Kidd v. Lance, 3-90-047-CV
| Decision Date | 08 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-90-047-CV,3-90-047-CV |
| Parties | Scott R. KIDD and Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, d/b/a St. Edward's Hospital, Relators, v. Honorable Charles LANCE, Judge, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Alan J. Winters, Houston, for real parties-in-interest, Orlia and Janice Dunsmoor and on behalf of respondent, Hon. Charles Lance, Judge.
Before SHANNON, C.J., and CARROLL and ABOUSSIE, JJ.
This mandamus action arises out of a hotly contested personal injury action. The district court concluded that the attorney for the hospital intentionally disregarded an order granting a motion in limine, and after the jury had returned its verdict, granted the plaintiffs' motion for mistrial and imposed substantial sanctions against the attorney and the hospital.
We find that the district court failed to accord the attorney the due process protections provided in section 21.002 of the Texas Government Code, and that the sanctions imposed exceed the trial court's authority. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 21.002 (1988 & Supp.1990). We will conditionally grant the requested mandamus relief and order the sanctions set aside. 1
The plaintiffs sued three Milam County doctors and a Cameron hospital for damages caused by alleged medical negligence. Plaintiffs settled with the doctors shortly before trial for over $300,000 in cash and an annuity paying $850 per month for not less than 30 years.
During the pre-trial hearing, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion in limine and, among other things, ordered the hospital not to mention the plaintiffs' assets or net worth without first obtaining leave of court. Nonetheless, in response to testimony by one of the plaintiffs on direct examination about her financial worries, the attorney for the hospital questioned her about the settlement with the doctors.
The district court granted the plaintiffs' objection to the questioning; gave the jury a lengthy instruction to disregard the evidence regarding the settlement; and then deferred its decision on the plaintiffs' motion for mistrial until the jury returned its verdict. Some weeks after trial, the plaintiffs reurged their motion for mistrial and also requested sanctions for the attorney's "unethical misconduct."
The district court ordered the hospital and the attorney to pay over $53,000 in
attorney's fees; reinstated a cause of action against the hospital that it had already dismissed; struck the hospital's pleadings; and granted default judgment for the plaintiffs on all liability issues. Finally, the district court granted a new trial for the plaintiffs on damages, and ended all further discovery proceedings by the hospital pending the new trial.
According to the real parties in interest, plaintiffs in the underlying cause, the attorney for the hospital "deliberately violated the Trial court's order" and "intended to introduce error as a trial tactic." The hospital cites Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.1978), and responds that the cross-examination in question was proper as impeachment. The hospital contends that its attorney did not violate the court's order because the plaintiffs put their financial condition in issue.
We have reviewed the motion, the court's order, and the record of the exchange at issue, and we appreciate the understandable frustration felt by the district court when faced with attorneys who let the "heat of battle" influence their conduct before the court. No doubt it would have been better practice for the hospital's attorney to approach the bench and seek leave of court before attempting to impeach the plaintiff with questions regarding the existence of the substantial settlement with the co-defendants.
However, for the purpose of this proceeding, we need not decide whether the cross-examination violated the court's order. Instead, we have assumed that the attorney deliberately violated the order and that the district court would have been justified in holding the attorney in contempt.
Having done so, we find that the district court failed to follow the due process procedures laid out in section 21.002(d) of the Texas Government Code and that the sanctions assessed against the attorney far exceed those allowed in section 21.002. We can find no foundation...
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