Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne, No. 93-3796
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Writing for the Court | SMITH |
Citation | 677 So.2d 855 |
Decision Date | 19 December 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 93-3796 |
Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D19 KILBOURNE & SONS and Nationwide Insurance, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. John KILBOURNE, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Page 855
v.
John KILBOURNE, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
First District.
Page 856
Jack A. Weiss of Conroy, Simberg & Lewis, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
David L. Kahn, Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Page 857
SMITH, Senior Judge.
In this workers' compensation case, the employer/carrier (E/C) appeal and the claimant cross-appeals orders of the Judges of Compensation Claims (JCC). 1 We affirm in part and reverse in part as to the issues on appeal by the E/C. We reverse as to the two issues raised by the claimant on cross-appeal.
The E/C argue for reversal on grounds: (1) that the JCC's finding that the claimant satisfied his initial burden of showing a causal relationship between the loss of earnings and the industrial accident was not supported by competent substantial evidence; (2) that the JCC erred by failing to allow inquiry as to the claimant's knowledge of his obligation to perform a good faith job search when the source of that knowledge is the claimant's attorney; (3) that the JCC erred in ruling that the E/C waived the defense of lack of a good faith job search when the E/C did not specifically state this defense on each of its notices of denial, and (4) that the JCC erred in reserving jurisdiction on attorney's fees in the order on remand when the district court of appeal granted jurisdiction on remand only to determine the permanent impairment rating. We affirm without discussion on issues (1) and (4), and reverse on issues (2) and (3).
On the cross-appeal, the claimant argues for reversal of certain rulings made by the JCC, contending: (1) that the JCC's finding that the maximum medical improvement (MMI) date was November 11, 1992, was not supported by competent substantial evidence, and (2) that the JCC's determination of penalties based on the date the notices of denial were mailed as opposed to the date they were filed with the Division was in error. We reverse as to issues (1) and (2) on the cross-appeal.
Kilbourne, the claimant, while working for Kilbourne & Sons, suffered a potentially compensable industrial accident on November 30, 1990, when a wire bristle from a paint brush flew out and penetrated his left eye. Claimant was treated for his injury by Dr. Litinsky, who diagnosed a 14% impairment because of a decrease in the claimant's depth perception and glaucoma resulting from the puncture wound. Dr. Litinsky released the claimant back to work with "no restrictions" but testified that the claimant's work activities must be tempered by his lack of depth perception.
Claimant testified at the hearing below that prior to the accident he was hired as a salesman and estimator but that he also drove a truck, operated a paint machine, assisted in laying asphalt and concrete, applied sealing coats and assisted in cleaning job sites. Claimant further testified that after his injury he returned to Kilbourne & Sons to call on customers, make estimates and sometimes drive a truck, but was not able to perform the other tasks that were undertaken prior to the accident.
Subsequently, the claimant left his employment with Kilbourne & Sons and moved to North Carolina. Thereafter, the claimant filed wage loss forms. The E/C, in response, filed notices of denial stating, as reasons for denial, that the claimant's wage loss was not due to any compensable injury and that the claimant was released back to work with no restrictions, and any "other defenses which may become known." Upon final hearing before the JCC the E/C challenged the sufficiency of the claimant's job search efforts.
At the claimant's deposition, taken on October 14, 1993, the E/C inquired as to how the claimant became informed of his obligation to fill out wage loss forms and his job search requirement, and whether he was advised by his counsel. The claimant answered that his counsel had informed him of his responsibility. Upon further inquiry by E/C, claimant's counsel objected on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. At an emergency hearing on a motion to compel answers and again at the final hearing, the JCC sustained the objection barring the E/C from inquiring into whether the claimant had adequate notice of his obligation to file wage loss forms.
Page 858
At the final hearing, the claimant argued that the E/C waived its defense of a lack of a good faith job search when it failed to specifically list this defense on each of its notices of denial. The E/C defended on the grounds that the notices of denial stated "any other defense that may become...
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General Motors Corp. v. McGee, No. 4D98-2795
...or the language of a statute, Varner's letter conveyed the lawyer's pre-trial litigation strategy. Cf. Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne, 677 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (finding non-privileged an attorney letter to a client where the attorney merely recited language from a relevant statute);......
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Olvera v. Hernandez Constr. of SW Fla. Inc., No. 1D19-0500
...opinion testimony." Lemmer v. Urban Elec., Inc. , 947 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne , 677 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ). See also Buttrick v. By the Sea Resorts, Inc. , 108 So. 3d 658, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). "Because the question of wh......
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King v. Scotty's Distribution Center, No. 96-3234
...a clear, explicit expression of that fact set forth in medical records or medical opinion testimony." See Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne, 677 So.2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA It is true that Dr. Bellegarrigue testified during his deposition that when he released claimant to the care of Dr. Ibane......
-
Lemmer v. Urban Elec., Inc., No. 1D05-6098.
...and should be based on a clear, explicit expression in the medical records or medical opinion testimony. Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne, 677 So.2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Because the question of whether a claimant has reached MMI is essentially a medical question, it should be answered......
-
General Motors Corp. v. McGee, No. 4D98-2795
...or the language of a statute, Varner's letter conveyed the lawyer's pre-trial litigation strategy. Cf. Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne, 677 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (finding non-privileged an attorney letter to a client where the attorney merely recited language from a relevant statute);......
-
Olvera v. Hernandez Constr. of SW Fla. Inc., No. 1D19-0500
...opinion testimony." Lemmer v. Urban Elec., Inc. , 947 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne , 677 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ). See also Buttrick v. By the Sea Resorts, Inc. , 108 So. 3d 658, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). "Because the question of wh......
-
King v. Scotty's Distribution Center, No. 96-3234
...a clear, explicit expression of that fact set forth in medical records or medical opinion testimony." See Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne, 677 So.2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA It is true that Dr. Bellegarrigue testified during his deposition that when he released claimant to the care of Dr. Ibane......
-
Lemmer v. Urban Elec., Inc., No. 1D05-6098.
...and should be based on a clear, explicit expression in the medical records or medical opinion testimony. Kilbourne & Sons v. Kilbourne, 677 So.2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Because the question of whether a claimant has reached MMI is essentially a medical question, it should be answered......