Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc.

Decision Date12 June 1975
Docket NumberNo. 9431,9431
PartiesOtis KERR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRAND FOUNDRIES, INC., Defendant-Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Ivella Elsey, Springfield, Charles C. Shafer, Jr., Howard Chamberlin, Kansas City, for plaintiff-appellant.

B. H. Clampett, Ransom A. Ellis, Jr., J. Miles Sweeney, Daniel, Clampett, Ellis, Rittershouse & Dalton, William P. Sanford, James P. Ferguson, Miller, Fairman, Sanford, Carr & Lowther, Springfield, for defendant-respondent.

HOGAN, Judge.

In this case plaintiff Otis Kerr seeks to recover actual and punitive damages under our Service Letter Statute, § 290.140, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., and in a second count claims actual and punitive damages for personal injuries as a result of an assault made by one Blumer, alias McLaughlin, on the theory that the defendant induced McLaughlin to assault the plaintiff. Various aspects of the controversy--in defendant's view the whole controversy--have been litigated before. See N.L.R.B. v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 362 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1966): Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 451 S.W.2d 26 (Mo.1970). The parties the stipulated that the 'official files' of the court in both cases be filed here. That has been done; we have accordingly taken judicial notice of the decree of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the mandate of our Supreme Court. Reference may be had to the opinion filed and reported in N.L.R.B. v. Grand Foundries, Inc., supra, 362 F.2d 702, for the general factual background of the case.

Following issuance of the Supreme Court's mandate in Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc., supra, 451 S.W.2d 26, apparently with leave of court, plaintiff filed a slightly amended petition. Responsive pleadings were filed, the cause was put in issue, and the defendant moved for summary judgment on both counts. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. On motion, that court transferred the appeal here. The trial court's action was in effect a determination that as a matter of law there was no issue of fact to be tried, and our duty is to review that determination as we would any other bench-tried case. Swink v. Swink, 367 S.W.2d 575, 577--578(1--3) (Mo.1963).

The general subjects involved on this appeal--federal preemption of all jurisdiction in certain fields, and the extent to which a judgment in one case acts as an estoppel in subsequent litigation--are rather complex and the decisions relevant to the merits of this appeal are themselves somewhat difficult to follow. To illustrate, the trial court's reason for granting the motion for summary judgment on Court One of plaintiff's petition was that plaintiff's cause of action had been preempted by federal statute, specifically § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Management Relations Act, as amended 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3), which amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3), which for union activity. The United States Court of Appeals held in its decree that the plaintiff was not discriminatorily discharged in violation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3). Having concluded that the cause of action asserted by plaintiff in Count One had been preempted by federal statute, the trial court held that Count One presented no issue for adjudication in a state court, and even if there were no preemption, the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred plaintiff's relitigation of the issues tendered therein. As for Count Two, the trial court reasoned that the factual issues pleaded had already been litigated in the federal proceding, and the plaintiff was estopped from relitigating those issues by the federal decree.

Determination of the issue of federal preemption in this particular case would require careful factual distinction between the conduct asserted as a basis for recovery and similar...

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6 cases
  • City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 21, 1979
    ...Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust v. Commercial Bank of Liberty, N.A., 567 S.W.2d 710, 712(1) (Mo.App.1978); Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 783, 784(2) (Mo.App.1975); Swink v. Swink, 367 S.W.2d 575, 577(2) From our vantage point, we conclude that while the trial court's judgment decl......
  • Kaw Valley State Bank and Trust v. Commercial Bank of Liberty, N.A., KCD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 12, 1978
    ...upon any theory, the judgment of the trial court will be sustained. Swink v. Swink, 367 S.W.2d 575 (Mo.1963). Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.App.1975). It is not necessary to this review to consider summary judgment procedure in detail; it is sufficient to note that a sum......
  • Langford's Estate, Matter of
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • October 7, 1975
    ...demonstrate wherein and why the trial court allegedly erred in applying the law to the facts or vice versa. Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 783, 785(3) (Mo.App.1975). The widow's motion is well taken and is sustained. The appeal is, therefore, All concur. 1 References herein to st......
  • Home Bldg. Co. v. City of Kansas City
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • November 3, 1980
    ...as a matter of law, no fact issues were present and this court must review the case as any other bench-tried case. Kerr v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.App.1975). Under Rule 73.01(3) that review is on both the law and the evidence as in suits of an equitable nature. Brain Trust......
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