Keystone Operating Co. v. Runge Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1977
• Docket Number: No. 15712,15712
• Citation: 558 S.W.2d 82
• Parties: KEYSTONE OPERATING COMPANY, Appellant, v. RUNGE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 82

558 S.W.2d 82

KEYSTONE OPERATING COMPANY, Appellant,

v. RUNGE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees.

No. 15712.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

Nov. 2, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1977.

Parker Ellzey, Alice, for appellant.

Robert L. Busselman, Kenedy, for appellees.

CADENA, Chief Justice.

Defendant, Keystone Operating Company, appeals from a judgment granting plaintiffs, Runge Independent School District, the State of Texas, and the County of Karnes, recovery for delinquent taxes assessed by the taxing agencies on defendant's real property for the years 1969, 1970, and 1971 and ordering foreclosure of the tax liens on such property. In addition, the judgment denied defendant's prayer that the taxing agencies by enjoined from attempting to collect the taxes for such years and that they be required to accept payment of such taxes based on a lawful evaluation of defendant's property for tax purposes. The judgment was rendered after a trial without the intervention of a jury.

Defendant's sole contention is that the mandate, embodied in Article 8, § 1 of the Texas Constitution, that all taxes be equal and uniform, was violated by the plan adopted by the taxing agencies in that defendant's oil and gas properties were assigned a value, for tax purposes, based on a higher percentage of their true value than that on which other real property was valued for tax purposes.

In this case, defendant did not seek equitable relief for the purpose of preventing the taxing authorities from placing into effect an illegal plan of taxation. Instead, it waited until the plan had been put into effect and sat idly by until the taxing agencies sought, by judicial proceedings, to collect the taxes which had been assessed and remained unpaid. The rule applicable in such a situation has been stated in Bass v. Aransas County Independent School District, 389 S.W.2d 165, 170 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n. r. e.), as follows:

Once (the tax) plan is put into effect, in the absence of showing, by comparison of the assessments against his property with assessments against other like property, of a gross discrimination against him, the land owner may defeat recovery of taxes only to the extent that they are excessive, and he must assume the burden of proving excessiveness. He must show that the use of such a plan worked to his substantial injury, and the extent of such injury.

The trial court found that the assessed values of defendant's properties did not exceed their actual cash market value; that defendant had not been substantially injured by the valuations placed on its properties; that the valuations were not grossly excessive; that there was no discrimination between the assessed value of defendant's oil and gas properties and other real property; and that defendant at no time tendered the amount which he thought to be the correct amount of taxes owed by him.

Defendant's 9 points of error are followed by a prayer that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and judgment be rendered by this court in favor of defendant. Throughout the argument accompanying each point we find statements that certain evidence favorable to defendant was uncontradicted. It is apparent that the points before us are to the effect that either there is no evidence to support the judgment below or that the evidence conclusively establishes that defendant is entitled to judgment.

The taxing agencies introduced into evidence the pertinent delinquent tax records and evidence to the effect that such taxes had not been paid. Under the provisions of Article 7326, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. (1960), the introduction of such evidence constitutes "prima facie evidence of the true and correct amount of taxes and costs due by" defendant.

At the very least, the statutory provision assigning prima facie value to the official tax records has the effect of casting upon the taxpayer the burden of producing evidence of the existence of recognized grounds for avoiding the tax. State v. Whittenburg, 153 Tex. 205, 265 S.W.2d 569, 572 (1954). The language of the cases indicates that the statutory provision goes further and places on the taxpayer the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the assessment is invalid. For example, the grounds on which a taxpayer may avoid payment of the tax are frequently referred to as "defenses."...