Kentucky Central Railway Company v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 01 October 1891 |
| Citation | 92 Ky. 64 |
| Parties | Kentucky Central Railway Company v. Commonwealth. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT.
G. C. LOCKHART FOR APPELLANT.
P. W. HARDIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, FOR APPELLEE.
CHIEF JUSTICE HOLT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
In June and October, 1889, the State recovered judgments for taxes for the years 1884, 1885 and 1886, against the Kentucky Central Railroad Company.
Our statute provides: "The Commonwealth shall have a lien for all taxes, and the counties for the county levy and other taxes due the county, on the property assessed, and on all other property of each person, which shall not be defeated by gift, devise, sale, alienation or any means whatever: Provided, the lien herein provided for shall not exist longer than five years." (General Statutes, chapter 92, article 1, section 2.)
The judgments were merely for so much money, no lien being adjudged for their payment, and none asserted, so far as this record shows.
The appellant, the Kentucky Central Railway Company, came into existence in May, 1887, and became the owner of the property of the Kentucky Central Railroad Company in June, 1887. December 23, 1889, the appellee brought this action, claiming that it had a lien upon the property for the satisfaction of its judgments. The copies of them on file do not show that they were for taxes due the State, but this appears from the pleadings in this suit. The taxes for 1884 were due on October 10th of that year.
There is no averment in the petition of any assessment of the property, or of the preliminary steps necessary to its taxation; nor is it even stated that such averments were made in the original suits. A demurrer to the petition was overruled. One was sustained to the answer, which inter alia relies upon the lapse of five years from the time when they were due until this suit was brought as to the taxes of 1884; and a judgment was rendered allowing a lien, and placing the property in the hands of a receiver for its satisfaction.
It is contended for the State that the mere judgments for money obtained by it fixed a lien upon the property, and that the appellant took it cum onere. They did not, however, constitute liens upon the property. They were but ordinary judgments for money. The fact that they were based upon claims for taxes did not alter their character, and give them additional force.
The State had a lien by virtue of the statute. It arose by reason of a properly assessed tax. It was not necessary to reduce the claim to judgment to acquire it. In the original suits upon proper averments decrees might have been had enforcing the already existing lien, provided it had not been lost by lapse of time; but a mere...
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