Key v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 4:99CV3109 (D. Neb. 8/10/2001)
| Decision Date | 10 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | 4:99CV3109. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
| Parties | Edward Earl Key, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Defendant. |
Reginald Jordan is a production employee of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Jordan, along with twelve other plaintiffs, filed a six-count complaint against his employer alleging race-based discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I); retaliation in violation of Title VII and § 1981 (Count II); a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and § 1981 (Count III); gender-based discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count IV); disability-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA) (Count V); and discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1101 et seq. (NFEPA), and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-148 (Count VI) (filing 1). Reginald Jordan's own claims do not include causes of action based upon his gender or a disability (see Complaint ¶¶ 7, 15), and therefore do not involve Counts IV and V.
The defendant has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, filing 72, and was granted leave to submit a supporting brief and evidence out of time. (Filings 76, 80.) The plaintiff has now submitted his brief and evidentiary materials in opposition to the defendant's motion. After careful consideration of these materials, I find that the defendant's motion shall be granted in part.
The defendant's production and shipping operations in Lincoln, Nebraska, are divided into two plants. The defendant employs approximately 1,660 people at its Lincoln plant and an additional 150 people at its Global Distribution Center ("GDC") facility at the Lincoln Airpark. A vast majority of the employees at both facilities are assigned to production, maintenance, warehousing, and shipping positions. These employees are part of a collective bargaining unit represented by the United Steelworkers of America ("Union"). A collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the defendant determines pay rates, benefits, and job placements for the employees included in the bargaining unit.
The plaintiff, who is an African-American male, was hired by the defendant on July 22, 1988, as a production employee whose terms and conditions of employment were covered by the collective bargaining agreement. On or about January 7, 1998, the plaintiff bid for a position that would require him to transfer from the Lincoln plant to the GDC. The plaintiff's bid was successful, and on January 19 he was transferred to the GDC. Subsequently, in May 2000, the plaintiff bid back into the Lincoln plant. In August 2000, the plaintiff accepted a voluntary layoff, and he has remained on layoff as of the time of the submission of the defendant's brief in support of its motion for summary judgment. At all times, the plaintiff has been an employee covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
Generally, the allegations underlying the plaintiff's causes of action appear to be based upon events that occurred at or near the time of the plaintiff's transfer to the GDC. At some point prior to the plaintiff's bid to transfer to the GDC, a strike occurred at the Lincoln plant.2 The plaintiff states that following the strike, a "mob" formed to shout racial obscenities at two men who crossed the picket line during the strike. Although the plaintiff's supervisor allowed the plaintiff to move to the front of the facility to prepare to clock out before the mob assembled, the supervisor did nothing to break up the mob. It is not alleged that the plaintiff's experience with the mob caused him to bid for the position at the GDC, but it appears that the plaintiff's bid was made shortly after his exposure to the mob.
According to the plaintiff's statement of facts, the plaintiff bid on a first-shift job at the GDC that would allow him to schedule school around his workday. (See Pl.'s Statement of Disputed Facts and Controverted Issues at ¶ 11.) However, the portion of the record referred to by the citation accompanying ¶ 11 does not state that the plaintiff bid to a first-shift job at the GDC, but only that the plaintiff wanted to go to the first shift in order to go back to school. (Pl.'s Ex. 100 at 32:10-16.) In fact, the plaintiff admitted that the position he bid to was a second-shift position and that his training was to occur on the second shift. (Pl.'s Ex. 100 at 43:5-44:20.) The plaintiff was awarded the second-shift position and was transferred to the GDC on January 19, 1998. On February 2, 1998, the plaintiff requested that he be moved to the first shift even though his training on the second shift was not scheduled to end until April 13. The plaintiff's supervisor, Area Manager Joanna Cessna, refused to permit the transfer. The plaintiff states that Cessna threatened to eliminate the first-shift position rather than move the plaintiff into that shift. However, after discussions with the Union, the plaintiff was allowed to move to the first shift due to his seniority. The evidence is in conflict with respect to the date the plaintiff was allowed to move to the first shift. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff was transferred to the first shift effective February 2, 1998, which is the date the plaintiff requested to be transferred to that shift. The defendant further alleges that the plaintiff traded shifts with Sandy Schaff, thereby remaining on the second shift by his own arrangement until March 1, 1998, at which time he traded back to the first shift. In contrast, the plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully kept on the second shift until May 1998. As the evidence is to be considered in a light favorable to the plaintiff for the purposes of the defendant's summary judgment motion, I find that the plaintiff was not transferred to the first shift until May 1998. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). It is undisputed that there is no difference in wages or benefits between the first-shift and second-shift positions.
The plaintiff complained to Stan Patzel, the general manager at the GDC, about Cessna's refusal to move him to the first shift. He also complained about racial epithets that were once visible on the walls in the restroom at the workplace, pointing out that these epithets were not addressed until after complaints were made about them. The plaintiff was not satisfied with Patzel's response, which the plaintiff believed to be insincere. There is evidence that, at some point, the loudspeaker system at the GDC was used by employees to make obscene comments. The plaintiff argues that this practice was not addressed by management in a timely fashion. However, it is undisputed that the misuse of the speakers was eventually halted by the defendant.
In July 1998, the plaintiff and other employees complained to Patzel about the minority hiring practices at GDC. Patzel arranged for Rose Williams of the Human Resources Department to present data to the concerned employees regarding the defendant's hiring practices. The plaintiff attended the meeting, but he felt the meeting was just to show the complaining employees something to get them to "shut up." He admits that he did not really pay attention at the meeting. (Pl.'s Ex. 100 at 68:13-22.) Williams' data showed that the proportion of minorities comprising the defendant's overall workforce and the proportion of minority "area managers" exceeded the proportion of minorities found in the population of Lincoln, Nebraska. (Def.'s Ex. K at Exhibit 2.)
According to the plaintiff's charge of discrimination, after the July meeting with Williams, the plaintiff asked for an application for the defendant's Summer Vacation Replacement (SVR) program on behalf of his stepson. (Pl.'s Ex. 101.) He did not receive an application. However, the undisputed evidence shows that in 1998, the cutoff date for the receipt of SVR applications was April 13, 1998, and persons participating in the SVR program that year began working on May 15, 1998.3
The plaintiff was injured on the job, which caused him to miss work from Friday, July 10, 1998, to Monday, July 20, 1998. Upon his return to work on Tuesday, July 21, 1998, the plaintiff was placed on a light duty work restriction. Certain employees, including the plaintiff, were not eligible for overtime work while restricted to light duty. Thus, the plaintiff was ineligible to work overtime for a certain period following his injury. The plaintiff disliked light duty because it rendered him ineligible for overtime and because he felt the lack of work made the workday seem long.
On August 3, 1998, the plaintiff asked to be moved to a different area at GDC called Industrial Hose.4 Dr. Albers, the company doctor, issued the plaintiff a work restriction, and as a result the plaintiff was transferred to Industrial Hose on August 3. In response to complaints by the plaintiff's coworkers, Patzel investigated the plaintiff's medical restriction. He had conducted similar investigations over the course of his supervisory career.5 Following a functional capacity evaluation performed by a physical therapist selected by the plaintiff, Dr. Albers concluded that his medical restriction was issued erroneously. All of the plaintiff's medical restrictions were lifted on August 26, 1998.6 Even so, the plaintiff was allowed to remain in his new position at Industrial Hose.
The plaintiff believes that he was wrongfully denied overtime hours. At one point, he noticed a white female working prior to the start of her...
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