Kesling v. Florida
| Decision Date | 07 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:20cv143-AW/MAF |
| Parties | SHAWN M. KESLING, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On or about June 16, 2020, Petitioner Shawn M. Kesling, a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. On December 17, 2020, Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits. ECF No. 12. Petitioner has not filed a reply, although he was given the opportunity to do so. See ECF Nos. 19, 22 24.
The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Northern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). After careful consideration, the undersigned has determined no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. See Rule 8(a), R. Gov § 2254 Cases. For the reasons stated herein, the pleadings and attachments before the Court show Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief and his petition should be denied.
Under the supervision of Idaho state authorities, pursuant to the Interstate Compact, Petitioner Shawn M. Kesling was serving a Florida probation sentence, imposed by the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Alachua County, in case number 2007-CF-4206A, when he committed new offenses in Ada County Idaho, in 2017. ECF No. 1; Ex. A at 11.[1]The State of Idaho charged him, in Ada County Case 2017-16283, and he was convicted and sentenced to prison in the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC). See Ex. A at 2-3, 7; ECF No. 1. Because of the Idaho offenses, Florida officials filed a probation violation report and a warrant was issued February 12, 2018, for violation of probation. Ex. A at 13-14. As a result, the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) placed a detainer with IDOC to hold Kesling. Id.; Ex. B at 34. According to the IDOC, Kesling's “sentence satisfaction date” is May 12, 2031. Ex. B at 34; see www. idoc. idaho.gov/content/prisons.
On August 16, 2018, Kesling mailed a “Motion to Quash Warrant or In the Alternative Motion to Compel State to Produce Defendant,” to the Alachua County Circuit Court. Ex. B at 28-32. In this motion, Kesling asked the court “to quash the pending warrant for violation of probation” or “issue an order compelling the State” to produce Kesling “so that the allegation(s) against him may be disposed of forthwith.” Id. at 28. Kesling explains that, for his Idaho offenses, he “was sentenced to a fixed term of 4 (four) years of incarceration, followed by an indeterminate period of 10 (ten) years imprisonment, for a period not to exceed 14 (fourteen) years.” Id. at 29. He further explains that, absent the Florida warrant and detainer, he “would be classified as a minimum custody inmate” with the IDOC and, as such, he “would be eligible for placement at a minimum custody facility,” allowed “to work outside of the facility, and “even allow[ed] placement at a community work center, the IDOC equivalent to ‘work release.'” Id. He states he would also “be able to participate in programs designed to provide improved social skills, as well as tools to reduce recidivism.” Id. Kesling therefore moved the court to quash the warrant or, in the alternative, compel the State to produce him “for disposition of the pending VOP proceedings” at the court's “soonest available opportunity.” Id. at 31.
By order on August 27, 2018, the Alachua County Circuit Court denied Kesling's motion. Ex. B at 36-37. The court explained that “[a] Warrant was issued . . . on February 12, 2018 for violation of probation” and “[t]he Defendant has not been arrested on these charges.” Ex. B at 36. The court further explained:
Kesling appealed the order to the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA), assigned case number 1D18-3875. Ex. B at 38-41; see Ex. C. By order on January 8, 2019, the First DCA dismissed the case because Kesling had not responded to an order directing him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as the order did not appear to be a final order or an appealable non-final order. Ex. C at 3. Kesling sought to have the appeal reinstated, but the First DCA denied his motion on April 22, 2019. Id.
Kesling then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Florida Supreme Court, assigned case number SC19-1741. Ex. D. On October 31, 2019, the Florida Supreme Court transferred the case to the First DCA, where it was assigned case number 1D19-3961. Id.; Ex. E. Kesling filed an amended petition on or about November 8, 2019, in the First DCA. Ex. F; see Ex. E. On February 27, 2020, the First DCA denied the petition on the merits, citing Saunders v. State, 837 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Ex. G.
As indicated above, on or about June 16, 2020, Kesling filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. In his petition, Kesling challenges the detainer lodged against him in Alachua Circuit Court Case 1-2007-CF-4206A. See id.; ECF No. 4 at 1. He raises four grounds in this challenge:
On December 17, 2020, Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits. ECF No. 12. Petitioner has not filed a reply, although he was given the opportunity to do so. see ECF Nos. 19, 22, 24.
On July 20, 2022, this case was reassigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. ECF No. 15.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted federal courts the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. see United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). The habeas remedy is now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, subsection (c)(3) of which provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless the prisoner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” As noted in Hayman, generally prisoners must bring habeas corpus applications in the district of confinement. 342 U.S. at 213. Because courts with federal prisons in their jurisdictional boundaries became inundated with habeas petitions, and because the materials witnesses, and other evidence which had a significant bearing on the determination of the legality of a sentence were generally located in the district where sentence was imposed rather than where the prisoner was confined, in 1948 Congress enacted § 2255 of Title 28. See id. at 212-14, 218; see also Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 1999).
The language of § 2255 suggests, and the Eleventh Circuit has expressly concluded, that this statute channels challenges to the legality of the imposition of a sentence while leaving § 2241 available to challenge the continuation or execution of an initially valid confinement. see McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017); Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 629 (11th Cir. 1990) (). Thus, § 2241 provides an avenue for challenges to matters such as the administration of sentences or parole, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, and certain types of detention. see Antonelli, 542 F.3d at 1352 (); Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 810 (11th Cir. 2004) (); Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295, 1304 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000) (). See also, e.g., Moody v. Holman, 887 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2018) (...
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