Kilroy v. Mayhew

• Decision Date: 13 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1:11–cv–343.,1:11–cv–343.
• Citation: 841 F.Supp.2d 414
• Parties: Timothy KILROY, Plaintiff, v. Mary MAYHEW, Commissioner, Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

841 F.Supp.2d 414

Timothy KILROY, Plaintiff,

v.Mary MAYHEW, Commissioner, Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

No. 1:11–cv–343.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

Jan. 13, 2012.

Jack B. Comart, Maine Equal Justice, Augusta, ME, for Plaintiff.

Justin B. Barnard, Maine Attorney General's, Tracy A. Quadro, Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

SINGAL, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket # 7) Plaintiff's Complaint. As explained herein, the line of cases starting with Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943), requires that the Court ABSTAIN. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is therefore GRANTED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant moves to dismiss this case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Generally, under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP, 362 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. In the absence of jurisdiction, a court is powerless to act.”). After determining that it in fact has jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court then considers the “legal sufficiency” of a complaint. Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 304 F.Supp.2d 117, 120 (D.Me.2004).

Courts in this circuit have disagreed as to how the general rubric applies in the context of abstention doctrines. See Mass. Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 797 F.Supp.2d 164, 168 n. 2 (D.Mass.2011) (collecting cases involving Younger abstention); see also Burckhart Search Group, Inc. v. Doral Fin. Corp., Civil No. 11–1565(JAF), 2011 WL 6029817, at *3 n. 5 (D.P.R. Nov. 30, 2011). This Court has previously noted that “abstention is a prudential rather than a jurisdictional ground for dismissal,” and, therefore, when considering abstention it does “not rely upon the pleading or burden requirements of either Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6).” See Christian Action Network v. Maine, 679 F.Supp.2d 140, 143 n. 2 (D.Me.2010). In the context of this Motion, the relevant facts in this case are not in dispute nor do the parties dispute the Court's ability to consider the Amended Administrative Hearing Decision attached to Defendant's Motion. See id.;Biddeford Internet Corp. v. Verizon New Eng. Inc., 456 F.Supp.2d 165, 169 (D.Me.2006) (allowing for the consideration of a document attached to a motion to dismiss if the document is: one whose authenticity is not in dispute; an official public record; central to the plaintiff's claims; or sufficiently referred to in the complaint) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the Court proceeds to lay out the factual background.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Timothy Kilroy (“Kilroy”) is a divorced parent of the minor child, C.K.¹ ( See Complaint (Docket # 1) ¶ 1.) Kilroy is also disabled. Plaintiff and his ex-wife, C.K.'s mother (“Ms. Kilroy”), reside separate and apart from each other. ( See id. ¶ 8.) C.K. resides in Plaintiff's house half of the time and in his mother's house half of the time. ( See id. ¶ 9.) Pursuant to a Child Support Order dated December 1, 2001, Plaintiff is required to pay Ms. Kilroy $61.00 per week in child support for C.K. ( See id. ¶ 11.)

Due to his disability, Plaintiff receives disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). ( See id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff's son, C.K., is entitled to SSA dependent benefits in the amount of $844.00 per month. Those benefits are paid directly to Ms. Kilroy from the SSA. ( See id. ¶ 10, 13.) Pursuant to the December 1, 2001 Child Support Order, in any month where the SSA dependent benefits received by Ms. Kilroy for C.K. exceed Plaintiff's total monthly child support obligation, Plaintiff receives a credit for his monthly child support obligation. ( See id. ¶ 12.) However, Plaintiff is not given credit toward past or future child support obligations where the SSA dependent benefits received by Ms. Kilroy in any given month exceed Plaintiff's monthly child support obligation. ( See id.)

Kilroy also receives food assistance benefits under the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) for himself and C.K. ( See id. ¶ 7.) The United States Department of Agriculture has promulgated various regulations with respect to the SNAP program, but responsibility for administering the program in Maine has been delegated to the Maine Department of Health and Human Services (the “Department”) and thus the Department makes individual eligibility determinations and distributes the food assistance benefits to eligible households. ( See id. ¶ 6, 15; 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (e); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4(a), 272.3.) Defendant is the Commissioner of the Department. ( See id. ¶ 6.)

Although the SSA dependent benefits are paid directly to Ms. Kilroy, the Department made a determination that it would include those SSA payments (approximately $844.00 per month) as income in Plaintiff's household for the purpose of calculating food assistance benefits for Plaintiff's household. ( See id. ¶ 15.) As a result of this determination, the food assistance benefits for Plaintiff's household are lower than they would be if the SSA payments to Ms. Kilroy were not counted as household income. The SSA dependent benefits received by Ms. Kilroy on behalf of C.K. are not used to purchase food for Plaintiff's household, nor are they used to pay any of Plaintiff's other household expenses. ( See id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff disagreed with the Department's determination and requested a hearing to appeal the decision. ( See Amended Administrative Hearing Decision (Docket # 7–1) at 1.) On June 22, 2011, a hearing was held to determine whether the Department was correct when it counted C.K.'s SSA benefit as Plaintiff's household income. ( See id.) Following the hearing, on June 29, 2011, the Department issued a Decision affirming the Department's calculation of food assistance benefits for Plaintiff's household. ( See id.) On July 22, 2011, Plaintiff requested that the Hearing Officer amend his Decision on the grounds that (1) the Department had failed to meet its burden in showing that C.K.'s SSA benefit received by Ms. Kilroy is used for C.K.'s benefit, (2) C.K.'s SSA benefit should be treated as excluded income in computing Plaintiff's food assistance benefit amount because a court ordered that C.K.'s SSA benefit be paid to Ms. Kilroy in order to satisfy Plaintiff's child support obligations, and (3) C.K.'s SSA benefit should be considered excluded income as a legally obligated child support payment that is paid to Ms. Kilroy. ( See id. at 2, 4.)

The Hearing Officer re-opened the hearing record and received briefing from Plaintiff and the Department. After reviewing the parties' briefings, the Hearing Officer issued an Amended Decision, which concluded that the Department was correct when it counted C.K.'s SSA benefit as income in computing Plaintiff's food assistance benefits, even though that income is not paid to Plaintiff. The Amended Decision further noted that Maine's food stamp rules—specifically, 10–144–301 Me.Code R. § 555–3(2)—includes Social Security benefits as countable unearned income and that § 555–3(9) states that money legally due a household member but received and used for that household member by a non-household member must be included as countable unearned income. ( See id. at 4.) Meanwhile, under § 555–4(21), legally obligated child support payments made by a household member to or for an individual who is not a household member is excluded from income for the purpose of calculating food assistance benefits. The Hearing Officer ruled that § 555–4(21) did not apply to Plaintiff's case, however, because C.K.'s SSA benefit is his benefit and not his father's benefit. To be excluded as income, the payment must be a payment made by Plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, does not make the SSA benefit payment—the SSA makes the payment. The Hearing Officer agreed with the Department's argument that “[c]rediting the child's entitlement toward Mr. Kilroy's child support does not amount to a child support payment made by Mr. Kilroy, as Mr. Kilroy did not expend his own resources to make that payment.” ( See id. at 5 (internal emphasis omitted).) The Hearing Officer further observed that Mr. Kilroy's “income is not used to pay his child support obligation and [C.K.] is not the Food Stamp household member legally obligated to pay child support even though a portion of his income is used as a credit against the support obligation owed by his father.” ( Id.) The Hearing Officer concluded that C.K.'s “Social Security benefit is used for his care and support and because of that the Food Stamp rules clearly require his Social Security benefit to be used as countable unearned income in computing Mr. Kilroy's Food Stamp benefit.” ( Id.)

Within thirty days of the Hearing Officer's Amended Decision, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking an injunction stating that inclusion of C.K.'s SSA benefit paid to his mother's household is not income for the purpose of calculating Plaintiff's food assistance benefit. In addition, Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendant from reducing Plaintiff's food assistance allotment because of the SSA dependent benefit. Plaintiff also asks that Defendant issue the food assistance benefits Plaintiff would have received but for its allegedly improper benefit calculation methodology. Finally, Plaintiff seeks an award for the cost of this litigation as well as reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

III. DISCUSSION

As the First Circuit has repeatedly emphasized, “federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” See Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol P.R. Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705, 112 S.Ct. 2206, ...