Key v. Collins
| Decision Date | 19 May 1921 |
| Parties | KEY ET AL. v. COLLINS ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from Chancery Court, Henry County; V. H. Holmes, Judge sitting by interchange in place of J. W. Ross.
Bill by J. L. J. Key and others against R. D. Collins and another. From a decree overruling demurrers to the bill, defendants appeal. Affirmed and case remanded.
p>Page Lytton Taylor and G. L. Fryer, both of Paris, for appellants.
Fitzhugh & Rye, of Paris, for appellees.
On December 1, 1885, R. D. Collins and Mrs. E. A. Stevens were married, and on the day prior thereto the following antenuptial contract was executed by them:
Both parties had been married before, and at the date of this marriage both were about 50 years of age. Mr. Collins was a widower with four children, while Mrs. Stevens was a widow without children. They lived together as man and wife for about 35 years, and no children were born to them. Mrs. Collins died intestate in November of 1920, and her surviving husband qualified as the administrator of her estate and claimed jure mariti her personal estate amounting to about $15,000. She left surviving her some brothers, a sister, and the representatives of deceased relatives, who filed this bill against Mr. Collins, claiming that under the above-quoted contract he as surviving husband had no right or title to her personal estate, but that the same passed to the complainants as her next of kin.
Demurrers were filed to the bill, by Mr. Collins and the surety on his bond as administrator, and with the exception of the ground involving an estoppel on his part, all the other grounds of the demurrers were overruled by the chancellor, who in his discretion granted an appeal to Mr. Collins and his surety to this court.
While several errors are assigned by the appellants, the determinative question is one of the construction of the marriage contract entered into by the parties in contemplation of marriage, on the 30th day of November, 1885.
As said by the Supreme Court of Illinois:
Collins v. Phillips, 259 Ill. 405, 102 N.E. 796, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 188 (1913).
That antenuptial settlements are favored in law is settled. Stratton v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 91, 185 S.W. 522, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 917; 21 Cyc. 1242.
As heretofore stated, Mrs. E. A. Stevens (called Mrs. E. A. Collins in the contract) was a widow, and Mr. Collins was a widower with four children. This would indicate that much of life was behind them, and also that there might be two sets of children, in only one of which she would be primarily interested.
The rules of law applicable are settled in Tennessee, and for that reason the main question, as stated, is that of the construction or meaning of the antenuptial agreement. Before stating those rules, it is not improper to remark upon the fact that the writing shows on its face that it was not prepared by a lawyer but by some one with some acquaintance with a few law terms, not uneducated and unfamiliar with the nicer distinctions between those terms. To illustrate: It says, "We, undersigned * * * witnesseth," and the contract, though made before the marriage, is not signed by "Anna Stevens," but by E. A. Collins," and it uses the words "covenanted" and "seized."
As to the rules of law applicable:
1. The right of the husband as survivor can be cut off or abridged by a marriage agreement; but
2. For this to be done, it must clearly and plainly appear from the language used that this is the effect of the contract; and
3. Even though personal property be settled upon the wife by an antenuptial or other agreement, to her sole and separate use, with power to dispose thereof by deed or will, nothing else appearing, if she died possessed of the separate estate, and intestate, the husband's rights as survivor may be exercised. Carter v. Dale, Ross & Co., 3 Lea, 710, 31 Am. Rep. 660; Mitchell v. Bank, 126 Tenn. 669, 150 S.W. 1141; Hays v. Bright, 11 Heisk. 325; Baker v. Dew, 133 Tenn. 126, 179 S.W. 645.
Does this contract, construed according to its plain and obvious meaning, cut off the husband's rights as survivor of his wife?
It announces in the outset that it is a "marriage contract," and specifically states its object and purpose, namely, "to secure to each other (the contracting parties), in case of death, each one's property." The one announced purpose of the contract is to secure to each his or her property against the other, "in case of death"; that is, to preclude any and all claims which either might have as a spouse to the property of the other, in case of death.
The announced object and purpose is, not to secure to each his property as against the other during their married life, but as against the survivor in case of death.
With that announced object and purpose, the contract proceeds, and then provides that the woman shall retain all the property she has, or may afterwards acquire, "to be her own, in fact, to be free from my (the husband's) control as though we had never been man and wife." That is to say, her property shall be her own "in fact," and as free from his "control" as if the parties had never been married. When it is recalled that the contract provides that (1) its purpose is to secure to each his (or her) property, as against the other "in case of death," (2) that the wife's property shall be "her own, in fact," (3) and shall be as free from his "control" as if the parties "had never been man and wife," it is obvious that the word "control" is used in the sense of "rights and claims," and used to declare that he shall have no more right or claim to her property on her death than if they had never been married.
While the principal object announced was to cut off all claims of each to the property of the other at death, it, as matter of course, cut off all rights of the spouses during life also.
This contract provides that the wife shall retain, not merely the use or control of her property, but the property itself, "to be her own in fact," and that property so "retained" by her, to be as free from his control as though they "had never been man and wife."
As to his property, it provides that he too shall "retain" it, and that in the event he should die first, she shall claim neither dower nor anything that the laws of the state would give her as widow; carrying out the idea that his property should be "secure" upon his death against her claims, the same as if they had never been man and wife.
Moreover, it is unreasonable to suppose that all her rights as widow would be precluded, while his rights as surviving husband should remain unabridged.
It is said in the brief for appellants that the contract makes provision beyond the life of Mr. Collins by the use of the words "for all time," and that this "irresistibly implies the inevitable conclusion" that the only purpose was to "suspend" his...
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