Keyes v. National RR Passenger Corp., Civ. A. No. 90-0607.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
Writing for the CourtDavid E. Faust, Post & Schell, P.C., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants
Citation766 F. Supp. 277
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 90-0607.
Decision Date04 April 1991
PartiesMarie V. KEYES v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, et al.

766 F. Supp. 277

Marie V. KEYES
v.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, et al.

Civ. A. No. 90-0607.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

April 4, 1991.


766 F. Supp. 278

Richard Koelle, Mylotte, David & Fitzpatrick, Media, Pa., for plaintiff.

David E. Faust, Post & Schell, P.C., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

LOWELL A. REED, Jr., District Judge.

Presently before the court is the timely motion of plaintiff, Marie V. Keyes (Document No. 22) to reconsider my order dated February 6, 1991 granting summary judgment in favor of defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and all supporting and responsive papers 756 F.Supp. 863. I shall consider the motion as made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). For the reasons outlined below, the motion for reconsideration shall be denied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought a negligence action against defendant Amtrak, among others, seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on ice and snow while boarding defendant's train. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming it was not liable for ordinary negligence because plaintiff used her pass to obtain a free ticket and a condition for riding at a reduced fair was that Amtrak would not be liable for ordinary negligence. Plaintiff argued that state law applied and under Pennsylvania state law the liability limitations clause was unenforceable. Alternatively, plaintiff argued that even if federal law applied, the clause was still unenforceable because it did not provide proper notice of the limitation. Plaintiff reasoned that because the clause was contained on the mailer rather than on either the ticket or the pass, notice was insufficient to release Amtrak from liability. I concluded that because plaintiff was an interstate traveler and Amtrak was a federal corporation that commonly travels from state to state, federal law applied. I then noted that provisions limiting liability have been consistently upheld under federal law and held that plaintiff was, therefore, barred from recovering against Amtrak. In determining that plaintiff was engaged in interstate travel, I found that plaintiff's pass entitled her to unlimited interstate travel and she admitted in ¶¶ 17 and 18 of the complaint that she was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident. In addition, although I was not legally obligated to consider the reasonableness of the clause under controlling law I did consider it using maritime law by analogy and found that the clause was not unreasonable because it was conspicuously placed on the mailer which contained special language, in bold letters, that the mailer should be held for further reference.1

Plaintiff now asks me to reconsider this decision. She makes the following arguments: (1) The decision was based on the reasonable notice standard applied to liability limitations provisions for sea-going vessels and under that standard courts uniformly require notice to appear on the face of the ticket, and since notice was not contained on the face of the ticket in this case it was not reasonable; and (2) the order was premised on "additional grounds" that federal law applied and this was established because of inconclusive evidence of intrastate travel and by cases applying to interstate travel. Plaintiff has since submitted an affidavit stating that she was traveling intrastate and now argues that Pennsylvania law, which does not support limitations on liability, should apply.

DISCUSSION

It appears that plaintiff has misconstrued my opinion by her assertion that I relied on or adopted the reasonable communicative standard applied to...

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