Kerlin v. State, 768S117
Citation | 265 N.E.2d 22,255 Ind. 420 |
Decision Date | 22 December 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 768S117,768S117 |
Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Parties | Elwood KERLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Austin C. Gildea, Elkhart, Wilmer L. McLaughlin, Goshen, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Murray West, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was charged by affidavit with the crime of sodomy. Trial was had by jury resulting in a verdict of guilty and fixing punishment at a fine of $100 and imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than two nor more than fourteen years.
The record in the case is as follows:
On June 22, 1966, at approximately 7:30 P.M. a fifteen year old boy met the appellant at the home of a neighbor where appellant was delivering some furniture. The appellant offered the boy a job helping him transplant some trees in Michigan. After first obtaining approval of his parents, the boy accepted the employment and received permission from his father to go with the appellant to appellant's residence in Elkhart County, Indiana. The appellant and the boy arrived at appellant's home at approximately 11:30 the same evening. They went to bed together at about 12:30 A.M. on June 23, 1966. The boy testified that after they were in bed the appellant accomplished oral copulation on the person of the boy. He further testified that when he awoke the next morning at approximately 10:00 A.M. the appellant was again practicing oral copulation of his (the boy's) person.
The boy stayed at appellant's home for two or three days then returned to the home of his parents. He was later taken to the Elkhart Police Station where he was questioned concerning his relationship with the appellant.
Two male witnesses called on behalf of the State testified over objection that they had had sexual relations with the appellant under circumstances similar to those described by the prosecuting witness.
The appellant first claims the court erred in refusing the defendant's motion to require the accuser to be in attendance at the trial. This contention is made by the appellant by reason of the fact that the charging affidavit was signed by the father of the boy upon whom the acts of sodomy were alleged to have been committed.
It is appellant's contention that his rights as defined under Article 1, Section 13 of the Constitution of Indiana were violated by the failure of the court to order the State to produce the father, thus denying the appellant the right 'to meet the witnesses face to face.'
Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution reads as follows:
'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.'
There is no question but what any person charged with a crime has the rights guaranteed by the above section of our constitution. This Court was recently called upon to interpret this section of the constitution in a factual situation similar to the case at bar. In that case this Court held:
Denton v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 155, 160, 203 N.E.2d 539, 541, 4 Ind.Dec. 420.
In the record before us there is no indication that the appellant attempted to subpoena the father. It certainly was not incumbent upon the judge to order the prosecuting attorney to produce the father in court. It is quite proper and natural that the father of a fifteen year old boy be the person to make an affidavit charging such a crime. Where, as here, the alleged victim was a competent witness to testify against the appellant and where he was in fact in court and did testify both on direct examination and on cross- examination concerning the facts alleged in the affidavit, we fail to see where the appellant was harmed by the absence of the boy's father, who had made the charging affidavit. In fact, the appellant does not allege any specific harm resulted from the absence of the father other than his claim that he should have had the right to face the accusing witnesses. He had this right fully guaranteed him by our constitution as above quoted and the statutes which implement the constitution. Burns' Ind.Stat., 1956 Repl., § 9--1601 reads as follows:
There is nothing in this record to indicate appellant attempted to make use of the foregoing statute.
Appellant also alleges that he was denied his constitutional rights in that testimony by the boy indicated that his father did not know anything about the crime charged in the affidavit and therefore the father had no knowledge of facts except hearsay upon which to base the information alleged in the affidavit. An examination of the record, however, discloses that it is wholly devoid of any challenge to the affidavit at the trial level. In the absence of any record before us we cannot assume the appellant's conclusion be true. We have repeatedly held that the appellant cannot on appeal assert a theory which was not asserted in the trial court. Martin v. State (1963), 245 Ind. 224, 194 N.E.2d 721, 2 Ind.Dec. 463; Langley v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 29, 232 N.E.2d 611, 12 Ind.Dec. 419.
Appellant next contends the court erred in permitting two adult male witnesses to testify to facts which amounted to the commission of acts of sodomy between them and the appellant some eight years prior to the trial of this case. The admissibility of evidence of similar offenses committed by the accused has been the source of discussion in many cases. We have repeatedly held that general evidence of prior offenses by the accused is inadmissible if it is irrelevant or produced merely to show the defendant's general character is bad or that he has a tendency to commit certain types of crimes. Meeks v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 659, 234 N.E.2d 629, 13 Ind.Dec. 268. There are recognized exceptions, however, to this general proposition of law. The decision in the Meeks case was in keeping with the general proposition of law as set out in the case of Lovely v. United States (1948, 4th Cir.), 169 F.2d 386, which is quoted therein. However, the Lovely case specifically points out that evidence of former similar offenses is admissible in sex crimes involving a 'depraved sexual instinct' whereas it is not per se admissible in a rape case, and in so holding stated:
"* * *.
This Court reaffirmed this proposition of law in Woods v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 132, 235 N.E.2d 479, 13 Ind.Dec. 610.
The case of Lamar v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 104, 195 N.E.2d 98, 2 Ind.Dec. 518, which was criticized in the Meeks case, was totally...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Mitchell v. State, 57746
...(1969); Bissell v. State, 157 Ga.App. 711, 278 S.E.2d 415 (1981); Estes v. State, 244 Ind. 691, 195 N.E.2d 471 (1964); Kerlin v. State, 255 Ind. 420, 265 N.E.2d 22 (1970); Gilman v. State, 258 Ind. 556, 282 N.E.2d 816 (1972); Pieper v. State, 262 Ind. 580, 321 N.E.2d 196 (1975); Bowen v. St......
-
Kagebein v. State
...of an adult is relevant to the crime charged, it seems clear that there is a definite relaxation of the remoteness test. Kerlin v. State, 265 N.E.2d 22 (Ind., 1970). In Ward v. State, supra, where appellant was charged with fondling a male child, we approved the jury hearing testimony conce......
-
Derouen v. State
...(1969); Bissell v. State, 157 Ga.App. 711, 278 S.E.2d 415 (1981); Estes v. State, 244 Ind. 691, 195 N.E.2d 471 (1964); Kerlin v. State, 255 Ind. 420, 265 N.E.2d 22 (1970); Gilman v. State, 258 Ind. 556, 282 N.E.2d 816 (1972); Pieper v. State, 262 Ind. 580, 321 N.E.2d 196 (1975); Bowen v. St......
-
State v. Treadaway
...and cites only one case actually on point for each. Gilman v. State, 258 Ind. 556, 282 N.E.2d 816 (1972) (similar); Kerlin v. State, 255 Ind. 420, 265 N.E.2d 22 (1970) (near in time). Both sides attempt to bolster their arguments with citations to opinions which often involve different exce......