Keyes v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1, DENVER, COLO., Civ. A. No. C-1499.
| Decision Date | 06 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. C-1499. |
| Citation | 670 F. Supp. 1513 |
| Parties | Wilfred KEYES, et al., Plaintiffs, Congress of Hispanic Educators, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLORADO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Gordon G. Greiner, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., James M. Nabritt, III, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Antonia Hernandez, Norma V. Cantu, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, San Antonio, Tex., Kenneth Siegal, Kenneth Salazar, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs-intervenors.
Michael H. Jackson, Semple & Jackson, Denver, Colo., Phil C. Neal, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
In the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered June 3, 1985, Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 609 F.Supp. 1491 (D.Colo.1985), this court determined that the remedial phase of this desegregation case had not been completed and, therefore, denied the defendants' motion to declare the District unitary and terminate jurisdiction. After the parties' unsuccessful attempts to reach a settlement, an Order For Further Proceedings was entered on October 29, 1985, directing the District to submit plans for achieving unitary status. The defendants and plaintiffs submitted their respective proposals for further remedial action, resulting in the Memorandum Opinion and Order of February 25, 1987, 653 F.Supp. 1536 (D.Colo.1987). That decision recognized the plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenors' (plaintiffs) skepticism about the concern, commitment and capacity of the defendants to achieve and maintain a unitary system in Denver, Colorado, given the history of this litigation. Nonetheless, this court refused to grant the further relief sought by the plaintiffs and accepted the defendants' approach in the matters of: (1) Barrett, Harrington and Mitchell elementary schools, (2) the "hardship" transfer policy, (3) faculty assignments, and (4) plans for implementation of Resolution 2233. Additionally, this court rejected the plaintiffs' proposed data collection, monitoring and reporting requirements, relying on the defendants to establish and implement sufficient data collection and monitoring to demonstrate the effectiveness of their proposals when called upon at an appropriate time.
This court also looked to the future and recognized the need for modification of the existing court orders to relax court control and give the defendants greater freedom to respond to changing circumstances and developing needs in the educational system. Accordingly, the parties were asked to submit proposals for an interim decree to replace existing orders. Those suggested modifications were received and a hearing was held on June 24, 1987. The proposals, the memoranda concerning them and the arguments of counsel at the hearing have been carefully considered.
The essential difference between the parties in approaching the task at hand is that the defendants have asked the court to establish standards which will provide guidance for the District in taking the necessary actions and which will also provide a measurement for compliance. Thus, the defendants suggest that changes in attendance zones, assignments to schools, and grade-level structure from the student assignment plan in effect for the 1986-87 school year not be made without prior court approval if the projected effect would be to cause a school's minority percentage to move five percentage points or more further away from the then-current district-wide average for the level (elementary, middle or high school) than in the year preceding the proposed change. Additionally, the defendants suggest that no new magnet school or magnet program be established unless enrollment is controlled so that the anglo and minority enrollments, respectively, are at least 40% of the total enrollment within a reasonable time. The defendants also suggest that prior court approval must be obtained for any enlargement of existing school facilities, construction of new schools, or the closing of any schools.
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants' request for specific judicial directives demonstrates their reluctance to accept responsibility to eradicate the effects of past segregation, and to assure that changes in policies, practices and programs will not serve to reestablish a dual school system. The defendants' reliance on the court creates doubt about their ability and willingness to meet the constitutional mandate of equal educational opportunity.
The injunctive decree must meet the requirements of Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, yet, that requirement of specificity should not be permitted to stifle the creative energy of those who plan, supervise and operate the District, or to supplant their authority to govern. The task, therefore, is to develop a decree which strikes a balance between rigidity and vagueness. The principal purpose is to enable the defendants to operate the school system under general remedial standards, rather than specific judicial directives. This interim decree removes obsolete provisions of existing orders, relinquishes reporting requirements, and eliminates the need for prior court approval before making changes in the District's policies, practices and programs. The defendants are expected to act on their own initiative, without prior court approval, to make those changes in the student assignment plan of attendance zones, pairings, magnet schools or programs, satellite zones and grade level structure which the Board determines to be necessary to meet the educational needs of the people of Denver.
The interim decree is a necessary step toward a final decree which will terminate jurisdiction. The legal principles involved continue to be those articulated by Chief Justice Burger for a unanimous Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). The final decree will be formed under the guidance of Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.1986). The timing of a final order terminating the court's supervisory jurisdiction will be directly related to the defendants' performance under this interim decree. It will be ...
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Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators
...Toward that end, an Interim Decree was issued on October 6, 1987, supported by another Memorandum Opinion and Order, published as Keyes XVII, 670 F.Supp. 1513. That Interim Decree, superseding all prior remedial directives, gave the Board of Education considerable freedom to make changes ne......
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Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo.
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Dowell by Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent Dist. No. 89, Oklahoma City, Okl.
...establish segregative intent." Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 662 (9th Cir.1984). In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 670 F.Supp. 1513 (D.Colo.1987), the court [S]ome discriminatory intent must be shown to prove a violation of the constitutional requirement ......
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