Kettenring v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n

• Decision Date: 19 July 1899
• Docket Number: 23,824.
• Citation: 96 F. 177
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: KETTENRING v. NORTHWESTERN MASONIC AID ASS'N.

96 F. 177

KETTENRING v. NORTHWESTERN MASONIC AID ASS'N.

No. 23,824.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Illinois, Northern Division.

July 19, 1899

Bulkley Gray & More, for plaintiff.

Walker & Payne, for defendant.

KOHLSAAT District Judge.

This is a suit at law upon a policy of insurance which contains the following clause: 'No suit at law or in equity shall be maintainable against said association upon or growing out of this contract, unless the same shall be commenced within twelve months after the death of said insured. ' This suit was commenced 12 months and 15 days after the death of the insured. Defendant pleads the limitation of 12 months and plaintiff demurs to the plea. This decision is upon said demurrer. Under another clause of the policy the amount to be paid to the beneficiary is payable within 90 days after the receipt by the company of satisfactory proofs of the death of insured. Plaintiff contends that the two clauses are conflicting; that the limiting of the right of action to 12 months must be construed as meaning a full period of 12 months during any portion of which plaintiff could sue, and that such limitation period should only commence to run at the expiration of the said 90-day period. The case of Riddlesbarger v. Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386, is the leading case in the federal courts sustaining the validity of a clause in an insurance policy limiting a right of action thereon to a period less than that provided by the general statute of limitation. Without discussing the question of whether or not such decision was faulty as against public policy, I hold that, in view of it the plain meaning of the clause in question should be given effect by the court, and that unless some equitable circumstances are disclosed which would take the particular case out of the rule, or unless the insurance company is estopped by its own actions from relying upon such limitation clause, the clause must be enforced literally and strictly. The decisions are hopelessly antagonistic on this point. The courts of a large majority of the states--including Illinois-- have given a literal construction to the limitation clause, and enforced it as it reads. A few of the state courts have attempted to distinguish between the meaning of 'after the loss,' and 'after time of death,' or 'after date of fire,' but I am not able to recognize that the terms are not practically synonymous. The matter has not been...