Kidd v. Colvin

Decision Date02 February 2017
Docket NumberCV 115-207
PartiesRANDY KIDD, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Randy Kidd appeals the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act. Upon consideration of the briefs submitted by both parties, the record evidence, and the relevant statutory and case law, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS the Commissioner's final decision be AFFIRMED, this civil action be CLOSED, and a final judgment be ENTERED in favor of the Commissioner.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for DIB in June of 2012, alleging a disability onset date of August 9, 2011. Tr. ("R."), pp. 117-18, 126. Plaintiff's last insured date for purposes of the DIB application was December 31, 2016. R. 141. Plaintiff was fifty-two years old on his alleged disability onset date. Plaintiff applied for benefits based on allegations of a back injury with nerve damage, which causes constant left hip and leg pain. R. 35, 144. Plaintiff has a tenth grade education, and prior to his alleged disability, Plaintiff had accrued relevant work history as a tractor trailer truck driver. R. 41, 145.

The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's applications initially, R. 54, and on reconsideration, R. 77-78. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), R. 79-80, and the ALJ held a hearing on February 5, 2014. R. 26-45. At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, as well as from Mary Cornelius, a Vocational Expert ("VE"). Id. On May 9, 2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. R. 14-21.

Applying the sequential process required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the ALJ found:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 9, 2011, the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairment: status post inter-body fusion at L4-5 and L5-S1 secondary to degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).
4. The claimant has the RFC to perform less than the full range of medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c) with frequent climbing of ramps and stairs and frequent balancing.1 He can occasionally stoop, but never kneel, crouch, crawl, or climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He is further restricted to avoiding concentrated exposure to machinery and heights. Thus, the claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R. § 404.1565).
5. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, including sandwich maker, laundry marker, and hand packer (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)). Therefore, the claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 9, 2011, through May 9, 2014 (the date of the ALJ's decision) (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)).

R. 16-21.

When the Appeals Council ("AC") denied Plaintiff's request for review, R. 1-3, the Commissioner's decision became "final" for the purpose of judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff then filed this civil action requesting reversal or remand of that adverse decision. Plaintiff argues the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ (1) failed to consider evidence indicating Plaintiff's severe impairment met or medically equaled Listing 1.04(A); and (2) erroneously determined Plaintiff has an RFC for medium work because he improperly evaluated the medical opinions of Dr. Daniel Boone, Plaintiff's treating physician, and Drs. Arthur Schiff and Robert Culpepper, two state agency non-examining physicians, as well as Plaintiff's credibility. See doc. no. 7 ("Pl.'s Br.") & doc. no. 14 ("Pl.'s Amend. Reply"). The Commissioner maintains the decision to deny Plaintiff benefits is supported by substantial evidence and should therefore be affirmed. See doc. no. 10 ("Comm'r's Br.") & doc. no. 15 ("Comm'r's Resp.").

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of social security cases is narrow and limited to the following questions: (1) whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997). When considering whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence,or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005); Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding this measure of deference, the Court remains obligated to scrutinize the whole record to determine whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).

The Commissioner's factual findings should be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support them. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance: '[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239). If the Court finds substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's factual findings, it must uphold the Commissioner even if the evidence preponderates in favor of the claimant. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004). Finally, the Commissioner's findings of fact must be grounded in the entire record; a decision that focuses on one aspect of the evidence and disregards other contrary evidence is not based upon substantial evidence. McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986).

The deference accorded the Commissioner's findings of fact does not extend to her conclusions of law, which enjoy no presumption of validity. Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding judicial review of Commissioner's legal conclusions are not subject to substantial evidence standard). If the Commissioner fails either to apply correct legal standards or to provide the reviewing court with the means to determine whether correct legal standards were in fact applied, the Court must reverse the decision. Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate evidence that Plaintiff's severe impairment, namely his back injury, met or was medically equal to Listing 1.04(A). See Pl.'s Br. & Pl.'s Reply. Plaintiff also contends the ALJ did not properly weigh the medical opinions of Drs. Boone, Schiff, and Culpepper, and improperly weighed Plaintiff's credibility, resulting in a faulty conclusion Plaintiff retains the RFC to perform less than the full range of medium work. See id. As explained below, the ALJ considered evidence regarding Listing 1.04(A) and properly concluded Plaintiff's impairment did not meet or medically equal it. Furthermore, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of the medical opinion evidence or Plaintiff's credibility, and he thoroughly explained his rationale for determining Plaintiff has an RFC for medium work. Therefore, none of Plaintiff's arguments form a valid basis for reversal or remand.

A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Evidence and Concluded Plaintiff's Severe Impairment Did Not Meet or Medically Equal Listing 1.04(A).

Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly evaluated the evidence in his determination Plaintiff failed to meet Listing 1.04, and that finding was not supported by substantial evidence. Pl. Br. pp. 13-16. As discussed herein, the ALJ determination was supported by substantial evidence and Plaintiff's claim fails.

1. Step Three Framework and Standard

If at step two of the evaluation process an ALJ finds a claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that is "severe," then at step three the ALJ must determine whether that impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart B, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. "To 'meet' a Listing, a claimant must have a diagnosis included in the Listings and must provide medical reports documenting that the conditions meet the specific criteria of theListings and the duration requirement." Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a)-(d). Moreover, "to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria[;] [a]n impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original).

An impairment "medically equals" a listing where "the medical findings are at least equal in severity and duration to the listed findings." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a); see also Wilkinson o/b/o Wilkinson, 847 F.2d 660, 662 (11th Cir. 1987) ("In order to equal a listing, the medical findings must be at least equal in severity and duration to the listed findings.") (emphasis in original). Furthermore, "[a]ny medical findings in evidence [relating to medical equivalence] must be supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 20 C.F.R. 404.1526(b). A claimant cannot equal a listing by "showing that the...

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