Kerr v. Louderback

• Citation: 35 S.W.3d 511
• Parties: (Mo.App. S.D. 2001) Stacey L. Kerr, Petitioner/Respondent v. Debra L. Louderback, Respondent/Appellant. 23400 0
• Decision Date: 26 January 2001
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

35 S.W.3d 511 (Mo.App. S.D. 2001) Stacey L. Kerr, Petitioner/Respondent
v.
Debra L. Louderback, Respondent/Appellant. 23400 Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District 01/26/2001

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Christian County, Hon. Anthony McConnell

Counsel for Appellant: Joanna Billingsley

Counsel for Respondent: Larry Bratvold

Opinion Summary: None

Parrish, P.J., and Montgomery, J., concur.

Kenneth W. Shrum, Judge

This is a domestic relations case in which Debra L. Louderback ("Mother") moved to modify that part of a dissolution decree that dealt with physical custody of and support for her minor daughter. The trial court found a modification would not serve the best interests of the child, and denied the relief requested. Mother appeals, charging that the trial court's decision was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree. We affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mother and Stacy L. Kerr ("Father") were married on April 16, 1985. Their only child, Cagney J. L. Kerr ("Cagney"), born October 4, 1985, is the subject of Mother's motion to modify. The dissolution decree vested "joint legal custody" of Cagney in Mother and Father, granted "physical custody" of Cagney to Father, and ordered extensive "visitation" periods for Cagney with Mother. Cagney's "visitation" time with Mother included every other weekend, several specified holidays, certain birthdays, Mother's day, and most of each summer.¹

This physical custody arrangement continued until January 1, 1999, when Cagney moved to Mother's home. Mother had recently moved into the Clever, Missouri, school district where Cagney was attending school, and Cagney stated she wanted to move "[b]ecause I miss my mom and my brothers." Father testified he considered this an informal arrangement and did not intend to relinquish custody. On February 19, 1999, Mother filed a motion to modify the dissolution decree requesting, among other things, the court "to award custody of Cagney" to her. On October 8, 1999, a trial was conducted in which several witnesses testified for both parties. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge found that the change in residence to Mother's home could qualify as a substantial and continuing change in circumstances to warrant a modification of the custody part of the decree; however, he also stated he must still decide if this was in the child's best interests. The trial judge then found it was not in Cagney's best interests for "Mother to become [Cagney's] legal custodian and for [Cagney] to primarily live with the Mother." Therefore, the motion to modify was denied. Mother's appeal to this court followed.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Mother's point relied on charges the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to modify because "the weight of evidence showed that the best interests of the child would be served by a transfer of custody . . . ."² Mother premises this argument on the fact that Cagney had been living with her for ten months, Cagney was "happy, adjusted to her environment, and doing well in school[,]" and Cagney's preference was to remain at Mother's home.

Our review of the trial court's judgment is governed by the principles enunciated in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.banc 1976). Tilley v. Tilley, 968 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Mo.App. 1998). Thus, we must affirm the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id.

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision of the trial court and will affirm the judgment under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence. Reeves-Weible v. Reeves, 995 S.W.2d 50, 55-56[5] (Mo.App. 1999). "We give greater deference to the trial court in child custody cases than in other types of cases because the trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of the parties, their sincerity, character, and other intangibles which may not be revealed by the record." Johnson v. Lewis, 12 S.W.3d 379, 382[2] (Mo.App. 2000).

The phrase "weight of the evidence" means its weight in probative value, not the quantity or amount of evidence. The weight of the evidence is not determined by mathematics; it depends on its effect in inducing belief. Nix, 862 S.W.2d at 951[5]. "Appellate courts should exercise the power to set aside a decree or judgment on the ground that it is 'against the weight of the evidence' with caution and with a firm belief that the decree or judgment is wrong." Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32[2].

Under Rule 84.13(d), formerly Rule 73.01(c), we give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Tilley, 968 S.W.2d at 211. Trial judges are better able than appellate courts to assess the credibility of the parties and other intangibles that are not completely revealed by the record on appeal. Id. at 211[2].

Presumably, the trial judge found that since Cagney had been living with Mother for ten months, this satisfied the requirement under Section 452.410, RSMo 1994, that a change in circumstances existed to justify an inquiry into whether this change promoted the best interests of Cagney. See Tilley, 968 S.W.2d at 212 (holding change in circumstances is a precursor to determining best interests of child). When deciding what is in the best interests of a child, a court seeks the guidance of the statutory factors listed in...