Kilian v. Atkinson
Decision Date | 01 August 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 71569-6.,71569-6. |
Citation | 147 Wash.2d 16,50 P.3d 638 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | N. John KILIAN and Lyn Kilian, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. Mitch ATKINSON, in his individual capacity and Jane Doe Atkinson, husband and wife; and the City of Chelan, a municipal corporation, Defendants. |
Paul Burns, Spokane, for Respondents.
Charles Zimmerman, Brian Walker, Wenatchee, for Petitioners.
Bryan Harnetiaux, Debra Stephens, Spokane, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington State Trial Lawyers Association.
Jeffrey Needle, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington Employment Lawyers Association.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, in an action pending in that court, by order dated October 9, 2001, certified to this court one question of state law asking whether an age discrimination claim can be asserted by an independent contractor under RCW 49.60.030. This court accepted certification under the Federal Court Local Law Certificate Procedure Act, RCW 2.60.010-.900, and Washington Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 16.16.
The sole question in this case is the certified question whether an age discrimination claim can be asserted by an independent contractor under RCW 49.60.030.
In this opinion the court is concerned only with a claim of age discrimination in a case pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington.1 Plaintiffs N. John Kilian and Lyn Kilian, husband and wife, were independent contractors who operated a bumper boat business under a concession contract with the City of Chelan (City) from 1984 through 1999.2 The initial contract was for a 10-year period beginning March 1, 1984 and ending February 28, 1994. After 10 years, the Kilians and the City renewed their contract for an additional 5 years. There were successive renewals of the contract until February 10, 2000, when the Chelan City Council voted to deny any further extensions of the contract.
Plaintiffs brought an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their free speech rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; for violation of their free speech rights under Article I, Section 5 of the Washington State Constitution; and for age discrimination in violation of Washington statutes RCW 49.60.030 and RCW 49.44.090. Named as defendants in the suit were Mitch Atkinson, Mayor of the City of Chelan, his wife, Jane Doe Atkinson, and the City of Chelan. The free speech matters, which relate to a claim that Defendant Mitch Atkinson and the Chelan City Council deprived Plaintiffs of their right to speak at a public meeting of the Council on February 10, 2001, are not before this court under the certified question.
With regard to the claims of age discrimination, Plaintiffs contend that when the City denied extension of their contract for the bumper boat concession on February 10, 2000, Plaintiff N. John Kilian was 60 years old and that the City renewed a lease agreement with a go-kart concessionaire who was substantially younger than he. Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Kilian's age was a substantial factor in the City's refusal to renew the bumper boat concession agreement.
By order dated October 9, 2001, the Honorable Alan A. McDonald, presiding over the case in the United States District Court, granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' age discrimination claim under RCW 49.44.090 "based strictly on the applicable law, without regard to the factual record." With regard to the age discrimination claim under RCW 49.60.030, the District Court asked this court to "answer whether an age discrimination claim can be asserted by an independent contractor under that statute." The order concluded that:
....
This court in interpreting a statute ascertains and gives effect to the intent and purpose of the Legislature in creating it.3 If a statute is clear on its face, its meaning is to be derived from the language of the statute alone.4 This court has repeatedly held that an unambiguous statute is not subject to judicial construction5 and has declined to add language to an unambiguous statute even if it believes the Legislature intended something else but did not adequately express it.6 A statute is ambiguous if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way, but it is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable.7 If a statute is ambiguous, this court resorts to principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to assist in interpreting it.8
When a statute is ambiguous, this court must construe the statute in order to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.9 In construing a statute, courts should read it in its entirety,10 instead of reading only a single sentence or a single phrase.11 "`Each provision must be viewed in relation to the other provisions and harmonized, if at all possible....'"12 Statutes must be construed so that all the language is given effect and no portion is rendered meaningless or superfluous.13 The court must also avoid constructions that yield unlikely, absurd or strained consequences.14 Courts may not read into a statute matters that are not in it15 and may not create legislation under the guise of interpreting a statute.16
The Washington law against discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW, under RCW 49.60.010 declares as a civil right the right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a disabled person. Another statute, RCW 49.44.090, prohibits age discrimination in employment, referring to an "individual who is forty years of age or older." (Emphasis added.) The certified question, though, refers specifically and only to RCW 49.60.030, which states, in part, in subsections (1) and (2):
(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability ... is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;
....
(2) Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 ....
(Emphasis added.)
Age is not included in the listing of protected classes under RCW 49.60.030(1). The statute is clear and unambiguous. Its language is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. In Marquis v. City of Spokane, this court, although only in a footnote, observed that the Legislature expressly limited its specification of protected classes in RCW 49.60.030(1) to race, creed, color, national origin, sex, and disability.17 The Legislature refers to age discrimination in employment only in RCW 49.60.180 and RCW 49.44.090.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that on its face RCW 49.60.030 does not include age in its listing of protected classes. They argue that the broad language of RCW 49.60.030(2), which provides a civil cause of action and remedy for persons injured by "any act in violation of this chapter," makes RCW 49.60.030 ambiguous and subject to judicial construction by this court. Relying on the Legislature's stated purpose in RCW 49.60.010, the language in RCW 49.60.020, and this court's decision in Marquis, Plaintiffs urge this court to add "age" to the protected classes listed in RCW 49.60.030(1). Plaintiffs misinterpret both the statute and this court's decision in Marquis.
The Legislature's broad policy statement for chapter 49.60 RCW does not, standing alone, support Plaintiffs' argument that age is included among the protected classes listed in RCW 49.60.030(1). The law against discrimination includes a policy statement proclaiming that discriminatory practices are "a matter of state concern." The Legislature has made it clear that the State has an obligation to eliminate and prevent discrimination because it "menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state."18 Under the heading "Purpose of chapter," RCW 49.60.010 provides, in part, that:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants because of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability ... are a matter of state concern, that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state.
....
(Emphasis added.)
A declaration of policy in a legislative act, however, serves only as an important guide in determining the intended effect of the operative sections.19 In reading the applicable statutes together to determine the legislative intent and to achieve a harmonious...
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Table of Cases
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§ 22.3 Questions of State Law Certified By Federal Court
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