Keystone Copper Mining Company v. Miller

• Decision Date: 17 December 1945
• Docket Number: Civil 4795
• Parties: KEYSTONE COPPER MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. T. C. MILLER, Also Known as Clyde Miller, U. R. MILLER, E. T. DUKES, as Administrator of the Estate of Mary E. Miller, Also Known as and Called Mrs. W. W. Miller, Deceased, Appellees
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

164 P.2d 603

63 Ariz. 544

KEYSTONE COPPER MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. T. C. MILLER, Also Known as Clyde Miller, U. R. MILLER, E. T. DUKES, as Administrator of the Estate of Mary E. Miller, Also Known as and Called Mrs. W. W. Miller, Deceased, Appellees

Civil No. 4795

Supreme Court of Arizona

December 17, 1945

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Cochise. Gordon Farley, Judge.

Suit by Keystone Copper Mining Company against T. C. Miller, also known as Clyde Miller, and others, to cancel judgments, to quiet plaintiff's title as against the judgments, and to recover possession of real property, wherein defendants filed a counterclaim to quiet title. The court entered judgment quieting plaintiff's title and awarding plaintiff possession, with the exception of a certain tract, and from the portions of the judgment adverse to the plaintiff company, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded with directions.

Mr Clifford R. McFall, for Appellant.

Mr Martin S. Rogers, for Appellees.

Morgan, J. Stanford, C. J., and LaPrade, J., concur.

OPINION

Morgan, J.

Plaintiff, an Arizona mining corporation claiming to be the owner of certain unpatented mining claims with the fixtures and improvements thereon, situate in Cochise County, brought suit against the defendants. The complaint contains three causes of action. The first count is for cancellation of judgments, in favor of the individual defendants and the administrator's decedent, charged to have been procured through fraud and upon the ground that plaintiff's title was clouded thereby. The second count charged that the judgments were barred by the statute of limitations, that the defendants were barred and estopped from asserting the liens thereon or from enforcing such judgments, and that plaintiff's title be quieted as against the judgments. The third count was brought under Section 27-1501, Arizona Code Annotated 1939, for possession of the property which defendants were alleged to be unlawfully withholding.

Answer to the complaint and the various causes of action contained therein was made by defendants. On this appeal, the answer to the third count only need be considered. This answer denies that plaintiff is the absolute owner of and entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession of the property. We paraphrase the following special defense urged by defendants:

Defendants are in lawful, peaceable and adverse possession "under a certain contract of purchase executed by the plaintiff in favor of the defendants' predecessor in estate, title and possession, dated the 20th day of December, 1921, signed by the officers of Keystone Copper Mining Company, and confirmed and approved by the board of directors signing the written minutes of said approval," which contract was filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder. The contract as recorded describes a tract of 125 feet by 125 feet. They assert peaceable, adverse possession of the tract as described, and allege that possession was taken under the contract of purchase referred to. They further allege that their possession is lawful, and that they and their predecessors in interest have been and now are in continuous possession, and have paid the taxes thereon for more than twenty years. The bar of the statute of limitations to plaintiff's claim is asserted. They invoke the provisions of Section 29-106, Arizona Code Annotated 1939, providing that whenever an action is barred by the provisions of Chapter 29, Article 1, Real Actions, the person who pleads and is entitled to the bar shall be held to have full title. Defendants also, through counterclaim, sought to have their title quieted to the tract of land mentioned. The allegations of the counterclaim are practically the same as those contained in the answer to the third count, with the following additional averments; that defendants are the owners of the surface rights with the improvements thereon of the tract described, and have been in continuous possession of such premises, paying the taxes thereon since 1921. The counterclaim relies on the contract to purchase as recorded, but does not allege that the contract was confirmed or approved by the board of directors.

Defendants' affirmative defense and counterclaim was placed in issue by plaintiff's reply. Plaintiff pleads that defendants are estopped to claim the tract of ground in question and the improvements thereon, upon the ground that they have made various oral and written representations to the effect that all of said property and improvements belonged to plaintiff, and that in reliance thereon many persons had loaned and advanced money to the corporation and had purchased its bonds and stock.

The case was tried to the court without a jury. Written opinion and decision was filed. Findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the second and third counts of the complaint and defendants' counterclaim, were made. Although demand was made for findings upon the first count, none were made nor any formal judgment entered thereon.

The findings and conclusions are long, and for the purpose of this appeal may be summarized as follows: The court found that plaintiff was the owner of the property as alleged in its complaint, and that the judgments mentioned in the second count were barred by the statute of limitations, no valid renewal thereof having been made, and concluded that plaintiff was entitled to judgment as prayed for under the second count.

Additional findings in connection with the third count to the following effect were made: From and prior to 1921 to November 7, 1941 the defendants, T. C. and U. R. Miller, acted as directors of the plaintiff corporation, the former acting in the capacity of secretary during such period, and the latter from the year 1929 acted in the capacity of president and general manager. One W. W. Miller was the father of the defendants T. C. and U. R. Miller, and the husband of Mrs. W. W. Miller. From prior to the year 1921 to the date of his death in 1929, W. W. Miller was a director, the president and general manager of the corporation. Subsequent to November, 1941, and prior to the institution of the action, plaintiff demanded of defendants possession of the premises, which demand was refused.

In 1921 and 1922 the officers of plaintiff contemplated a conveyance to W. W. Miller of a portion of the Haggerman claim, and relying upon such contemplated conveyance Miller constructed a home and store building on the property which defendants have occupied peaceably for more than twenty years, paying taxes thereon each year until the filing of the present action, the residence being known as "the Miller residence." About July 17, 1922 certain directors of the corporation met, the minutes of which referred to an agreement entered into by W. W. Miller and one Alex. Bannow (the written agreement referred to in the answer and counterclaim of defendants), reciting that W. W. Miller was erecting a building for his individual use, business and dwelling. This agreement was adopted by all directors present. At the time of the meeting, the board of directors consisted of fourteen members, of which there were present in person only six directors, among them being W. W. Miller and T. C. Miller, the latter one of the defendants in this action. The defendants' claim to possession is limited to that portion of the Haggerman claim upon which is located the residence and store building. At all times prior to November 1941 plaintiff corporation used and occupied the building and the premises upon which it was located as an office and place for the transaction of its business. The defendants, during the same period, used and occupied the building and premises in their capacity as officers, directors, agents and employees of plaintiff, and as and for their private dwelling place. Defendants have failed to prove that their use or occupancy or possession of building and tract prior to November 17, 1941 was hostile or adverse to plaintiff. Many years have elapsed since defendants entered into possession and constructed the building, and they have been in peaceable possession with full knowledge of the officers of plaintiff for more than twenty years.

The court then concluded that: (1) plaintiff was the owner of and entitled to possession of the mining claims described in its complaint; (2) defendants have no right to the possession of any part thereof under or by virtue of any contract to purchase; (3) they have no rights of possession under the laws relating to adverse possession; (4) that W. W. Miller nor defendants as successors in interest could acquire any title or right to possession under such laws; (5) plaintiff is entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession of the claims and every part thereof, except that part of the Haggerman claim referred to as the residence and store building; (6) defendants have withheld such portion of the Haggerman claim and a judgment or decree awarding to plaintiff possession of the residence, store building and premises upon which it is located would not be in accord with equity nor in furtherance of justice; and (7) that plaintiff is not entitled to recover its possession from defendants.

The issues under defendants' counterclaim were found against them. The court concluded that plaintiff is the owner of the property, and defendants were not entitled to the relief prayed for in their counterclaim.

Judgment was entered in accordance with the findings and conclusions holding that the judgments were barred by limitations, quieting title under the second count of the complaint, and awarding plaintiff possession of the property under count three, with the exception of...