Kidd v. Ward

• Decision Date: 24 May 1894
• Citation: 91 Iowa 371,59 N.W. 279
• Parties: KIDD v. WARD.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

91 Iowa 371

59 N.W. 279

KIDD

v.WARD.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 24, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Dickinson county; George H. Carr, Judge.

Action for slander. Trial by jury. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Soper, Allen & Morling, for appellant.

Cory & Bemis, Parker & Richardson, and W. W. Cornwall, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J.

The petition is in two counts: In the first count the defendant is charged with slandering the plaintiff, by saying to him, in the presence of others, “You (meaning plaintiff) are a thief and a robber, and I can prove it,” and that the language was used in the general office of the American Pill & Medicine Company, at a meeting of the officers and stockholders of said company. The second count of the petition charges the speaking of the same words on the public stairway leading from said general office to the street below, while the plaintiff and the defendant and others were on their way from said meeting. The answer was a general denial, and a defense to the effect that the words were not spoken in a slanderous sense, and were not so understood by the persons in hearing, and that the words, as used, were true, in the sense in which they were spoken. A partial defense, founded on mitigating circumstances, was also pleaded, but was withdrawn from the jury because the plaintiff, during the trial, withdrew from his petition all allegations of malice, and all claim for exemplary damages; and the jury were instructed that no evidence was received in support of the defense founded on mitigating circumstances. The plaintiff, however, pleaded that he was entitled to recover certain special damages, which he alleged had accrued to him from the loss of employment in a business capacity by reason of the alleged slander. It will be observed that when the case was submitted to the jury the question to be determined was whether the plaintiff was entitled to any damages by reason of the mere speaking of the words, and, if so, whether he was entitled to recover the special damages alleged. Part of the argument of counsel for appellant is founded on errors assigned in reference to the claim for special damages. We think this feature of the case demands no consideration, for the reason that the jury, as we believe, were fully authorized, from the evidence, in finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to even nominal damages. If this finding was correct, there was nothing in the case, as made, which would support a verdict for special damages for loss of employment.

2. We may properly say here that this is nothing but a plain case of slander, to recover for words spoken. We have stated the issues in a brief--but, we think, in a plain and concise--manner, to the end that we may, as briefly as may be, dispose of the material questions in the case. The appeal is presented on a very voluminous record. A motion was filed to strike out parts of the answer. This motion was upon 22 grounds. It was overruled, and there was no error in the ruling. After this ruling a demurrer to the answer was filed and overruled. This ruling was correct. The motion and demurrer were mainly directed to that part of the answer which pleaded in mitigation, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the speaking of the words, in the light of which, it was claimed, they were not slanderous. We need not cite authority to sustain the principle that such pleading is always allowable. It may have been one of the ancient doctrines of the law of slander that an action may be founded upon a mere assertion of actionable words. But the modern doctrine is that the whole conversation, and the facts leading up thereto, may be pleaded and proven, to show what was intended by the party charged, and understood by the hearers.

3. It is necessary to make a further statement of facts. It appears that the plaintiff was the promoter and organizer of a corporation at Spencer, in Clav county, known by the name of American Pill & Medicine Company. He induced the defendant and others, residents of that place, to take stock in the company. The plaintiff was the general manager of the corporation, and the defendant was its vice president. The pill company was not a successful business enterprise. It lost money. The plaintiff was thought by the other officers and stockholders to be chargeable with mismanagement, and at a meeting of the board of directors the plaintiff was removed from the office of position of general manager. After his discharge, another meeting was had, and the plaintiff demanded an explanation of the reason why he was removed. Thereupon, there was a general wrangle, and charges and countercharges of dishonesty were made, and in the course of the dispute the alleged slanderous words were spoken by the defendant....