Kiisel v. Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 June 1906
• Citation: 107 N.W. 1027,131 Iowa 54
• Parties: KIISEL ET AL. v. MUTUAL RESERVE LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

131 Iowa 54

107 N.W. 1027

KIISEL ET AL.

v.MUTUAL RESERVE LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 12, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Jasper County; B. W. Preston, Judge.

Action at law to recover upon a policy of life insurance. At the close of the evidence for plaintiffs, there was a directed verdict in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.Clark Varnum and E. C. Ogg, for appellants.

Grimm, Trewin & Moffit, F. L. Kennedy, and C. B. Robbins, for appellee.

BISHOP, J.

The policy in suit was issued to Henry L. Kiisel, and therein Mary O. Kiisel, his wife, and Fred A. Kiisel, his son, are named as beneficiaries. Henry L. Kiisel died May 5, 1902, and Mary O. Kiisel died, intestate, August 12, 1903. In default of payment of the amount of the policy, this action was begun by said Fred A. Kiisel and Eugene Bean, administrator of the estate of Mary O. Kiisel, on August 31, 1903. A copy of the policy is attached to the petition, and therein is contained the requirement that upon death of the insured, proofs shall be furnished the association which “shall comprise evidence satisfactory to the executive committee of the causes and manner of death.” etc. Further, it is therein provided that payment of the amount of the policy shall be made within 90 days after acceptance of proofs. This provision also appears: “No action at law or suit in equity shall be maintained thereon, or recovery had, unless the same is commenced within one year from the date of the death of the insured, any statute of limitation to the contrary notwithstanding.” The defendant appeared and answered, admitting proofs of death furnished by Mary O. Kiisel, as of date June 9, 1902. In a separate count, the limitation clause of the policy was pleaded, and the bar created thereby insisted upon.

The motion for verdict was put upon the single ground that “the cause of action is barred under the conditions of the policy.” We think it should have been overruled. No question is made in argument but that in the absence of a statute to the contrary--and we have no such statute--parties to a life insurance contract may ignore the general statute of limitations and provide by agreement for the time within which an action must be brought to recover upon such contract. But we have repeatedly held that in such cases--as in cases arising under the general statute--the limitation period does not commence to run until a cause of action has accrued; that is, until suit may properly be brought. And this is true notwithstanding the form of words employed in the contract, as in the one before us, is “within one year from the date of death.” McConnell v. Association, 79 Iowa, 757, 43 N. W. 188;Matt v. Association, 81 Iowa, 135, 46 N. W. 857, 25 Am. St. Rep. 483. So too, where by the terms of the contract, it is provided that the insurer shall have a time stated after proofs are filed in which to make payment, a cause of action does not accrue upon the contract until after the expiration of the time agreed upon. McConnell v. Association, supra; Read v. Insurance Co., 103 Iowa, 307, 72 N. W. 665, 64 Am. St. Rep. 180. Now, included in the provisions of the policy in suit, there is no requirement in respect to the time within which proofs of death should be furnished. It is provided, as we have seen, that the insurer should have 90 days after the filing of proofs in which to make payment. This then is the situation; proofs of death were furnished June 9, 1902, and 90 days thereafter a cause of action accrued upon the contract. As this action was commenced August 31,...