Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watts
| Decision Date | 31 October 1944 |
| Citation | 298 Ky. 471 |
| Parties | Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watts. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
6. Evidence. — Statement in death certificate that cause of death was a gunshot wound was a statement of "fact" within statute making certified copy of death certificate prima facie evidence of facts therein stated, but further statements that such wound was self-inflicted and that death was suicide were mere expressions of "opinion". KRS 213.190.
7. Insurance. — In action to recover double indemnity benefit under life policy for accidental death, death certificate, while admissible as evidence of identity of deceased and fact that death was caused by gunshot wound, was not evidentiary in respect to issue of accidental death or suicide. KRS 213.190.
8. Continuance; Pleading. — Statute providing for amendment of pleading to conform to proof does not preclude amendment upon discovery of facts theretofore unknown, though amendment offered materially changes defense or cause of action, but in such case adverse party is entitled to a continuance as a matter of right. Civil Code of Practice, secs. 134, 136.
9. Insurance. — Trial court erred in refusing to permit insurer during trial, when it first learned from beneficiary's testimony that insured suffered from a double hernia, to amend answer by alleging that answer to question in application for life policy concerning existence of a rupture was false, fraudulent, and material to the risk, and that policy would not have been issued had insurer known the true facts. Civil Code of Practice, secs. 134, 136.
10. Appeal and Error; Trial. — Instruction to jury to find for beneficiary in action on life policy unless jury believed from evidence that insured committed suicide was prejudicial to substantial rights of insurer, in that it placed burden of proof on the whole case on insurer instead of beneficiary.
11. Trial. — In action on $1,000 life policy providing double indemnity for accidental death, but limiting liability to premiums paid if insured committed suicide, court should instruct jury to find for beneficiary in sum of $2,000 if it believes insured died of bodily injuries effected directly and independently of any other cause, through external, violent, and accidental means, but unless jury so believes, or if it believes insured committed suicide, to find for beneficiary only in an amount equal to premiums paid.
12. Insurance. — In action on life policy providing double indemnity for accidental death, but limiting liability to premiums paid if insured committed suicide, whether insured, if he did commit suicide, was so bereft of mind as not to comprehend consequences of his act, should not be submitted to jury unless evidence is sufficient to support such a contention.
Appeal from Casey Circuit Court.
Woodward, Dawson & Hobson, L.H. Hilton, and Montgomery & Montgomery for appellant.
Moore & Pittman for appellee.
Before J.C. Carter, Judge.
Reversing.
Appellee instituted the action against appellant to recover as beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life of his son. By the terms of the contract, appellant agreed, upon due proof of the death of the insured, to pay to the beneficiary the sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000), with double indemnity in the event of accidental death. The ordinary benefit feature of the policy contained a provision that, in the event of self-destruction within two years from the date of the policy, the liability of the Company would be limited to an amount equal to the premiums theretofore paid. The accidental feature of the policy exempted appellant from liability, should the insured's death occur from self-destruction. The exemption in the double indemnity feature was contained in the insuring clause; whereas the exemption in respect to the ordinary death feature was contained in a separate clause. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee in the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000); judgment was entered accordingly.
As grounds for reversal, appellant contends (1) the Trial Court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a peremptory instruction at the conclusion of the evidence for appellee; (2) the Trial Court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a peremptory instruction at the conclusion of all the evidence; (3) the Trial Court erred in overruling appellant's motion to be permitted to file an amended answer to conform to the proof; (4) the verdict of the jury was rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice; and (5) Instruction No. 1, given by the Court over the objection of appellant, was erroneous.
Consideration of the first two contentions requires a brief resume of the evidence. On April 18, 1942, three months and nineteen days after the policy became effective, the insured came to the home of his parents, which was momentarily occupied by his mother and sister. He stated to his mother that he wanted to borrow a gun to go squirrel hunting. She consented that he might use his father's shotgun, which was on a rack above a bed in a room adjoining the kitchen. He asked his mother if she wanted a knife; and, upon being told that she did, gave her one. The mother testified that she had many times spoken of being in need of a knife to whittle kindling with which to build fires. The insured entered the room where the gun was kept; the mother and sister immediately heard the gun fire; they rushed into the room, and discovered the insured lying on his face on the floor, on top of the gun. They slipped the gun from under him and turned him on his back; he died in about an hour. The father was called to the house, and found the body and gun in the position last related. Appellee introduced evidence to the effect that the insured was in a happy frame of mind from the time he arrived at the house to the time he was shot. In support of appellant's contention that death was the result of suicide, it introduced evidence that the insured had been placed in Class 1-A by the local draft board on February 13, 1942, and had taken preliminary examinations for induction into the Army; that the insurance policy was issued at the solicitation of the insured; the agent of the Insurance Company did not explain to the insured the provisions of the policy in respect to suicide, but did explain its general provisions. That when the father of the insured heard that his son had "shot himself," he made the statement, "I bet a dollar he done it a-purpose." About a month and a half before his death, while "deviling" with Logue Smith, the deceased said that if he killed himself he would not have to go to the Army. That a long time before his death the deceased, in discussing the probability of going into the Army, stated "I will kill myself"; and then he laughed, and said "Well, I will let the Japs do that." The mother of the deceased was quoted by a witness as saying she did not know "what made her boy kill himself." Appellee told the acting Coroner that two or three weeks before the insured's death, he told appellee, "One thing, I will never go to the Army." He was likewise quoted by the witness as saying that he, appellee, had an uncle who committed suicide several years before. Another witness testified that appellee stated "he did not know what made the boy do it or shoot himself, unless over going to the Army." Appellant introduced in evidence a certified copy of the death certificate of the insured, the pertinent part of which is the answers to Questions 22 and 23, as follows:
No objection was made to any of the testimony related above. Because the insured's death occurred within two years from the issuance of the policy, appellee was entitled to recover either the double indemnity benefit, or nothing in excess of the premiums paid. Appellee sued for the double indemnity benefit; therefore, the burden of proof was upon him to show that the death of his insured resulted from bodily injuries effected directly, and independently of all other causes (including self-destruction), through external, violent, and accidental means. Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Tuggle's Adm'r, 254 Ky. 814, 72 S.W. 2d 440; United Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Schott, and companion case, 296 Ky....
To continue reading
Request your trial