Keyes v. Checker Taxi Co.

• Decision Date: 26 May 1931
• Citation: 275 Mass. 461
• Parties: MARION A. KEYES v. CHECKER TAXI COMPANY. WILLIAM A. KEYES v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

275 Mass. 461

MARION A. KEYES v. CHECKER TAXI COMPANY. WILLIAM A. KEYES v. SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

May 26, 1931

May 11, 1931.

Present: CROSBY PIERCE, CARROLL, WAIT, & FIELD, JJ.

Negligence Contributory, Motor vehicle, In use of way, Imputed. Law of the Road. Practice, Civil, Requests, rulings and instructions.

At the trial of an action by a woman, who was a guest in an automobile, for personal injuries sustained when the automobile was run into by a taxicab of the defendant, there was evidence that the accident occurred late at night in a city; that the plaintiff was on the right side of the back seat of the automobile, whose driver, previous to the collision, was proceeding on a street toward an intersection with a second street, which crossed the first nearly at right angles, intending to continue on a third street which entered the same intersection and continued in the same general direction as the first street that the plaintiff, who testified that she "did some looking out for herself," was looking toward her right but, although her view was clear, she saw no approaching vehicle; that the driver of the automobile, proceeding slowly, crossed the intersection, and that, when almost the entire length of the automobile was beyond the intersection and in the third street, it was struck at the right rear wheel by the taxicab with such force that, although it weighed forty-two hundred pounds, the wheels were lifted, the driving shaft was detached from the body and the bumper was knocked in three or four feet toward the left hand curb. In crossing the intersection, the plaintiff's host did not go to the right of the intersection of the second and third streets. Held, that

(1) The question of negligence of the driver of the taxicab was for the jury;

(2) In the circumstances, there was no error in a refusal by the trial judge to instruct the jury, in substance, "If the operator of the plaintiff's automobile failed to keep to the right of the center of the intersection of" the third street in its junction with the second in turning into the third, "he thereby violated the ordinance with reference to making such left-hand turns";

(3) There was no evidence from which it could be ruled as matter of law that the plaintiff entrusted herself wholly to the care and caution of the operator, her host, without taking care for her own safety;

(4) The negligence of the operator, the plaintiffs' host, if there were any, could not be imputed to her. An instruction to the jury in the judge's charge, defining the

"intersection" and applying G.L.c. 89, Section 8, as amended by St. 1926, c. 330, Section 1, by stating that it was difficult to describe the intersection in the circumstances shown by a plan of the place of the accident which was in evidence because there were two streets coming in very close together and opening into another one, but that he "should suppose the point of intersection between" the first street and the second street would be that part found by the extension of the sides of the two streets, was free from error.

TWO ACTIONS OF TORT, the first for personal injuries sustained when an automobile in which the plaintiff was riding was run into by a taxicab of the defendant; and the second by the husband of the plaintiff in the first action for consequential damages. Writs dated November 3, 1927.

In the Superior Court, the actions were tried together before F.T. Hammond, J. A copy of a chart of the location of the accident which was used at the trial was made a part of the bill of exceptions and is shown below.

The defendant admitted that the taxicab in question was owned by the defendant and was registered in its name, and that the operator thereof, at the time of the collision, was employed by the defendant and was acting within the scope of his employment.

In direct examination, the plaintiff testified "that when she got to Essex Street she looked to the right and straight (ILLUSTRATION) ahead but saw no approaching vehicle, but the next thing she observed was that she saw lights bobbing up and down in front of her eyes and turned quick but did not remember anything." In cross-examination, she testified "that she had driven a car herself for four or five years before the accident and had been in the vicinity of Essex and Chauncy Street on other occasions before the accident; that she looked to the right and Essex and Chauncy Street to Washington Street was perfectly straight and there was nothing to prevent her from looking all the way to Washington

Street, and that if a vehicle was coming down and she did look she would have seen it; . . . that she relied on Mr. Cunningham's handling the automobile; that she trusted him with the operation or handling of the machine, but that she liked to know where she was going and was awake about it; that she entrusted her safety to Mr. Cunningham; that when she said she entrusted herself to Mr. Cunningham she meant that she knew the man; that he was a careful man and that she knew him just as she would if she were driving with her father; that she did some looking out for herself, it being hot and she turned every window down, but that was all she did, and apart from this she left everything in regard to her personal safety to Mr. Cunningham."

Other material evidence is described in the opinion. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant rested and moved that verdicts be ordered in its favor. The motions were denied. A request for a ruling, denied by the judge, is quoted in the opinion. The judge's charge as to the law of the road, which was excepted to by the defendant, was as follows:

"Now, there is another statute; that is, in regard to the law of the road when people meet at intersecting ways. In this case the accident happened at the junction of these two streets. As you know, there is this right of way statute, which provides, in substance, that every person driving an automobile approaching an intersecting way shall grant the right of way at the point of intersection to a vehicle approaching on his right. The vehicle approaching from his right has the right of way, with this proviso, that such vehicle is arriving at the point of intersection at approximately the same instant. . . . What does the point of intersection mean? Ordinarily, where you have two streets that cross each other . . . like a cross, the point of intersection is the area that is common to both streets; the square, in other words, formed by the side lines of the two streets. Now it is very difficult from this chalk [the chart shown on page 463] to . . . [describe exactly the point of intersection] applicable to this case, because there are two streets coming in very close together and opening out into another one. I should suppose the point of intersection between Essex Street and Chauncy Street would be . . . that part of Essex Street and Chauncy Street which would be common to both of them. If you extended the west line of Chauncy Street across Essex, and the east line of Chauncy Street across Essex, and then extended the north and south lines of Essex Street to the west, you would get something like a square, which would be the point of intersection between Chauncy Street and Essex Street. Now, if two vehicles were approaching that point of intersection at...