Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Ohio & M. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 October 1895
• Citation: 98 Ky. 152,32 S.W. 595
• Parties: KENTUCKY WAGON MANUF'G CO. v. OHIO & M. RY. CO. et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

32 S.W. 595

98 Ky. 152

KENTUCKY WAGON MANUF'G CO. v. OHIO & M. RY. CO. et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 17, 1895

Appeal from Louisville law and equity court.

"Not to be officially reported."

Suit in equity by the Kentucky Wagon Manufacturing Company against the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company and others to enjoin defendants from refusing to deliver to complainant certain freight. The petition was dismissed, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.

W. O Harris and Humphrey & Davie, for appellant.

Edmund F. Trabue, Pirtle & Trabue, and Lyttleton Cooke, for appellees.

HAZELRIGG J.

The Kentucky Wagon Company is a corporation extensively engaged at South Louisville in the business of manufacturing and selling wagons. Its works are located near the junction of the tracks of the Louisville & Nashville and the Louisville Southern Railroad Companies, and upon its yards it has its own switches and side tracks, connecting with each of these roads, and with these roads alone. It receives its materials in car-load lots, and sends out much of the finished product in the same way. These railroad companies, the one or the other, have physical connection with every other railroad entering the city of Louisville, and are under contract with the wagon company, for a stipulated consideration, to deliver upon the side tracks of the latter all loaded cars consigned to that company over their own lines, or over their connecting lines, which cars, when unloaded by the wagon company, the carriers are to remove free of charged. In February, 1890, the two roads named, together with the other railways entering the city of Louisville, conceiving that their patrons who handled these shipments in car-load lots were unreasonably detaining the cars of the carriers, using them for storage purposes, and otherwise materially impeding the service, formed what is known in the record as the "Louisville Car-Service Association," and through it at once promulgated certain rules and regulations calculated to remedy the evil, and insure the prompt unloading of the consignments and consequent prompt return of the cars. On the other hand, the shippers, conceding that the abuse complained of had in fact grown up, though not through their fault, and contending that the association of the carriers was illegal and wrongful, and the rules they were attempting to enforce unreasonable and exorbitant, formed a counter association to resist their enforcement. The wagon company was a member of this organization, and, refusing to conform to the rules of the car-service association, or pay the charges accumulating against it, by reason of its detention of cars for more than 48 hours after delivery, the carriers refused to deliver freight consigned to it over their respective lines. Whereupon, in November, 1890, the wagon company brought this action in equity against some 11 of the railroad companies, to restrain them from refusing to deliver to it on its side tracks, because of its noncompliance with the car-service rules, certain designated car loads of freight ready for delivery, and from so refusing in the future. The original order, which issued on the plaintiff's petition, enjoined the defendants from further refusing to deliver to the plaintiff the car loads of freight held by them, respectively, but thereafter, in August, 1891, and after much of the proof had been taken, the court so modified the order as to require the wagon company to return and redeliver to the railway companies the cars delivered by them, within the time prescribed by the car-service rules; and such seems to have been the attitude of the parties upon the rendition of the final judgment herein, in December, 1891, when the chancellor refused to grant the relief asked by the plaintiff, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the petition without costs.

The question to be determined at the threshold of our investigation of this case is, whether or not the rules and regulations of the associated defendants are reasonable and just, and such as the plaintiff ought to have regulated its business by. Whether, if reasonable, the carriers might enforce them by a combination or association, and whether however reasonable the rules may be, and however wrongful may have been the action of the plaintiff in resisting them, the carriers could lawfully refuse to deliver the freight consigned to the owners, are questions to be considered further along, as is the question whether, conceding the refusal of the carriers to deliver the freight to have been wrongful, the plaintiff is in an attitude to ask the chancellor to right the wrong by compelling an unconditional delivery of the cars to it. The rules of the association are of great length, and need not be recited in detail. A discussion of the grounds upon which the appellant seeks to impeach them will sufficiently indicate their nature and purpose. Those grounds, as carefully grouped by the learned chancellor, are as follows: (1) That the period of 48 hours which, computed under the car-service rules, extends to nearly 60 hours, within which it is required to unload said cars after delivery, is too short. (2) That the demurrage charge of a dollar per day per car for the detention of cars after the expiration of said 48 hours is exorbitant and excessive. (3) That neither the plaintiff nor any other shipper or consignee was consulted by the defendants in the framing of said rules, and that neither it nor any other shipper or consignee has any voice in the selection and appointment of the manager or committee of the car-service association. (4) That there is no reciprocity of indemnity and counter penalty in said rules, in favor of plaintiff and other shippers and consignees, against the defendants for not promptly performing their duties as common carriers. (5) That the defendants, by entering into the car-service association, have surrendered their corporate autonomy and functions, and relegated the control and management of their business as common carriers to the arbitrary control of the manager and committee of the car-service association, and have thereby agreed to abolish competition, and that, for this reason, the said rules are illegal. (6) That, under the car-service rules, a delivering railroad company is authorized to demand demurrage charges on cars that do not belong to it but to other companies.

That there may be a reasonable charge for the detention of the carrier's cars by the consignee or consignor beyond a reasonable time within which to load and unload them cannot now be doubted, and that such charges may be imposed and enforced through what are known over the country as "Car-Service Associations," is equally well settled. A few cases, only, had arisen in the courts prior to the institution of this action, but several have since been considered, and we know of no exception to the general doctrine that reasonable rules, involving charges for such...