Kidwell v. State, 972S122

Decision Date03 May 1973
Docket NumberNo. 972S122,972S122
PartiesJames Larry KIDWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Forrest Bowman, Jr., Martz, Bowman & Kammen, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Harry L. Sauce, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

GIVAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying relief on a petition for post-conviction relief filed by the appellant. Appellant had been convicted in 1964 for the crime of the commission of a felony while armed. The appellant perfected an appeal to this Court from that conviction. This Court affirmed appellant's conviction. See Kidwell v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 430, 230 N.E.2d 590, 11 Ind.Dec. 641.

On October 18, 1971, appellant filed his petition for post-conviction relief. Hearing was held on this petition on March 17, 1972. Following hearing the trial court entered special findings of fact and conclusions of law which read as follows:

'The Court, having heard the evidence in the above entitled Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the argument of counsel and being duly advised now makes the following Special Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

'SPECIAL FINDINGS OF FACT

'1) Petitioner was tried and convicted by jury.

'2) During the trial petitioner testified in his own behalf.

'3) During the trial petitioner was represented by competent counsel.

'4) Petitioner, prior to commencement of any evidence, agreed that the jury could separate at the close of court each day and should not be sequestered.

'5) During the trial and before verdict, petitioner himself was interviewed and filmed by television news reporters in which petitioners disclosed certain facts involved in his trial.

'6) Petitioner entered a plea of temporary insanity at his trial and his privately employed phychiatrist testified in his behalf.

'7) Petitioner failed to show to this court that either pre-trial or in-trial publicity, including petitioners voluntary television presentation, was observed by any juror trying his case.

'8) Petitioner appealed his conviction, asserted only one ground for reversal, namely: that a knife was not a deadly weapon within the meaning of the charging statute. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Indiana. See Kidwell vs. State, 249 Ind. 430, 230 N.E.2d 590.

'9) Petitioner failed to present to this court any substantial basis or circumstance which would satisfactorily mitigate petitioner's failure to pursue or present his claim that a coerced, involuntary confession was introduced into evidence and that physical evidence was erroneously introduced into evidence against him or that an Odium attached to petitioner in the county where he was tried.

'10) Petitioner, by failing to raise the questions of the trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence and alleged distractions in the courtroom, without explanation, has waived the questions now presented in his petition for post conviction relief.

'11) Petitioner has failed to show to the court where any basic constitutional right was denied him at any stage of the proceedings against him.

'12) The dictum of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana to the effect that petitioner's cause was fairly dealt with throughout is, in all things, confirmed and approved, and the petition for post conviction relief should be denied.

'CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

'1) The law of the case is against petitioner.

'2) Where a petitioner raises claims of basic denials of constitutional rights in a petition for post conviction relief and has previously failed to raise these questions on appeal, the burden is upon petitioner to show some substantial basis or circumstance at his hearing which would satisfactory mitigate or explain petitioner's failure to pursue the remedy through normal appellate procedural routes.

'3) The petitioner's prayer for post conviction relief in this cause be and the same is hereby denied.

'Dated this 21st day of April, 1972.'

Following the overruling of a motion to correct errors, appellant appealed to this Court. We have fully examined the transcript filed in this appeal and have also examined the transcript of record which was filed in the original appeal. This original transcript was introduced in evidence as an exhibit at the hearing on the post-conviction remedy petition. These records entirely support the special findings of fact and conclusions of law made by Judge Kitchen.

The Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies provide, in part, as follows:

Rule P.C. 1(A)(1)(d) reads as follows:

'That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;'

Rule P.C. 1(A)(2) reads as follows:

'This remedy is not a substitute for a direct appeal from the conviction and all available steps including those under Post-Conviction Remedy Rule 2 should be taken to perfect such an appeal. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and it shall be used exclusively in place of them. This rule supersedes present Supreme Court Rules 2--40, 2--40A, and 2--40B.'

And Rule P.C. 1(H) reads as follows:

'All grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition. Any ground finally adjudicated on the merits or not so raised and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding the petitioner has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent petition, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original petition.'

In his petition for post-conviction relief, appellant attempts to raise numerous questions concerning the voluntary nature of a confession made by him, the introduction of physical evidence acquired as a result of a so-called coerced confession and prejudicial publicity surrounding appellant's original trial. These matters obviously were well known to trial counsel at the time of the original trial. The question thus first arises as to whether or not trial counsel did, in fact, diligently pursue these matters in the representation of his client. An examination of the original transcript discloses that counsel did, in fact, make pertinent and proper objections where indicated concerning these matters and did, in fact, following appellant's conviction, file a very comprehensive and well prepared motion for new trial which contained thirty-five specifications of error, including all matters which appellant now seeks to raise in his petition for post-conviction relief.

As observed by this Court in the original appeal, appellant's counsel on the original appeal, who was not the same counsel as the one who represented appellant at the trial, chose not to pursue all thirty-five stated grounds in the motion for new trial.

The next question is, therefore, did counsel for appellant on his original appeal fail to properly represent the appellant when he waived some of the error alleged in the motion for new trial. Included in this record is an Exhibit A filed in the post-conviction hearing, which exhibit is a scrapbook containing numerous newspaper articles beginning with an article which appeared in an afternoon paper after the appellant's initial arrest that morning and continuing through numerous articles which appeared from time to time throughout the course of the jury trial, including articles which appeared concerning the progress and result of appellant's appeal. An examination of this...

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9 cases
  • LeFlore v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 9 Agosto 1973
    ...Code Ed. 1973), Court Rules, Book 2, p. 634. Langley v. State (1971), Ind., 267 N.E.2d 538, 25 Ind.Dec. 118, Kidwell v. State (1973), Ind., 295 N.E.2d 362, 36 Ind.Dec. 247. The State, however, has failed to argue waiver and has elected to argue the merits of the issues petitioner-appellant ......
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    • Indiana Supreme Court
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    ...been resolved against the petitioner, such matters would be deemed waived. Layton v. State (1974), Ind., 307 N.E.2d 477; Kidwell v. State (1973), Ind., 295 N.E.2d 362. The rule of Langley; Richardson v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 199, 267 N.E.2d 538, requiring that the issue of 'waiver' be char......
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    • 30 Noviembre 1982
    ...failing to object at trial. Failure to raise an issue on appeal does not, alone, demonstrate incompetent counsel. See Kidwell v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 303, 295 N.E.2d 362. Counsel filed a timely appeal and presented this Court with a timely brief setting forth and arguing several issues. W......
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