Khan v. Holder
| Decision Date | 29 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–1287 (JDB) |
| Citation | 134 F.Supp.3d 244 |
| Parties | Ali Khan, a/k/a Arshad Ali Malik, Plaintiff, v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Ali Khan, pro se.
Kenneth A. Adebonojo, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
JOHN D. BATES
Everyone agrees that Ali Khan's last year in federal jail was a mistake. After he finished serving his original sentence, he received an additional 168 months for violating parole from an earlier offense. But under the terms of Khan's extradition from Canada, there was no authority to impose that additional sentence. Now properly released from American custody, he seeks ten million dollars in damages. Although Khan surely suffered a terrible injury, the relief he seeks is barred by the procedural and jurisdictional rules as well as Khan's failure to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the Court will grant the government defendants' motion to dismiss.
Back in 1981, Khan was sentenced to fifteen months' imprisonment and—relevant here—lifetime parole in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See Malik v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 2012 WL 6682128, at *1 (N.D.Ohio Dec. 21, 2012)
. After he served his sentence, Khan returned to his native Canada. Id.
More than twenty years later, the federal government indicted Khan in the Eastern District of Michigan. See id.
Khan eventually consented to his extradition from Canada to the United States, under the terms of the extradition treaty between the two nations. See id. This meant that his surrender to the United States was "for the sole purpose of facing the charge filed against [him] in the Michigan federal case." Id.
And once in Michigan, Khan pleaded guilty. Id. At sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") incorrectly stated that Khan had waived, rather than consented to, extradition. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 9. Khan surmises that the mistake might have occurred because the Clerk of Court did not enter Khan's order of surrender on the docket until after the PSR had been completed. See id. At the time, however, neither Khan nor his attorney noticed the error, and so did not object to the PSR. See id. The Court sentenced Khan to seventy-eight months in prison. Malik, 2012 WL 6682128, at *1.
The day before Khan expected to be released, he was informed that his incarceration would continue indefinitely. See Compl. at 11. The United States Probation Office had issued a detainer, believing that Khan's conviction in the Eastern District of Michigan meant that he had violated the terms of his parole from his earlier conviction in the Northern District of Illinois. Within a few months, the United States Parole Commission held a hearing on that issue. See Malik, 2012 WL 6682128, at *1
. At the hearing, according to Khan, his counsel failed to present a defense, and did not discuss the terms of Khan's extradition. See Compl. at 12. The Commission found that Khan had violated the terms of his parole and sentenced him to 168 months. See Malik, 2012 WL 6682128, at *1. Khan found this prospect emotionally devastating, "a cause of indescribable duress and ... negative repercussions on [his] health." Compl. at 12. And he suffered further upon receiving a document indicating that his new sentence was life imprisonment. See id. at 13.
Khan filed an appeal with the Parole Commission's National Appeals Board, arguing, among other things, that the government lacked jurisdiction under the terms of his extradition. See id. The Board denied the appeal, explaining that Khan's jurisdictional argument was "unsupported by any documentation or other evidence." See Ex. M to Compl. at 90. And it pointed out that, according to the PSR, Khan had waived extradition. See id.
But Khan persisted. Finally in possession of the documents he needed to prove the circumstances of his extradition, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
. See Compl. at 15–16. The government requested that the court grant Khan's petition, which it did. See Malik, 2012 WL 6682128, at *1. The court explained that the "rule of specialty prohibits the prosecution of an individual for an offense in the country that requested his extradition unless the extraditing country grants his or her extradition for that offense." See id. at *2. It found that Khan's additional sentence did not fall within the scope of his consent or the terms of the extradition treaty with Canada. Id. at *3. And so, about a year after Khan should have left prison, the court ordered Khan's release. Id.
After returning to Canada, Khan filed this lawsuit, pro se, seeking ten million dollars in damages from various defendants in connection with his wrongful imprisonment. See Compl. at 28. The government has responded1 by filing a motion to dismiss. See Gov't's Mot. [ECF No. 19].
The government moves, in part, to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
. As "[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[,] ... [i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting" it. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted). Thus, Khan must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Gordon v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 750 F.Supp.2d 82, 87 (D.D.C.2010). In making this determination, "the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," but those facts "will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Id. at 86–87 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Although a court is to construe liberally a pro se complaint, pro se plaintiffs are not freed from the requirement to plead an adequate jurisdictiona l basis for their claims." Kurtz v. United States, 798 F.Supp.2d 285, 288 (D.D.C.2011) (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
The government also seeks to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
. "[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint." Hall & Assocs. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 77 F.Supp.3d 40, 50 (D.D.C.2014). Although a plaintiff need not set forth "detailed factual allegations" to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in order to establish the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief," a plaintiff must furnish "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). The court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). "[T]he complaint is construed liberally in [plaintiff's] favor, and [a court should] grant plaintiff[ ] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). However, a court need not accept inferences that are not supported by the facts alleged and legal conclusions drawn by plaintiff. See id. ; Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
Khan has sued numerous federal defendants—and it is not entirely clear from the complaint whether he means to sue them in their official capacity, in their individual capacity, the agencies they represent, or some combination thereof. The amenability of these defendants to suit—and the Court's jurisdiction—depend on the claims Khan brings against them, the capacity in which Khan has sued them, and the way these decisions implicate federal sovereign immunity. To impose some semblance of order, the Court will address Khan's claims in two broad categories: first, the common-law tort claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and then the Bivens
claims for alleged constitutional violations of the rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. See generallyBivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)
. Khan is unable to succeed on any of his claims.
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy for Khan's common-law tort claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165–66, 111 S.Ct. 1180, 113 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991)
; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). To bring an FTCA claim, the plaintiff must have "first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing." 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). In other words, the plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993). And that requirement is jurisdictional. See Simpkins v. Dist. of Columbia Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.Cir.1997).
Khan has not alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. The only mention of exhaustion in his complaint refers to his Bivens
claims, not his common-law tort claims. And Khan provides only a...
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