KG v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 17 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIV 12-1209 KBM/LFG |
| Parties | KG, by and through her mother and next friend, CHRISTINE C., Plaintiff, v. SANTA FE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR THE SANTA FE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOBBIE GUTIERREZ, in her official capacity as the former superintendent of Santa Fe Public Schools, TOM SULLIVAN, in his official capacity as the former interim superintendent of Santa Fe Public Schools, JOEL BOYD, in his official capacity as superintendent of Santa Fe Public Schools, FELICIA SENA, in her individual and official capacity, and KIMBERLY SEYMOUR, in her individual and official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and FED. R. CIV. P. 73(b), the parties have consented to me serving as the presiding judge and entering final judgment. See Docs. 11, 17, 18. The Court, having considered the parties' briefs and cited authorities and having heard the arguments of counsel on May 10, 2013, will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part.
KG suffers from a brain disorder that causes cognitive and physical impairments. She attends elementary school and receives special education services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. See, e.g., Doc. 1-2 at 3-4 (¶¶ 9-15) ("Complaint"); Doc. 9-1 at 2 (¶¶ 8-10) ("Hearing Request"). When a dispute arose over the nature and extent of those services, KG's mother requested a due process hearing through a letter from her attorney in August 2012. Hearing Request at 1. KG's mother sought ten instances of specific relief for the failures that she asserted violated KG's "rights under the IDEA and denied her of a free appropriate education." Id. at 8; see also id. at 9. As part of her "proposed resolution," counsel concluded by noting KG's mother "will seek damages for [her child's] physical injuries, emotional distress, loss of education opportunity and permanent harm and attorney's fees and costs in an appropriate forum." Id. at 9.
The administrative proceedings resulted in an agreement in September 2012. The District essentially complied with all of the mother's demands, and also paid her attorney's fees. See Doc. 9-2 at 1-14 ("Agreement"). The parties "acknowledge[d] and represent[ed] that [their agreement] is a compromise in resolution of disputed IDEA claims," and KG's mother agreed to release "any and all claims or causes of action for violation of . . . IDEA." She expressly, however, did "not agree or . . . release any claims or causes of action arising under any laws other than the IDEA." Id. at 15.
In October 2012, KG's mother filed suit in the First Judicial District Court of New Mexico. Her state complaint seeks nominal and compensatory damages and attorney fees for violations of state and federal law, specifically: the New Mexico Tort Claims Actwaiver provisions for operating vehicles and public schools in a dangerous and unsafe manner, citing to N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-4, 41-4-6; a federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The factual background and failures by Defendants that counsel detailed in this Complaint are identical in all substantive respects to those she asserted in the Hearing Request letter. Compare Complaint at 3-16, with Hearing Request at 1-9. Plaintiff's Complaint does not pursue a claim for relief under the IDEA.
Defendants removed the action to this Court in November 2012, and immediately filed a motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Docs. 1, 9. Because Defendants' motion raises the issue of qualified immunity, Defendants were successful in securing a stay of discovery pending resolution of this motion. See Docs. 10, 12.
Defendants have attached copies of the Hearing Letter and Agreement to their motion to dismiss. A preliminary, but unaddressed, issue arises as to whether these documents convert Defendants' motion to one for summary judgment. The Federal Rules mandate conversion when a party is moving for dismissal for failure to state a claim or on the pleadings:
(d) Result of Presenting Matters Outside the Pleadings. If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given areasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.
Conversely, for an assertion of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court has "wide discretion to allow affidavits [or] other documents . . . to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts." Resolution of such facts by reference to matters outside the pleadings does not convert dismissal to summary judgment unless the "jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case," such that "subject matter jurisdiction is dependent on the same statute which provides the substantive claim in the case." Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Garcia v. United States, No. CIV 08-0295 JB/WDS, 2009 WL 1300938, at *6 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2009) ().
Plaintiff does not object to the Court considering the documents. Indeed, her Complaint and Response reference facts from the proceedings that are essential to resolution of the motion. See Complaint at 12 ). As Plaintiff suffers no disadvantage, and Defendants' counsel stated at the hearing they had no objections, the Court will address the motion as one to dismiss.
The IDEA is the primary means of assuring a free appropriate education for disabled children, and the statute afforded this particular Plaintiff relief for her child andpaid her attorney's fees. Defendants argue that it therefore is improper for Plaintiff and her attorney to now bring suit to reap additional relief by other means based on the same allegations. These equitable, policy, and fiscal rationales may have practical and emotional appeal, but they do not accurately state the law this Court is bound to apply. Congress amended the IDEA specifically for the purpose of rejecting that position. Defendants' original citation to the IDEA statute, federal regulations, and binding authority recognize this, and their reply concedes the same. See Doc. 9 at 17; Doc. 23 at 6.
A very recent decision by a court in this Circuit discusses the interrelationship between the three statutes. See Kimble ex rel. B.K. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, _ F. Supp. 2d _, _, 2013 WL 659109 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 2013). The IDEA, Rehabilitation Act and ADA all apply to disabled children and to the elementary school setting. See id. at **3-5. Courts consider the Rehabilitation Act and ADA together ("RA/ADA") in a single analysis because the two involve identical substantive standards. See id. at *5 ().
The reach of the RA/ADA is broader and less stringent than the IDEA. The RA/ADA requires schools to give all students with disabilities "equal access" to ensure those children receive a free and appropriate public education. The IDEA applies to a narrower subset of disabled children and requires specific services consistent with the individualized program designed for that particular child. See Kimble, _ F. Supp. 2d at _, 2013 WL at **4-5. As one court put it, and as Plaintiff's counsel so ably arguedat the hearing, "[Section 504] is a bludgeon to the IDEA's stiletto, protecting a broader swath of the population without describing a precise manner of compliance." Weber v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 245 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406 (D.R.I. 2003)).
Thus, while the statutes overlap substantially, they protect different interests.
We further note that while Section 504 and the IDEA both provide certain forms of relief for individuals with disabilities, they have separate purposes. Section 504 provides relief from discrimination, . . . . but the IDEA provides relief from inappropriate educational placement decisions, regardless of discrimination, . . . . "Concomitant to these distinct purposes are separate statutory definitions of what it means to be disabled or handicapped." Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 563 F. Supp. 2d 508, 533 (D.N.J. 2008). These definitions may substantially overlap, but we decline to conflate them entirely.
Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Institute, 572 F.3d 815, 821-22 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Ellenberg II"). Defendants' argument that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude Plaintiff from suing under the RA/ADA is simply misplaced.
As seen above, the IDEA and RA/ADA statutes operate independently. But prior to filing suit under either of these statutes, the plaintiff must exhaust IDEA administrative remedies. Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Institute, 478 F.3d 1262, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Ellenberg I") (...
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