Kidd v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, City of Richland Ctr. & Town of Richland

• Decision Date: 06 December 1927
• Citation: 194 Wis. 353,216 N.W. 499
• Parties: KIDD v. JOINT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2, CITY OF RICHLAND CENTER AND TOWN OF RICHLAND.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

194 Wis. 353

216 N.W. 499

KIDD

v.JOINT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2, CITY OF RICHLAND CENTER AND TOWN OF RICHLAND.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 6, 1927.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Richland County; S. E. Smalley, Circuit Judge.

Action by Virgil Kidd, an infant, by Sylvia Kidd, his guardian ad litem, against Joint School District No. 2, City of Richland Center and Town of Richland. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed, with directions.--[By Editorial Staff.]

Action to recover school tuition paid under protest. The court denied recovery and plaintiff appeals.Edgar Ewers and Black & Clark, all of Richland Center, for appellant.

Brindley & Brewer, of Richland Center, for respondent.

CROWNHART, J.

The plaintiff, at the age of 16, desirous of gaining a high school education, applied to his father in that regard. His father told him he was unable to help the boy, except to give him his time, and thereupon it was understood between them that plaintiff would seek his own livelihood and be his own master. Plaintiff then considered his future. He wanted to continue his education, and to do so he had to seek a place where he could earn his way. He decided upon the city of Richland Center as the place best suited for his purpose. He went there in the fall of 1922, with the purpose of making that place his home, and with no intent to return to his father's home for residence, and he never did return, except for some temporary purpose. He entered the high school in 1922 at Richland Center, and continued for the full school year. No request was made upon him for tuition. However, the town of Bloom, the home of his father, upon the demand of Richland Center, through mistake paid his tuition, which was later refunded to the town of Bloom. Again, in the fall of 1923, the plaintiff entered the Richland Center high school without paying tuition, but later in the year, upon the request of the school authorities, he paid tuition for that year under protest, claiming he was a resident of the school district. He then, at the suggestion of the principal of the school, secured manumittance papers from his father, and had his aunt, a resident of Richland Center, appointed his guardian by the county court of Richland county.

Plaintiff continued his high school course in the fall of 1924, without paying tuition, and until March 17, 1926, claiming his residence in Richland Center. On that day, on demand of the school authorities, and on pain of being dismissed from the school, plaintiff, under protest, paid tuition in arrears, $196, and continued to pay tuition thereafter until he finished his course. In all, he so paid under protest $264, and then, pursuant to an understanding between him and the school officers, he brought this action to recover the sum so paid. During all the time he was attending school at Richland Center he worked in and about the school district, making his home therein. He earned sufficient money to pay his way through the school. Thereafter he entered into business in said city.

The simple question presented is whether the plaintiff, under the circumstances, was a resident for school purposes of Richland Center or of the town of Bloom, where his father had residence. If a resident of Richland Center, the plaintiff was entitled to be admitted to the school, tuition free. Section 40.53, Stats. 1925.

The case of State ex rel. School District No. 1 of Waukesha v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48, 41 N. W. 1014, presented facts quite similar to the instant case, and the court there held:

“The only question in this case was whether the minor child of Mrs. Smith had a residence in the school district in the village of Waukesha, within the meaning of the laws concerning public schools.”

But, on the subject of the public policy, the court said:

“To establish the rule that a minor cannot have a residence for school purposes other than that of his parents would in many cases deprive such minor of all benefit of such schools. When the minor has poor parents, the poverty of the parents renders it absolutely necessary, in many cases, that a home for the minor children should be found in places different from that of the parents; and under the construction insisted upon by the learned counsel for the relator, such unfortunate children, for whose benefit our free schools were especially...