Talley v. State
Decision Date | 30 November 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 3-682A120,3-682A120 |
Citation | 442 N.E.2d 721 |
Parties | James Edward TALLEY, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Joseph Oddo, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cynthia Sue Stanley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
James Edward Talley filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied his petition and Talley appeals. Four issues are raised on appeal: 1
(1) Whether Talley received adequate legal representation at trial and on appeal;
(2) Whether Talley was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct;
(3) Whether the State used perjured testimony against Talley at his trial; and
(4) Whether the jury viewed inadmissible evidence outside the courtroom.
We affirm.
The judge presiding over the hearing on Talley's petition for post-conviction relief made the following findings and conclusions:
Because Talley is appealing from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, he is in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the petitioner has the burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court judge is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence. His determination will be reversed on appeal only if the evidence is not conflicting and leads unerringly to a contrary result. Henson v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 79; Johnson v. State (1980), Ind., 406 N.E.2d 1170.
Talley contends that his attorney provided inadequate representation both at trial and on appeal. The standard of review of the competency of counsel is whether the proceedings, taken as a whole, were a mockery of justice, and whether the defendant received adequate legal representation. Furthermore, there is strong presumption that counsel was competent and convincing evidence is required to rebut that presumption. Henson v. State (1982), Ind., 436 N.E.2d 79.
In contending that his counsel was incompetent at trial, Talley alleges one pre-trial error and four trial errors. First, Talley asserts that his counsel failed to file a notice of alibi prior to trial. Consequently, Terri Pace, an alibi witness, was not allowed to testify in Talley's behalf. The trial record shows that defense counsel called Ms. Pace to the stand and she answered questions regarding Talley's activities on the day of the fires. The State then moved to strike her testimony on the grounds that no alibi notice had been filed. The motion was granted. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, Talley's trial counsel testified that he had interviewed Ms. Pace prior to trial and decided not to file a notice of alibi because she said that Talley left her prior to the time the fire was set. The trial court's subsequent ruling that Ms. Pace was an alibi witness does not render counsel's judgment incompetent. We will not use hindsight or second-guess strategic or tactical decisions in determining whether counsel was competent. Adams v. State (1982), Ind., 430 N.E.2d 771.
Talley also claims that his attorney was incompetent because he failed to object to testimony regarding other fires. At the evidentiary hearing, Talley's trial counsel testified that he allowed the State to introduce evidence of other fires as part of his defense strategy. Decisions made by trial counsel as to strategy and tactics may not show incompetency of counsel despite the fact, in retrospect, those decisions may appear incorrect or may have hurt the defense. Morris v. State (1980), Ind., 409 N.E.2d 608; Jackson v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 54, 339 N.E.2d 557. Likewise, the errors Talley alleges in counsel's failure to prevent the admission of evidence regarding firefighting equipment found in Talley's house, counsel's cross-examination of witnesses and counsel's direct examination of Talley are strategic or tactical decisions which we will not second-guess.
Finally, Talley alleges that his counsel was incompetent because he failed to move for a mistrial after several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Not only could such an omission be considered a tactical decision, but we find, infra, that the prosecutor was not guilty of such misconduct as would require a new trial; therefore Talley was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to object.
The record contains evidence to support the trial court's determination. Talley's privately-retained counsel filed pre-trial motions, prepared for trial, cross-examined the State's witnesses and called and examined six defense witnesses, including Talley himself. In addition, counsel consulted with Talley about his defense. 2
Talley alleges two errors which he claims constitute incompetent counsel on appeal. First, he argues that counsel failed to properly preserve any error regarding Instruction No. 2 by failing to object at trial. Failure to raise an issue on appeal does not, alone, demonstrate incompetent counsel. See Kidwell v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 303, 295 N.E.2d 362. Counsel filed a timely appeal and presented this Court with a timely brief setting forth and arguing several issues. We will not second-guess the strategic decisions made either at trial or on appeal. Greer v. State (1975), 262 Ind. 622, 321 N.E.2d 842.
Second, Talley alleges that counsel failed to properly raise his objection to Instruction No. 3. This Court considered Instruction No. 3 on appeal, so the alleged failure to raise the issue properly does not prove that counsel was incompetent.
There was evidence to support the trial court's determination that Talley's counsel provided competent representation both at trial and on appeal. Therefore, we will not overturn that determination. 3
Talley raises four specific instances in which he contends prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial. 4 Conduct by the prosecutor requires that a conviction be reversed if, first, ...
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