Wever v. Pioneer Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 December 1915 |
| Docket Number | 3756. |
| Parties | WEVER ET AL. v. PIONEER FIRE INS. CO. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The provision in the standard form of fire insurance policy provided for in section 3481, and contained in section 3482, Rev. Laws 1910, that "no suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity until after full compliance by the assured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire," is unambiguous, and, in an action on the policy commenced more than 12 months after the date of the fire, will be enforced in accordance with the plain meaning of its terms, where no extrinsic facts are alleged excusing delay in instituting the action.
Where a standard form of policy of fire insurance contains the provision that no suit or action shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless commenced within 12 months next after the fire, the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the fire, notwithstanding the policy also contains a provision that "the loss shall not become payable until sixty days after the notice, ascertainment estimate, and satisfactory proof of the loss herein required have been received by this company, including an award by appraisers when appraisal has been required."
Error from County Court, Coal County; R. H. Wells, Judge.
Action by W. F. Wever and another against the Pioneer Fire Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.
William H. Fuller and George M. Porter, both of McAlester, and C. E B. Cutler, of Coalgate, for plaintiffs in error.
Scothorn, Caldwell & McRill, of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
Plaintiffs' action was brought July 29, 1911, to recover on an Oklahoma standard form fire insurance policy, issued by the Pioneer Fire Insurance Company to the plaintiff W. F. Wever, October 16, 1909. The amended petition alleged the total destruction of the property insured on April 5, 1910, on which date, it was said, the insurance policy was in full force and effect. To both the original and amended petition, the defendant filed a general demurrer, and also a special demurrer, on the ground that both petitions disclosed that plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by limitation.
Section 3481, Rev. Laws 1910, provides that no fire insurance company shall issue fire insurance policies on property in this state, other than those of the standard form therein set forth, with certain enumerated exceptions not involved in this appeal. Section 3482 contains a standard form of policy, and in which is the following provision:
"No suit or action on this policy, for the recovery of any claim, shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity until after full compliance by the insured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire."
The policy contains additional provisions to the effect that if fire occur, the insured shall give immediate notice in writing of any loss thereby, and within 60 days after the fire, unless such time is extended in writing by the insurer, shall render a statement to the company, signed and sworn to by the insured, stating the knowledge and belief of the insured as to the time and origin of the fire, together with other requirements not here necessary to enumerate; and further provides, in effect, that the policy shall be payable 60 days after due notice, ascertainment, estimate, and satisfactory proofs of the loss have been received by the company, in accordance with the terms of the policy, and not otherwise.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs in error that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the expiration of 12 months from the time the policy was payable by the insurer; while on the part of the insurer it is urged that the statute of limitations commenced to run from the time of the fire. It is said, in effect, by plaintiffs in error, that because of the terms of the policy, the company could not be sued until certain conditions were complied with, which would necessarily consume a portion of the time, and, the loss not being payable until 60 days after satisfactory proofs of the loss were received by the company, it might happen, if the limitation clause should be construed according to its language, that the action would be barred before the right to sue actually accrued under other provisions in the policy, and therefore the parties cannot have intended what they expressly said; that the provision in the policy, postponing a right of action until 60 days after proofs of loss are furnished, is in conflict with the provision limiting the time within which an action may be commenced, and that these provisions must be harmonized by judicial construction. To this view we cannot give our assent. "Twelve months next after the fire" cannot be tortured into meaning "twelve months from the date the loss becomes payable." Plain, unambiguous words which have but one meaning are not subject to construction. "Twelve months next after the fire" has but one meaning. It can have no other. The fact that the policy was not payable until 60 days after proofs were furnished does not tend to make uncertain or ambiguous the language of the policy.
Nor is there any conflict in the several provisions of the statutory form of policy. Giving to the insured the full time allowed him for the submission of the proofs of loss, and to the insurer the time prescribed for payment of the loss, after proofs of loss have been received, there would have remained 8 months in which to bring action in the event that liability was denied or payment refused. To so hold gives full force and effect to each of the several provisions of the policy, and does violence to none. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Lindsay Bridge Co., 32 Okl. 31, 121 P. 639. Any other view would be not to construe the language of the policy, but to change it. Oklahoma Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 44 Okl. 783, 145 P. 1138, L. R. A. 1915E, 695; United States v. Fisk, 3 Wall. 445, 18 L.Ed. 243. To substitute another and different policy for the one prescribed by the Legislature. Not only are we precluded from changing the provisions of the policy, under the guise of construction, of making a new contract for the parties, but the parties themselves could not have made the contract contended for by the insured. They had no volition in the matter. They could have provided no different period of limitation. The limitation in the policy for the bringing of an action was not a part of the policy by virtue of any agreement of the parties, but by command of the statute. Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co., 156 N.Y. 327, 50 N.E. 863, 42 L. R. A. 485; Temple v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 372, 85 N.W. 861; Tracy v. Queen City Fire Ins. Co., 132 La. 610, 61 So. 687, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1145. The Legislature having undertaken to fix a special statute of limitations, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the time allowed is unreasonable. The statutes of some of the states, it appears, allow but 6 months after loss, or fire, or the doing of a certain act, in which to bring suit. Circumstances might arise, and often do, that would have the effect of delaying the period in which suit could be brought. Such was the case in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 27 Okl. 496, 112 P. 1026. No circumstances appear from the plaintiffs' amended petition by which he was deprived of a reasonable time in which to bring his action. If such were the case, a different question might arise.
When the statute commenced to run presents a question in which there is much conflict of authority. We believe, however, that the weight of authority and the better reasoned cases support our conclusion. The provision of our statute, fixing the time within which suit shall be brought, is identical with that provision of a policy before the court in Allen v. Dutchess County Mut. Ins. Co., 95 A.D. 86, 88 N.Y.S. 530, in which it was held that the 12 months' limitation began to run from the date of the fire, citing King v. Watertown Fire Ins. Co., 47 Hun, 1; Cooper v. U.S. Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 132 N.Y. 334, 30 N.E. 833, 16 L. R. A. 138, 28 Am. St. Rep. 581. In the latter case, the prior decisions of that court in Mayor, etc., v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 39 N.Y. 45, 100 Am. Dec. 400, Hay v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 77 N.Y. 235, 33 Am. Rep. 607, and Steen v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 89 N.Y. 315, 42 Am. Rep. 297, were held not to be controlling, for the reason that there the period of limitation was 12 months "after any loss or damage shall accrue," or "after the loss shall occur," or "next after the loss or damage shall occur." In the latter case the policy limited the time for bringing an action, as already seen, to a term of 12 months "next after the loss or damage shall occur," and it was said, after referring to previous decisions of the court:
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