Kidwell v. State, 96-3423
Decision Date | 11 June 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-3423,96-3423 |
Citation | 696 So.2d 399 |
Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1416, 25 Media L. Rep. 1929 David KIDWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Fourth District |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Sanford L. Bohrer of Holland & Knight, Miami, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Robert Rivas and Florence Snyder Rivas of Rivas & Rivas, Boca Raton, and Jane E. Kirtley, Gregg P. Leslie and Tina Burnside, Arlington, VA, for amicus curiae, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Arlington, Virginia.
At bottom, the issue raised in this contempt proceeding is identical to that decided by this court in Gold Coast Publications Inc. v. State, 669 So.2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We, of course, follow our recent precedent, which means that we affirm the judgment of contempt.
Here a newspaper reporter engaged in a jailhouse interview with a man charged with murder. The defendant had previously given the police a confession. The interview was not on any confidential basis, and the reporter made no promises to defendant of any confidentiality in order to persuade him to talk to the reporter. In a later newspaper article, the reporter wrote extensively about the interview.
After a mistrial was ordered in the criminal case, necessitating a retrial, 1 the prosecutor subpoenaed the reporter for a deposition for discovery purposes and to adduce at the retrial certain statements made by the defendant to the reporter. The prosecutor openly revealed his intention to use these statements as admissions of the defendant at the retrial. The reporter, however, claimed a privilege on the grounds that his knowledge was acquired while he was engaged in "professional news gathering." After being ordered by the trial judge to answer the prosecutor's questions, the reporter continued to claim the privilege and refused to answer. The trial judge found him in criminal contempt and sentenced him to be incarcerated for 70 days in jail or until he earlier answered the questions, and to pay a fine of $500. This appeal timely followed.
The retrial has since been had and the defendant convicted but without any testimony from the reporter. We must therefore first address why this case is no longer moot. The trial judge has refused to vacate the contempt conviction on account of that circumstance. In doing so, the trial judge has obviously concluded that the contempt conviction is necessary to vindicate the powers of the court in providing access to relevant evidence, and we do not fault him in that determination. The criminal justice system would founder at the very beginning of the process if witnesses with relevant and unprivileged knowledge could decide when they shall be required to testify and the subjects about which they can permissibly be examined. Our system has long recognized the right of both the state and the defendant to "every man's evidence" 2 and has provided compulsory process for the attendance and testimony of witnesses. The process for summoning witnesses would soon lack any compulsion if witnesses could refuse compliance with subpoenas issued to procure their testimony.
The reporter argues that he has a First Amendment privilege to refuse to testify about his communications with the criminal defendant even though his conversations were undertaken without any promise of confidentiality. In short, he argues that a reportorial privilege exists for nonconfidential sources when they are acquired in "professional news gathering activities." This argument is directly contrary to our recent holding in Gold Coast Publications. Just as we did there, we rely on Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So.2d 577 (Fla.1990), where the court made clear:
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), the Court confronted a claim of privilege by media reporters after they had been served with subpoenas ad testificandum to appear before a Grand Jury and testify about criminal events they had witnessed while engaged in news gathering. The argument made by these reporters was simply stated as follows:
408 U.S. at 679-680, 92 S.Ct. at 2655-2656. The Court then framed the issue as follows:
408 U.S. at 682, 92 S.Ct. at 2657. It will, of course, be seen that the claim of the newsmen in Branzburg involved confidential sources rather than, as here, ordinary nonconfidential sources of information.
Proceeding from that statement of the contentions of the newsmen, the court reasoned that:
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