Kilbreth v. United States

Decision Date17 August 2021
Docket Number1:20 CV 193 ACL
PartiesJOHN KILBRETH, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ABBIE CRITES-LEONI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This action is before the Court on Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 6.) This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff John Kilbreth filed this negligence action against Defendants United States of America, Marty Norman Shelby, and Patti Suzane Shelby, regarding an accident that occurred on January 17, 2018 in Bollinger County, Missouri. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint alleges that Defendant Patti Shelby was a Rural Mail Carrier and employee of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Plaintiff states that Defendant Marty Shelby-Patti Shelby's husband-was operating a 1998 Jeep Cherokee that was clearly marked as a Rural Mail Carrier and was delivering the United States Mail under the direct supervision of Patti Shelby. Plaintiff was operating a 2000 Chevrolet 1500 automobile.

Plaintiff alleges that Marty Shelby turned in front of Plaintiff without warning on a county road while Plaintiff was passing Defendants' vehicle, causing a collision between the two vehicles. He alleges that the collision was caused by the negligence of Marty Shelby, in that Shelby failed to yield the right of way to a vehicle passing him, failed to keep a careful lookout, failed to use the highest degree of care failed to signal his left-hand turn, and turned in front of a passing vehicle when it was unsafe to do so. In Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against the United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“FTCA”). Count II is a state law negligence claim against Marty Shelby. In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a negligence action against Patti Shelby for the negligence of Marty Shelby based on an agency theory.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that he provided written notice of his claim to the United States (via the USPS) on July 3, 2019 pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2675. On June 18, 2020, via certified letter, the USPS denied Plaintiff's claim. The letter stated that [t]he vehicle involved in this accident was not owned by the Postal Service and the driver was not a postal employee.” (Doc. 1 at p. 8.)

On November 10, 2020, the United States filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant argues that, because neither Marty Shelby nor Patti Shelby were federal employees as defined by the FTCA, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars this suit against the United States.

Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to Defendant's Motion, in which he argued that the Shelby Defendants were employees under the FTCA, because the USPS exerted significant control over their conduct. (Doc. 11.) In the alternative, Plaintiff requested that the action be stayed and that the parties be granted limited discovery on the jurisdictional issue. (Doc. 12) The Court granted Plaintiff's alternative motion, and permitted the parties to engage in limited discovery on the issue of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 27.) An Initial Case Management Order was issued, setting forth a schedule for discovery and additional briefing. (Doc. 28.)

After engaging in limited discovery, the parties filed supplemental briefs regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33.)

II. Legal Standards

“[Jurisdiction is a threshold question, [and] judicial economy demands that the issue be decided at the outset rather than deferring it until trial.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1990). “A district court has the authority to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court may consider materials outside the pleaded allegations of the complaint. Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730. Moreover, the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiffs allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Id. “Jurisdictional issues, whether they involve questions of law or of fact, are for the court to decide.” Id. at 729.

III. Facts Related to the Shelby Defendants' Employment

The information contained in this section has been taken from the exhibits attached to the parties' supplemental briefs:

The USPS contracts with independent contractors to provide mail delivery service on behalf of the USPS. (Doc. 7-1 at p. 2.) Under these contracts, the independent contractor provides drivers that deliver mail on certain routes not serviced by USPS City or Rural carrier employees. Id.

Patti Shelby entered into such a contract with the USPS to deliver mail to USPS customers in Zalma, Missouri. Id. at p. 3. Specifically, the USPS entered into a renewal of Contract Delivery Service Route Contract Number 63765 (Contract) with Patti Shelby for a two-year contract term, from April 1, 2017, to March 31, 2019, for the delivery of mail on a route for the Zalma, Missouri Post Office. Id.

Under the Contract, the services provided by Patti Shelby were performed in her capacity as an independent contractor. (Doc. 7-2 at p. 1-2.) Patti Shelby testified in her deposition that she is self-employed. (Doc. 30-1 at p. 18.)

Patti Shelby is referred to by the USPS as a “Contract Supplier, ” as distinguished from a “Rural Carrier, ” which is a USPS employee. (Doc. 30-2 at p. 14.) Both Contract Suppliers and Rural Carriers deliver mail. Id. at p. 17. Patti Shelby, pursuant to the Contract, was required to provide her own vehicle to transport and deliver the mail. (Doc. 7-1 at p. 4; Doc. 7-2 at p. 3.) Some Rural Carriers are provided delivery vehicles by the USPS and others provide their own vehicles. (Doc. 30-2 at p. 14-15.) The USPS requires Rural Carriers to undergo a daily vehicle inspection for safety purposes before they leave the Post Office to deliver mail, whereas it does not require Contract Suppliers to undergo a daily vehicle inspection. Id. at p. 23. The USPS also provides driver training for Rural Carriers, but not for Contract Suppliers. Id. at p. 22. In order to discipline a Rural Carrier, the Postmaster must follow a step-by-step process according to the union contract. Id. The Postmaster is not involved in disciplining or discharging a Contract Supplier. Id. at 26. Contract Suppliers and their hired drivers are not permitted to join the USPS unions. Id.

The Postmaster enters the Rural Carriers' time on a daily basis and at the end of the pay period and submits the time to the district office, so that they are compensated. Id. Rural Carriers are paid by the USPS every other week, and their pay is based on a route evaluation. Id. Patti Shelby is paid once a month under the Contract, based on her negotiated annual rate. (Doc. 301 at p. 19.) The Postmaster is not typically involved in the process of paying Contract Suppliers, other than submitting any claims of extra mileage to a program in Denver to ensure the Contract Supplier receives compensation for that extra mileage. (Doc. 30-2 at p. 28.) When extra mileage is not sought by a Contract Supplier, the Postmaster only “glances at” the Contract Supplier's time sheets. Id.

Under the Contact, Patti Shelby was required to maintain a liability insurance policy for all motor vehicles used in furtherance of the Contract. (Doc. 7-1 at p. 4.) The Contract also provided that Patti Shelby was responsible for all damage to persons or property that occurs as a result of Patti Shelby's omissions or negligence. Id. at p. 6.

At the time of the accident on January 17, 2018, Marty Shelby was an employee of Patti Shelby. (Doc. 7-2 at p. 2.) The Zalma Postmaster had no authority or control over Marty Shelby's schedule, compensation, or benefits, and did not supervise him. Id. Patti Shelby supervised her drivers, including Marty Shelby. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citations omitted). Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States because of sovereign immunity. Barnes v. United States, 448 F.3d 1065, 1066 (8th Cir. 2006). The court may hear the case, however, if the plaintiff shows that the government has unequivocally waived that immunity. Id. The scope of waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. LaFromboise v. Leavitt, 439 F.3d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 2006), citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).

The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for “personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The Act defines Government employees to include “officers or employees of any federal agency ... and persons acting on...

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