Kentera's Guardianship, In re

• Decision Date: 27 October 1953
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: In re KENTERA'S GUARDIANSHIP. KENTERA v. BOESEL. S. F. 18511.

Page 317

262 P.2d 317

41 Cal.2d 639

In re KENTERA'S GUARDIANSHIP.

KENTERA v. BOESEL.

S. F. 18511.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 27, 1953.

Marshall E. Leahy and John F. O'Dea, San Francisco, for appellant.

W. L. A. Calder and Lorne M. Stantley, San Francisco, for respondent.

John E. Anderton, San Francisco, as amicus curiae on behalf of respondent.

SPENCE, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying the petition of Richard Steven Kentera for the appointment of his grandmother as guardian of his person. Appellant contends that as a minor, fourteen years of age, he has an absolute right to have his nominee appointed as guardian of his person, provided that his nominee is found to be a suitable person. Respondent, who is the mother of appellant, contends that there must first be a showing of necessity of convenience for the appointment of a guardian. If no such showing is made, respondent asserts that the petition of the minor should be denied without regard to the fitness of the nominee. The statutory scheme sustains respondent's position.

Appellant's mother and father were divorced in 1939 and both remarried. By the terms of the divorce decree appellant's custody was vested in both parents, with physical custody in the mother. Since 1939 he has been living with his mother and following her remarriage, with her and his stepfather. There are three other boys in the family: the oldest was seventeen and is the stepfather's child by the former marriage; the two younger boys, nine and seven, are the children of the present marriage. In 1951 appellant, then aged forteen, filed a petition for guardianship in which he nominated his paternal grandmother, Angelinal Kentera, to be guardian of his person. He was at the time visiting her in San Francisco during his summer vacation from school. Appellant's mother filed an opposition to his petition. After setting forth the facts entitling her to appellant's custody, she denied that he was in need of a guardian and she denied that the grandmother was a suitable person to serve as such. Appellant's mother alleged that the grandmother was about sixty years of age; that she lived with her husband, who is not related to appellant; that no young people resided in their home; that they operated a restaurant in San Francisco which consumed most of their time and attention; and that because of age and outside interests, the grandmother would not be able to supervise appellant properly and give him a proper home environment. Appellant's mother also alleged that in her own home, that four boys lived and played together, and that it would be in the best interests of appellant to remain with his mother.

After the hearing, the court entered an order denying appellant's petition and ordering him to return to his mother in Ukiah. The court found that since the divorce of his parents, appellant has been in the general physical custody of his mother; that he has lived in his mother's home practically his entire lifetime; that she was a fit and proper person to have his care, custody, and control, and that her home in Ukiah was a suitable place for him to live. The court also found that the grandmother was a fit and proper person to act as personal guardian but that the appointment of such grardian was not 'necessary or convenient'.

Appellant challenges the order denying his petition. This denial was based on the last mentioned finding. Guardianship matters are special proceedings and the validity of orders must be determined from a consideration of the governing statutes. In re Guardianship of Salter, 142 Cal. 412, 413, 76 P. 51; In re Britt, 176 Cal. 177, 181, 167 P. 863.

The following sections of the Probate Code are controlling. Section 1405 provides that the 'superior court shall appoint a general guardian of the * * *person or estate, of minors * * * whenever necessary or convenient * * *.' (Emphasis added.) Section 1406 states that the court, in making such appointment, is 'to be guided by what appears to be for the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal and mental and moral welfare', and that where the child is a resident of this state and over fourteen years of age, 'he may nominate his own guardian * * * and such nominee must be appointed if approved by the court.' (Emphasis added.) Section 1440 provides: 'When it appears necessary or convenient, the superior court of the county in which a minor resides or is temporarily domiciled * * * may appoint a guardian for his * * * person or estate. The appointment may be made * * * on the petition of the minor, if fourteen years of age.' (Emphasis added.)

These statutes, construed as a whole, require the trial court to proceed in the following manner: first, to determine whether sufficient cause (necessity or convenience) exists to warrant the appointment of a guardian; and second, if sufficient cause is found to exist, then to determine whether the nominee merits approval. If the court initially finds that the appointment of a guardian is not 'necessary or convenient,' then it should deny the petition whether it be made by a 'relative or other person on behalf of the minor, or (by) the minor, if fourteen years of age.' Prob.Code, § 1440. While the statutes give the fourteen-year-old minor the privilege of directly petitioning for the appointment of a guardian, such procedure does not eliminate the need for making the required showing of necessity or convenience as the basic ground for the appointment. It is only after such showing has been made to the satisfaction of the court that the law distinguishes between the fourteen-year-old and the younger minor, granting to the former the right to have his nominee appointed if approved by the court as a suitable person. Otherwise, in the case of the fourteen-year-old, the words 'necessary or convenient' would be given no meaning, with the result that every minor attaining that age would have the absolute right to select any fit person as his personal guardian regardless of the fitness of his natural parents. The statutory provisions were not intended to upset the normal relationship of parent and child or to disrupt normal family discipline by allowing the fourteen-year-old minor to withdraw from the family circle at his whim. In other words, sections 1405 and 1440 apply in every case of the appointment of a guardian of a minor in that there must be the initial showing of necessity or convenience; and it is only thereafter that the right of the fourteen-year-old minor to have his nominee appointed his personal guardian, if fit, may be said to be 'absolute.' Prob.Code, sec. 1406.

Appellant relies on two groups of cases. The first group concerns the question of the appointment of a guardian for a minor's estate. Where a minor owns property, that fact is ordinarily sufficient to support a finding that the appointment of a guardian of the minor's estate is 'necessary or convenient,' and the preference of the minor, if fourteen years old, prevails over the objection of any person, including the parent, provided that the nominee is found to be suitable. In re Guardianship of Kirkman, 168 Cal. 688, 690, 144 P. 745; In re Estate of Meiklejohn, 171 Cal. 247, 248, 152 P. 734; In re Estate of McSwain, 176 Cal. 287, 288, 168 P. 117. While in two of these cases the matter of the appointment of a guardian of a minor's person was noticed, the court in neither instance passed upon the question. In the Kirkman case, appellant waived any objection as to the disposition of the personal guardianship claim, 168 Cal. 690-691, 144 P. 745-746; and in the McSwain case the issue of whether it was either 'necessary or convenient' that a personal guardian should be appointed had become moot by the time the appeal was taken and was not decided, 176 Cal. 288, 168 P. 117.

The cases in the second group cited by appellant concern solely the appointment of a personal guardian for a minor. In two of these cases the principal question involved was the jurisdiction of the court to appoint a personal guardian, and it does not appear that the question of whether there must be proof of necessity or convenience was presented. Collins v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.App. 579, 199 P. 352; In re Guardianship of Kerr, 29 Cal.App.2d 439, 85 P.2d 145. In Re Guardianship of Burket, 58 Cal.App.2d 726, at page 728, 137 P.2d 475, at page 477 the court observed that '* * * there appears to be some doubt as to the necessity for such proof * * *' but it nevertheless held that the evidence in that case was sufficient to establish such necessity or convenience. In Re Guardianship of Gianoli, 60 Cal.App.2d 504, 140 P.2d 987, the court cited the Burket case with approval and held that the evidence there was likewise sufficient to establish 'the necessity or convenience for the appointment.' 60 Cal.App.2d at page 507, 140 P.2d at page 988. If it may be said that any of these cases imply either that a minor of the age of fourteen years has the absolute right to the appointment of his nominee as his guardian in the absence of a showing of necessity or convenience, or that a mere showing that a minor has reached the age of fourteen years and has nominated a guardian compels a finding of necessity or convenience, such implication is out of harmony with the statutory scheme governing the appointment of a personal guardian and is hereby disapproved.

As above stated, the court here found that the appointment of a guardian for appellant was not 'necessary or convenient'. This was a matter for the determination of the trial court. As was said in Guardianship of Hann, 100 Ca.App. 743, at page 746, 281 P. 74, at page 75, where the court denied the petition of a sixteen-year-old minor: 'It is provided in Code of Civ.Proc. § 1747 (now Prob.Code, § 1405), that the court may appoint a guardian for a minor 'when it appears necessary or convenient.' The court was not bound to appoint a guardian simply because the minor...