Kimball Hill Homes Texas, Inc., In re

Decision Date07 May 1998
Docket NumberNo. 14-98-00043-CV,14-98-00043-CV
Citation969 S.W.2d 522
PartiesIn re KIMBALL HILL HOMES TEXAS, INC. and Kimball Hill, Inc, Relators. (14th Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

S. Tanner Garth, R. Paul Yetter, Houston, for Appellees.

Before YATES, AMIDEI and FOWLER, JJ.

OPINION

YATES, Justice.

This mandamus proceeding involves a suit for damages brought by several hundred homeowners in the Houston area against Kimball Hill Homes Texas, Inc. and Kimball Hill, Inc., ("Kimball Hill") and Houston Lighting and Power ("HL & P"). Kimball Hill is the relator. It claims the trial court abused its discretion by not abating the case under the Residential Construction Liability Act ("the RCLA"). 1 See TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 27.004 (Vernon Supp.1998). We conditionally grant the writ.

On October 29, 1997, the homeowners, the real parties in interest, filed their first amended original petition and petition for intervention against relators and Houston Lighting and Power ("HL & P"). 2 The homeowners allege that Kimball Hill misrepresented the quality, craftsmanship and energy efficiency of their homes and that their homes were constructed with "substandard workmanship, poor quality materials and virtually no craftsmanship." The homeowners asserted causes of action for conspiracy, common law fraud, statutory fraud in a real estate transaction, breach of contract and breach of warranty. On November 26, 1997, Kimball Hill filed a verified motion to abate the case under section 27.004(c) of the RCLA. Kimball Hill also filed an answer and special exceptions "subject to" their abatement motion. On December 9, 1997, the parties appeared for a hearing on the entry of a docket control order. That hearing was passed after Kimball Hill raised the abatement issue. On December 15, 1997, the homeowners filed a second amended petition, dropping their breach of contract and breach of warranty claims and adding sixty-two additional homeowners as intervenors. They also filed a brief in opposition to Kimball Hill's motion to abate in which they asserted the RCLA was inapplicable. Kimball Hill and HL & P in turn filed briefs re-urging abatement under the RCLA. Following a hearing on December 17, 1997, the trial court concluded that the homeowners did not plead a cause of action under the RCLA and denied Kimball Hill's motion to abate. On January 14, 1998, Kimball Hill filed this petition for writ of mandamus.

We must first determine whether the denial of a motion to abate under the RCLA is appropriate for review by mandamus. Mandamus relief is available if the trial court violates a duty imposed by law or abuses its discretion in resolving factual issues or in determining legal principles when there is no other adequate remedy by law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992). A trial court abuses its discretion if "it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985). When alleging that a trial court abused its discretion in its resolution of factual issues, the party must show the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision. Id. at 918. As to determination of legal principles, an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court clearly fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

Mandamus is intended to be an extraordinary remedy, only available in limited circumstances "involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that may be addressed by other remedies." Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex.1989). The Texas Supreme Court has held that incidental rulings by the trial court are generally not subject to review by mandamus because those rulings can be adequately reviewed on appeal. See Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566-67 (Tex.1985). Where the trial court's order is void, however it is unnecessary for the relator to show it pursued other available remedies and mandamus will issue. See South Main Bank v. Wittig, 909 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex.App.--Houston [14 th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding). Here, Kimball Hill contends abatement was automatic because its verified motion to abate was not timely controverted. See TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 27.004(d). Because the order denying its motion to abate was signed during the automatic abatement, Kimball Hill contends it was void. If Kimball Hill is correct, it is unnecessary for it to show that an appeal is inadequate. Even if Kimball Hill is required to make such a showing, however, we conclude it does not have an adequate remedy by appeal.

In Permanente Medical Ass'n v. Johnson, 917 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.App.--Ft. Worth 1996, orig. proceeding), the court granted mandamus relief to the defendant when the trial court failed to abate the case under the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act. See TEX.REV.CIV. STAT ANN. ART. 4590i § 4.01 (Vernon Supp 1998). Stating that "issuance of writs of mandamus is limited to those instances in which no adequate remedy by appeal exists," the court held that "when a plaintiff fails to give the statutory notice that is a prerequisite to filing suit and a defendant's timely request for an abatement is denied, that defendant is entitled to seek review of the court's denial by mandamus." See id. (citing Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex.1992)). This Court recently followed Hines and Permanente in America Online, Inc. v. Williams, 958 S.W.2d 268, 271-72 (Tex.App.--Houston [14 th Dist] 1997, no writ), where we held the trial court erroneously certified a class during the mandatory abatement period under the DTPA.

Like the DTPA and article 4590i, the RCLA has a notice provision that is a mandatory prerequisite to filing suit. See Hines, 843 S.W.2d at 469; see also Trimble v. Itz, 898 S.W.2d 370, 373-74 (Tex.App.--San Antonio), writ denied, 906 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.1995). The purpose of the notice requirement is to encourage pre-suit negotiations to avoid the expense of litigation. Trimble, 898 S.W.2d at 374. Forcing Kimball Hill to trial without reviewing the propriety of an abatement under the RCLA will deprive Kimball Hill of the opportunity to inspect the homes, make a reasonable settlement offer and present a defense to damages based on such an offer. See TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 27.004(a), (b), (f). Even Abor does not foreclose mandamus review of incidental rulings "when the district court fails to observe a mandatory statutory provision conferring a right or forbidding a particular action." 695 S.W.2d at 567. An appeal will be an inadequate remedy where a party's ability to present a defense at trial is vitiated or severely compromised by the trial court's error. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843. Here, Kimball Hill's defense to the suit is compromised if the trial court failed to observe the mandatory notice provision under the RCLA. Therefore, an appeal is inadequate and review by mandamus is appropriate. We now address the application of the RCLA.

The RCLA applies to "any action to recover damages resulting from a construction defect." TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 27.002(a). "A construction defect" means "a matter concerning the design, construction or repair of a new residence ... on which a person has a complaint against a contractor" and "may include physical damage to the residence ... proximately caused by a construction defect." Id. at § 27.001(2). A claimant seeking damages arising from a construction defect must give the contractor written notice of the defect sixty days before filing suit. See TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 27.004(a). If the claimant fails to give the required notice, the trial court, after a hearing, must abate the suit. See id. at § 27.004(d). The suit is automatically abated without court order on the eleventh day after the date a verified plea in abatement is filed, if the claimant does not file a controverting affidavit before the eleventh day. See id.

Kimball Hill argues the RCLA applies because the real parties' first and second amended petitions allege construction defects. The real parties, on the other hand, argue the RCLA does not apply because they allege only fraud based on pre-construction misrepresentations made by Kimball Hill and HL & P about the quality of their homes. They note that their pleadings do not even mention the RCLA. Nevertheless, we conclude their pleadings are sufficient to trigger the RCLA.

In O'Donnell v. Roger Bullivant of Texas, Inc., 940 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.App.--Ft. Worth 1997, writ denied), the plaintiffs sued their contractor for faulty foundation repairs to their home. The plaintiffs asserted causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, product liability, breach of warranty, breach of contract and violation of the DTPA. Id. As in this case, the plaintiffs did not plead the RCLA, but sought a declaratory judgment that the RCLA did not limit their claims. Id. at 413-14. The trial court instead granted summary judgment for the contractor and denied the plaintiffs' counter-motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs' suit was governed by the RCLA. Id. Thus, while the plaintiffs never pled the RCLA, the court of appeals held the RCLA applied. Likewise, in Trimble, an insurance company asserted causes of action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and violation of the DTPA. 898 S.W.2d at 371. Although the RCLA was never pled, the trial court sanctioned the insurance company in part for failing to give notice under the RCLA. Id. In reversing the sanctions order, the court of appeals also applied the RCLA and held that the proper remedy for failure to give notice under the statute is abatement, not sanctions. Id. at 373-74. Thus, the failure of the real parties to plead the RCLA does preclude its application where appropriate.

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