Key v. Gillette Co.
Decision Date | 24 January 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 85-1251,85-1251 |
Citation | 782 F.2d 5 |
Parties | 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1623, 39 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,865, 4 Fed.R.Serv.3d 916 Barbara J. KEY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. GILLETTE COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Douglas F. Seaver with whom Timothy Q. Feeley and Gaston Snow and Ely Bartlett, Boston, Mass., were on brief for plaintiff, appellant.
Richard L. Neumeier with whom Gary D. Buseck and Parker, Coulter, Daley & White, Boston, Mass., were on brief for defendant, appellee.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, BOWNES, Circuit Judge, and CEREZO, * District Judge.
The issue in this appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking the class certification, 104 F.R.D. 139 (D.C.Mass.), after the court had ruled against the plaintiff on her individual claim.
Barbara J. Key filed this sex discrimination in employment action on behalf of herself and all women who held any exempt position (salaried, nonhourly employees) at any of the Massachusetts facilities of The Gillette Company during the years 1968 through 1975, inclusive. It was alleged that Gillette regularly paid women less than comparably qualified men and relegated women to the lower paying job grades.
The issue of certification has been forcefully argued since the early stages of this litigation and has been a constant source of controversy. When the class was originally certified in 1979, notice was sent to all potential members of the class, inviting them to intervene if they so desired. None responded to this notice. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed plaintiff's individual claim and decertified the class. Plaintiff only appealed from the judgment of the district court with respect to the issue of decertifiation. The case was remanded in 1983 to allow the district court to decide that issue after hearing argument on the possibility that the statute of limitations had run on the claims of other members of the class and on appellant's representation that others in the class would have come forward to participate in the litigation, if so requested, once they learned that she had lost. The parties were given time to file memoranda on these matters. On remand, the district court rejected these arguments stating that the limitations period was tolled during the time that the class action was pending and that class-wide notices elicited no response whatsoever from any putative class member. The district court also observed that Key's inability to support her individual claim of discrimination was by no means the sole basis for its prior decision to decertify.
On this second appeal, appellant does not challenge the court's disposition of the two matters which prompted a remand. Instead, she has renewed her general objection to the decertification ruling as being erroneous and seeks a detailed review of the merits of the case arguing that the district court acted on an erroneous premise when it applied Rule 23 criteria. The applicable standard of review is whether the district court abused its discretion in decertifying the class. We find there was no abuse of discretion. See DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 809, n. 12 (1st Cir.1980); Lamphere v. Brown University, 553 F.2d 714, 720 (1st Cir.1977).
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