Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinney, 90-SC-000821-DG

• Decision Date: 14 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-SC-000821-DG,90-SC-000821-DG
• Citation: 831 S.W.2d 164
• Parties: KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Movant, v. Walter McKINNEY, Administrator of Diana Lynn McKinney Reed Estate, Walter McKinney, Administrator of Infant Reed Estate, and Walter McKinney, Individually, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 164

831 S.W.2d 164

KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Movant, v. Walter McKINNEY, Administrator of Diana Lynn McKinney Reed Estate, Walter McKinney, Administrator of Infant Reed Estate, and Walter McKinney Individually, Respondent.

No. 90-SC-000821-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

May 14, 1992.

E. Patrick Moores, R. Craig Reinhardt, Fowler, Measie & Bell, Lexington, for movant.

Thomas K. Herren, Glover, Herren & Adams, Lexington, for respondents.

DAVID L. YEWELL, Special Justice.

This is a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld a judgment of the Jessamine Circuit Court that found uninsured motorist insurance coverage (Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company) was applicable and payable to the estates of Diana Lynn McKinney Reed and her unborn infant child. Diana was struck and killed August 7, 1984, as she was flagging on-coming traffic around the scene of a disabled vehicle she had just exited. The rear of this vehicle was obstructing southbound traffic on Kentucky Highway 39, a public highway in Jessamine County, Kentucky.

The sole issue in this review requires an interpretation of the standard Kentucky uninsured motorist insurance policy definitional terms "Insured" and "Occupying." Specifically, under the facts of this case, at the time they were struck and killed by an uninsured motorist, were Diana and her unborn child "occupying" the insured vehicle and thus entitled to be covered as insureds under the uninsured motorist insurance coverage endorsement of the applicable policy? The term "occupying" is defined in the policy as meaning "in or upon or entering into or alighting from, with permission of the owner." This issue has not been directly considered previously by this Court in the context of an uninsured motorist insurance policy endorsement.

FACTS

In Jessamine Circuit Court, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts and Evidence. These facts are crucial to our review and must be recited:

1. That judgment for the wrongful death of Diana Lynn McKinney Reed to her estate, by and through the Administrator, Walter McKinney, would be in excess of $25,000.00, the liability limit per person of the uninsured motorist coverage in issue;

2. That judgment for the wrongful death of "Unborn Infant" Reed to the estate, by and through the Administrator, Walter McKinney, would be in excess of $25,000.00, the liability limit per person of the uninsured motorist coverage in issue;

3. That on August 7, 1984, prior to being struck by the motorcycle, Diana McKinney Reed, a 26 year old resident of Jessamine County, Kentucky, was operating a pickup truck on Kentucky Highway 39 in Jessamine County;

4. That Mrs. Reed was carrying her eight and one-half month term unborn infant;

5. That the pickup truck was owned by Charles Reed, father of Diana's husband, Doug Reed;

6. That Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company had the insurance coverage on the truck, including uninsured motorist coverage;

7. That Doug Reed and Diana McKinney Reed did not reside in the "household" of Charles Reed on August 7, 1984;

8. That Mrs. Reed attempted to turn the truck into their property, but the right front wheel slid off of the side of their driveway into a culvert, and the vehicle became stalled or stuck;

9. That the bed of the truck was obstructing the southbound portion of the road;

10. That Mr. Reed asked Mrs. Reed to go up the roadway and attempt to warn motorists of the obstruction (bed of the truck in the roadway);

11. That Mrs. Reed left her purse and other belongings in the truck and proceeded up the roadway;

12. That motorists had passed Mrs. Reed, and she had been successful in waving to those persons to warn them of the obstruction in the road;

13. That Mrs. Reed was carried after the impact in excess of 90 feet in a southbound direction back toward the vehicle from which she had departed;

14. That Mrs. Reed was between 130 and 200 feet away from the truck from which she had departed at the time of the impact;

15. In addition, the Kentucky Farm Bureau insurance policy in issue has been filed as a Exhibit to this review. Therein appears the Uninsured Motorist Coverage Endorsement, UM-1 (10-66), which provides insuring agreements for damages incurred by bodily injury caused by an uninsured motorist. Essential to our examination are the specific definitions within this particular policy which are as follows:

II. DEFINITIONS

"Named Insured " means the person or organization named in Item I of the declaration, and if such person is an individual, also includes his spouse if a resident of the same household.

"Insured " means (1) the named insured and, if the named insured is an "Relative " means a person related to the named insured by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of the same household.

individual or husband and wife, a relative; (2) any other person while occupying an insured automobile; and (3) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily injury, to which this endorsement applies, sustained by an insured under (1) or (2) above.

"Occupying " means in or upon or entering into or alighting from, with permission of the owner.

This uninsured motorist coverage results from the language of KRS 304.20-020 which mandates that such insurance be provided in automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance policies in Kentucky, subject, however, to rejection in writing by the named insured.

Upon these facts, judgment was entered in Jessamine Circuit Court against Farm Bureau in the sum of $50,000.00, that being the full uninsured motorist insurance coverage purchased by Charles Reed for the truck that Diana had been operating and then departed which was found to be applicable to and provide coverage for the stipulated damages to her estate and that of her unborn infant child.

HOLDING

For the reasons hereinafter discussed, we AFFIRM the September 29, 1990, opinion of the Court of Appeals and find that Diana and her unborn child were insureds under the Kentucky Farm Bureau insurance policy as they were "occupying," for uninsured motorist insurance purposes, the insured pickup truck at the time they were fatally injured.

Neither Diana nor her husband, Doug Reed, was the "Named Insured" on the automobile insurance policy. They did not own the truck nor did they reside within the household of Charles Reed who was the actual title owner of the truck and the "Named Insured" in the policy which insured the truck. If they are to be "Insured" under the policy, they must fall within the definition this Court now gives to the phrase "(2) any other person while occupying an insured vehicle." Thus, we are asked to give our interpretation to the word "occupying" and state whether it should be narrowly or broadly construed, giving consideration to the present facts and all applicable existing law on this subject.

Interestingly, KRS 304.20-020 requires uninsured motorist coverage against loss for "bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." The issue of whether or not the more narrow insuring agreement language of the policy meets the broader requirements of KRS 304.20-020 was not raised by the pleadings or litigated at any stage of this action. The statute appears to require broad coverage for persons damaged by one's "ownership, maintenance or use" of a motor vehicle while the policy language seems to provide coverage for such persons as Diana, under a more narrow approach, and only when she is found to be "occupying" the vehicle.

When faced with the necessity of construing such statutory and contractual language, we must look to prior pronouncements of any policy by which such insurance contracts will be interpreted by the courts of Kentucky. In so doing, we find that two cardinal principles apply: "(1) the contract should be liberally construed and all doubts resolved in favor of the insureds; and, (2) exceptions and exclusions should be strictly construed to make insurance effective." Grimes v. National Wide Mutual Ins. Co., Ky.App., 705 S.W.2d 926 (1985); Davis v. American States Ins. Co., Ky.App., 562 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1977), Wolford v. Wolford, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 835 (1984); and Tankersley v. Gilkey, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 589 (1967).

Additionally, the authoritative research and writing of Professor Alan I. Widiss on the specific issue of when a person is "occupying" an insured vehicle is most helpful, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, Second Edition, Volume One, see pages 189-228, Chapter 5. As Professor Widiss explains, uninsured motorist insurance which provides coverage for persons who are insured while "occupying" an insured vehicle are usually identified as: "Clause (b)" or "Clause (2)," and this class of covered persons is generally known as "Clause (b)" insureds (also sometimes referred to as Clause II, Class II, Class (2) or Class (b) insureds), page 189. As in Grimes, supra, when viewed as a group, courts generally employ expansive interpretations of insurance policy coverage terms to provide indemnification for persons engaged in a task related to the use, operation or maintenance of an insured vehicle even though they were not upon, entering into or alighting from an insured vehicle, page 204. "It is now evident that when this aspect of the uninsured motorist insurance terms is at issue, judges throughout the nation will employ a variety of approaches that result in sustaining the claims of injured persons who are either in proximity to an insured vehicle or engaged in some activity related to the use of an insured vehicle," page 204. "Even when a claimant is not in physical contact with an insured vehicle, coverage interpretations have been extended when the person's activities in proximity to the vehicle are consistent with the policy and principles of interpretation accorded safety responsibility legislation and...