Kilbourne v. Hanzelik
| Decision Date | 28 February 1983 |
| Citation | 648 S.W.2d 932 |
| Parties | Linda KILBOURNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Fred T. HANZELIK, Administrator of the Estate of Robert L. Hardeman, Deceased, Defendant-Appellee. 648 S.W.2d 932 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
James C. Lee, Chattanooga, for plaintiff-appellant.
Jay B. Stringer, David F. Harrison, Chattanooga, for defendant-appellee.
The appellant, Linda Kilbourne, through her group medical insurance, paid fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) in doctors' and hospital bills incurred by her husband after he was injured while riding as a guest passenger in an automobile. She then sought to recover the medical expenses thus paid by filing suit against the administrator of the deceased driver's estate. It appears that the trial court granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment because of the common law rules absolving a wife from any obligation for providing necessaries, including medical care, for her husband and denying to her a right of action to recover for such necessaries paid by her. The Court of Appeals affirmed and we granted permission to appeal.
The Court of Appeals' decision was based upon an antiquated rule that had as its historical foundation the notion that women were second-class citizens and not entitled to the rights of men. 1 This societal attitude resisted change for hundreds of years because it was elevated to the status of law by common law judges.
"[T]he common law stripped the married woman of many of her rights and most of her property, ... it attempted to partially compensate by giving her the assurance that she would be supported by her husband." Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279, n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 1112, n. 9, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979).
The attitude toward women mentioned above no longer predominates; and, in our view, new justifications for perpetuating the common law rule that wives owe no duty of support to their husbands cannot withstand legal analysis.
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"This was because at common law a married woman was deemed legally incapable of incurring any obligations independent of her husband." McDonald, supra, at 1357.
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"So, as between the parties, the rights of the husband to have contributions from the wife for those items became coequal with those of the wife." McDonald, supra, at 1357.
The Tennessee statute governing awards of alimony has been similarly amended, T.C.A., Sec. 36-820 (Supp.1982) (Ch. 187 and ch. 339, Pub.Acts, 1979). Moreover, we have held that prior to this amendment the statutorily established gender-based discrimination respecting alimony was violative of the equal protection guarantees of both state and federal constitutions. Mitchell v. Mitchell, Tenn., 594 S.W.2d 699 (1980). 2
It is conceded that the doctrine under attack in the case at bar is not a creature of the legislature; nevertheless, it must also be conceded that the discriminatory alimony statutes deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Orr v. Orr, supra, and the rule now under attack have a common ancestor, viz., the common law. That the illegal statutory scheme stricken down in Orr and the rule complained of in the instant case are inextricably linked is revealed in the following passage in Orr:
Orr, supra, 440 U.S. at 279 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. at 1112 n. 9.
To impose liability upon the husband for providing necessaries to his wife while denying such liability of the wife for providing necessaries to her husband not only defies logic and denies justice, it cannot pass constitutional muster under the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions as construed in Orr v. Orr, supra, and Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra.
The Orr decision heralded a re-examination of the rights of married women as established by the common law. See: Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra.
As was stated by the Florida court in McDonald:
"The law is not static. It must keep pace with changes in our society, for the doctrine of stare decisis is not an iron mold which can never be changed.
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We are of the opinion that the position adopted by the Florida court in McDonald is correct and should be established as law in Tennessee. See also: Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Gold, (Pa.) 66 D & C.2d 347 (1979). All prior decisions to the contrary are no longer to be followed as precedent.
We hold that genuine issues as to material facts are disclosed in the record and that plaintiff's claim is not to be...
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...or altered. See Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn.1983) (cause of action for interspousal torts recognized); Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn.1983) (allowing a wife to recover medical expenses paid on behalf of a tortiously injured husband); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739......
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