Khaimova v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 30 May 2012
• Citation: 945 N.Y.S.2d 710,95 A.D.3d 1280,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04137
• Parties: Guzi KHAIMOVA, plaintiff-respondent, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, defendant-respondent, I.D.D. Realty Corp., et al., appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

95 A.D.3d 1280

945 N.Y.S.2d 710

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04137

Guzi KHAIMOVA, plaintiff-respondent,

v. CITY OF NEW YORK, defendant-respondent,I.D.D. Realty Corp., et al., appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 30, 2012.

James R. Pieret, Garden City, N.Y. (Thomas B. Ferris of counsel), for appellants.

William Pager, Brooklyn, N.Y., for plaintiff-respondent.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Leonard Koerner and Kristin M. Helmers of counsel), for defendant-respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, L. PRISCILLA HALL, and LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants I.D.D. Realty Corp. and Shasette Linens, Inc., appeal, as limited by their notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Velasquez, J.), dated November 10, 2010, as, upon reargument, adhered to its original determination in an order dated January 5, 2010, denying that branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order dated November 10, 2010, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

As a general rule, this Court does not consider issues on a subsequent appeal which were raised or could have been raised in an earlier appeal which was dismissed for lack of prosecution, although the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to do so ( see Rubeo v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 N.Y.2d 750, 697 N.Y.S.2d 866, 720 N.E.2d 86;Bray v. Cox, 38 N.Y.2d 350, 379 N.Y.S.2d 803, 342 N.E.2d 575). The defendants I.D.D. Realty Corp. and Shasette Linens, Inc. (hereinafter together the appellants), appealed from a prior order of the Supreme Court dated January 5, 2010, which, inter alia, denied that branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar asserted against them, but that appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute after the Supreme Court, in an order dated November 10, 2010, made upon reargument, adhered to the original determination. The better practice would have been for the appellants to withdraw their prior appeal, rather than abandon it. Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to review the issues raised on the appeal from the order made upon reargument ( see Maksuta v. Galiatsatos, 62 A.D.3d 841, 879 N.Y.S.2d 538;Cesar v. Highland Care Ctr., Inc., 37 A.D.3d 393, 829 N.Y.S.2d 236).

“Generally, liability for injuries sustained as a result of negligent maintenance of or the existence of dangerous and defective conditions to public sidewalks is placed on the municipality and not the abutting landowner” ( Hausser v. Giunta, 88 N.Y.2d 449, 452–453, 646 N.Y.S.2d 490, 669 N.E.2d 470;see Alleyne v. City of New York, 89 A.D.3d 970, 971, 933 N.Y.S.2d 348;Farrell v. City of New York, 67 A.D.3d 859, 860, 889 N.Y.S.2d 103). “Effective September 14, 2003, Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7–210, in effect, shifted liability for injuries arising from a defective sidewalk from the City of New York to the owner of the real property which abuts the defective sidewalk,” with several exceptions not relevant here ( Smirnova v. City of New York, 64 A.D.3d 641, 642, 882 N.Y.S.2d 513;see Harakidas v. City of New York, 86 A.D.3d 624, 626, 927 N.Y.S.2d 673;Vidakovic v. City of New York, 84 A.D.3d 1357, 1357–1358, 924 N.Y.S.2d 537). Contrary to the appellants' contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that the brick walkway where the plaintiff allegedly fell, which ran parallel to a concrete section of the sidewalk, was part of the “sidewalk” for purposes of liability under Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7–210. The brick walkway lay between the curb and the adjacent property lines, and was intended for the use of pedestrians, as evidenced by the placement of parking meters thereon ( see Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 19–101 [d]; Harakidas v. City of New York, 86 A.D.3d at 626, 927 N.Y.S.2d 673;cf. Vucetovic v. Epsom Downs, Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 517, 860 N.Y.S.2d 429, 890 N.E.2d 191;Hartofil v. McCourt & Trudden Funeral Home, Inc., 57 A.D.3d 943, 871 N.Y.S.2d 299). Moreover, the obligation on the abutting landowner “to install, construct, reconstruct, repave, repair or replace defective sidewalk flags” (...