Kim v. State

• Decision Date: 18 September 1980
• Docket Number: No. 6460,6460
• Citation: 616 P.2d 1376,62 Haw. 483
• Parties: James A. KIM, a minor, by Anna Sur, his next friend, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1376

616 P.2d 1376

62 Haw. 483

James A. KIM, a minor, by Anna Sur, his next friend Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 6460.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Sept. 18, 1980.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A defendant in a non-jury trial may move, pursuant to Rule 41(b), H.R.C.P., for a dismissal of the case at the close of plaintiff's evidence on the ground that plaintiff has shown no right to relief upon the facts and the applicable law. The court may determine the facts and award judgment to defendant at this juncture or, at its discretion, action on the motion may be deferred until the close of all evidence.

2. Rule 41(b), H.R.C.P., vests trial courts with power to weigh and evaluate the evidence without special inferences favoring plaintiff, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to determine where the preponderance of evidence lies, and to award judgment on the merits where appropriate.

3. The trial court's authority to grant motions to dismiss should not be exercised indiscriminately, and sound discretion would decree that final judgment on the merits be withheld until the close of all evidence where doubts on the preponderance of evidence remain at the close of plaintiff's case.

4. The State of Hawaii has a duty of reasonably supervising public school students during their required attendance and presence at school.

5. The public school system's duty of reasonable supervision entails general supervision of students, unless specific needs, or a dangerous or a likely to be dangerous situation calls for specific supervision.

6. Conduct within a classroom consisting of giggling, scooting of chairs, whispering, and some gestures by several students was not such that would give rise to a probability of the invasion of the classroom by another student with a proclivity for physical harm.

7. Where findings of fact are rendered by a trial court, Rule 52(a), H.R.C.P., provides they "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."

8. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

9. Where records and related testimony offered as evidence could neither establish nor create a reasonable inference of knowledge on the part of responsible school personnel of what was in the records, the offered evidence was irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in the case.

Edward Y. N. Kim, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.

Howard Gravelle, Jr., Honolulu (Wallace W. Weatherwax, Honolulu, on the brief), Deputy Attys. Gen., for State of Hawaii.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and OGATA, MENOR, LUM and NAKAMURA, JJ. NAKAMURA, Justice.

Plaintiff-Appellant James A. Kim appeals from a judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee State of Hawaii in a negligence action brought under the State Tort Liability Act, HRS Chapter 662. Having examined the record and considered the questions presented but having found no error, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged the State was negligent because it failed to institute adequate measures to protect him from a fellow student's violent attack it should have known was likely to occur. At the close of plaintiff's case in a bench trial, defendant moved to dismiss the action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 41(b), H.R.C.P., which permitted a defendant in a non-jury trial to move for an involuntary dismissal of a case after the presentation of plaintiff's evidence. ¹ The circuit court granted the motion and subsequently entered judgment for defendant. The following issues are raised by plaintiff for our consideration:

1. Whether the circuit court correctly applied Rule 41(b), H.R.C.P., in reviewing plaintiff's evidence, or otherwise stated, whether plaintiff proved a case sufficient to withstand dismissal under the foregoing rule;

2. Whether the court erred in excluding certain records of the Department of Social Services and Housing from evidence; and

3. Whether there was bias in the conduct of the court that deprived plaintiff of a fair trial.

I.

Plaintiff James Kim was a student at Roosevelt High School, a public school in Honolulu with nearly 2,000 students, when the events that gave rise to this action occurred. He was then a student in the tenth grade who had been enrolled in school for only a few weeks. On the mornings of October 2 and 3, 1973, achievement tests were being administered to members of plaintiff's class. On both mornings several students in the classroom engaged in disruptive behavior apparently directed at plaintiff. The teacher undertook to quell the disturbances by remonstrating with the refractory students and by even locking them out of the classroom at one point.

Shortly after 11:00 on the morning of October 3, while students were in the process of completing the tests and leaving for lunch, the teacher became aware the unruly students were now engaged in conversation with someone in the hall outside the classroom. However, she could not see to whom they were talking. Minutes later, a large male student, a newly-enrolled tenth grader the teacher did not know at that time, entered the room and advanced determinedly and aggressively towards plaintiff. ² Concluding she would be unable to cope with the situation alone, the teacher rushed from the classroom to summon the principal and the vice-principal who occupied offices adjacent to her classroom. Meanwhile, the intruding student began to beat plaintiff. The principal and the vice-principal arrived on the scene very shortly thereafter. The efforts of both men were required to overcome the assailant and restore order. By then, plaintiff had sustained serious injuries at the hands of the intruding student.

On September 24, 1974, while still a minor, plaintiff filed this action against the State of Hawaii through Anna Sur, his guardian ad litem. Plaintiff alleged his injuries were a proximate result of defendant's negligence in failing to adequately police, control, and supervise the classroom where plaintiff had been attacked and in otherwise neglecting to adopt measures to ensure his safety.

II.

Plaintiff initially contends the trial court misapplied Rule 41(b) in granting defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal. He argues the court placed undue emphasis on plaintiff's testimony, which it discounted in part, and that it "overlooked" other testimony. In short, he implies the circuit court weighed the evidence and failed to view it, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to plaintiff. In his opinion, the trial court's application of the rule, following the interpretation given Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., by the federal courts, was at odds with the more enlightened approach of some state courts and with relevant Hawaii precedent. He also argues the motion should have been denied under any circumstance because there was a preponderance of evidence substantiating a right to relief even under the federal test. We do not find the arguments persuasive on either score.

A.

A defendant in a non-jury trial may move, pursuant to Rule 41(b), H.R.C.P., for a dismissal of the case at the close of plaintiff's evidence on the ground that plaintiff has shown no right to relief upon the facts and the applicable law. When the motion is interposed at what ordinarily is a trial's mid-point, the court may determine the facts and award judgment to defendant at this juncture. Or at its discretion, action on the motion may be deferred until the close of all evidence. The rule is an exactly-worded counterpart of Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The pertinent federal rule as originally adopted in 1938 did not define a judge's function when a motion for involuntary dismissal was made at the close of plaintiff's evidence in a non-jury trial. ³ The ambiguity resulted in conflicting interpretations within the federal judiciary. In several circuits, namely the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth, the Courts of Appeals adopted a view that the judge as the trier of facts could weigh the evidence and award judgment on the merits. Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 148 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1945); Gary Theatre Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 120 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1941); Young v. United States, 111 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1940). The Courts of Appeals of the Third and Fourth Circuits, on the other hand, held the judge's role on such a motion paralleled his limited function on a motion for directed verdict in a jury trial, i. e., to decide whether plaintiff's evidence, viewed in the most favorable light, was sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mason 115 F.2d 548 (3rd Cir. 1940); Whitley v. Powell, 159 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1946).

The conflict among the circuits was resolved through an amendment of the rule in 1948 when the following language was added:

In an action tried by the court without a jury the court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a).

This left little doubt on which view prevailed. That a judge considering a motion for involuntary dismissal in a non-jury trial was expressly endowed thereby with authority to weigh and determine the evidence and to render a judgment on the merits was unmistakably clear. If doubt remained, an examination of the Advisory Committee's Note, specifically stating that the view of the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits was incorporated in the amendment, would have dispelled any uncertainty. ⁴ Rule 41(b), H.R.C.P., was adopted after this pointed alteration of the...