleo', 'oleomargarine' or 'margarine' in type or lettering at least as large as any other type or lettering on such label, and a full and accurate statement of all the ingredients contained in such oleo, oleomargarine or margarine; and each part of the contents of the package is contained in a wrapper which bears the word 'oleo', 'oleomargarine' or 'margarine' in type or lettering not smaller than 20-point type.'

Other parts of section 3, following the imprint provision, are:

'* * * Whenever coloring of any kind has been added it shall be clearly stated on both inside wrapper and the outside package. The ingredients of oleo, oleomargarine or margarine shall be listed on both the inside wrapper and outside package in the order of the amounts of ingredients in the package. * * * 'Each one pound package of oleo, oleomargarine or margarine shall be approximately four and three-quarter inches by four and three-quarter inches in its greater dimensions commonly known as the 'Eastern pack'. * * *'

Code section 189.19 prescribes the penalty for violation of any provision of chapter 97 and other statutes--a fine of $10 to $100 or imprisonment in the county jail not over 30 days, and on a third conviction for the same offense the offender may be restrained from operating his place of business.

Plaintiff Kent Products, Inc., is a manufacturer of margarine in Kansas City. Plaintiff Skelton is a retail grocer in Des Moines. They brought this action in behalf of themselves and other manufacturers and retailers of colored margarine against the attorney general and secretary of agriculture of Iowa and the county attorney of Polk county to enjoin enforcement of the imprint provision of the act quoted first above.

In Count I of the petition plaintiff Kent Products alleges the imprint provision is arbitrary, unnecessary, unreasonable and an unwarranted interference with a lawful business, depriving it and other manufacturers of property rights of great value, in violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions, sections 9 and 6, Article I, Iowa Constitution, I.C.A., section 1, 14th Amendment U. S. Constitution. Kent Products also alleges the imprint provision constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause, section 8, Article I, of the federal constitution.

In Count II of the petition plaintiff Skelton asks a declaratory judgment that the act does not subject anyone other than a manufacturer to prosecution and penalty if margarine is not imprinted with the word 'oleo.' Skelton alleges defendants have interpreted the act to subject retailers to prosecution and penalty if colored margarine is found on their shelves not imprinted as required by section 3. That as so interpreted the act is unconstitutional because the language is vague, indefinite, unreasonable, oppressive, and subjects retailers to prosecution and loss of business as a result of climate, nature of margarine and other conditions beyond their control. Skelton asks that enforcement of the imprint provision be enjoined if the act is construed as subjecting retailers to a penalty.

Defendants filed written resistance to the prayers for temporary injunction stating the grounds of unconstitutionality alleged in the petition are inadequate to warrant such relief, a temporary injunction would not maintain the status quo since sale of colored margarine was prohibited prior to July 4, 1953, the alleged injuries to manufacturers are mere conjecture since they have been limited to sales of uncolored margarine in the past, many manufacturers have already manufactured margarine bearing acceptable imprints of the word 'oleo' which is available to the retail trade, granting a temporary injunction would do greater injury than would result from its refusal.

Following a hearing July 2, 1953, on the application in the petition for a temporary injunction against enforcement of the imprint provision (quoted above) such relief was granted on July 6. Pursuant to rule 332(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 I.C.A., we granted defendants an appeal from this interlocutory order. See Wolf v. Lutheran Mutual Life Ins. Co., 236 Iowa 334, 344, 18 N.W.2d 804, 810.

At the hearing on July 2, Mr. Kent, president of plaintiff company, testified in substance that its sole business is manufacturing margarine, it is in the lower third of the industry in size, it has no office or agents in Iowa, it sold uncolored margarine in Kansas City to wholesalers who in turn sold to stores in Iowa, his company would like to enter the Iowa market for colored margarine as Iowa is within its natural trade territory, the manufacturer of its packaging machines which supplies such machines for 90 per cent of the margarine throughout the country 'advised us they cannot supply a machine to make a satisfactory imprint,' margarine is soft when the imprint would have to be made and there is no assurance it would stay in the product if made, his company and other smaller manufacturers have no elaborate machine shops and are dependent upon the advice of the packaging machine people, he has read and been told that some large manufacturers which have their own machine shops were ready to comply with the law, it would take time and special handling to segregate margarine for ultimate sale in Iowa if it had to be imprinted, normally margarine is without refrigeration part of the time before it reaches the consumer and that would add to the danger the imprint would be obliterated, he knows of no other state where such imprint is required, his company will lose what business it has in Iowa and be prevented from taking on any new business if the margarine must be imprinted, the large companies which have been able to comply with the requirement would then get established in Iowa and it would be hard for anyone else to get any of the market.

Plaintiffs offered no other evidence. Two representatives of wholesale groceries in Des Moines testified for defendants. One said his company deals in two brands of colored margarine, the other testified his company handles five brands. A package of each of the seven brands, taken from regular stock, was brought to court in insulated containers and produced. The sample of one of the brands did not have an imprint that was legible and perhaps no imprint had been attempted on it. The imprints on the package of another brand were indistinct. Some of the other imprints were not entirely clear. The imprints on some of the packages were plain, however. On cross-examination the first of these witnesses said 90 per cent of shipments of margarine by his company were not under refrigeration. The second witness testified probably about half the trucks carrying margarine from his company were not refrigerated, nothing printed on the outer packages of the five brands his company handled states they should be refrigerated and he wouldn't think continuous refrigeration is necessary to preserve the eating qualities of margarine.

The chief of the dairy and food division of the state department of agriculture said that originally manufacturers' representatives objected to the imprint provision on the ground they did not think compliance would be possible, later two such representatives told him it would be possible for them to make a satisfactory imprint.

The above is a sufficient summary of the evidence.

The issuance or refusal of a temporary injunction rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. We will not interfere with such a ruling unless there is an abuse of such discretion or a violation of some principle of equity. Wood Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 559, 1 N.W.2d 655, 660, and citations; 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, § 14; 28 Am.Jur., Injunctions, sections 35, 36, 328. We think there was an abuse of discretion here.

We have approved this statement from Bonaparte v. Camden & A. R. R. Co., 3 Fed.Cas. page 821, 827, No. 1,617, Baldw. 205: 'There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing [of] an injunction; * * *.' Beidenkopf v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 629, 639, 142 N.W. 434, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 290; Ontjes v. Bagley, 217 Iowa 1200, 1206, 250 N.W. 17; Wood Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, supra, 231 Iowa 550, 559, 1 N.W.2d 655, 660. See also 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, § 15, which states a similar rule has been applied more...